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The Winn family were landowners with estates at Nostell in Yorkshire and Appleby in 
Lincolnshire. Their property was mainly agricultural but included a small colliery on the 
Yorkshire estate. In the late 1850s the Winns’ land was heavily mortgaged and the 
family was in financial difficulty. The thesis centres on the successful efforts led by 
Rowland Winn (1820-1893), elder son of the landowner Charles (1795-1874), to restore 
the estates’ financial ‘equilibrium through the exploitation of their mineral resources. 
Edmund Winn (1830-?1908), Rowland’s younger brother, supported him in these 
endeavours, as did George Winn (1863-1952), Rowland’s fourth son. 
 
The thesis places the Winn family in the context of the mid-nineteenth century 
landowning class, with particular reference to their characteristic attitudes to the 
preservation, management and economic development of landed property. The Winns’ 
previous experience in mining is linked to their plan for a new and larger colliery at 
Nostell, which they considered the best opportunity for increasing the income from their 
estates. This plan was overtaken by the discovery of ironstone on the Lincolnshire 
property, and the thesis investigates the Winns’ rationale for leasing the stone rather 
than mining it on their own account. The ironstone generated a rapid and growing 
income and, building on this success, the Winns sank a new colliery at Nostell that 
opened in 1866.  
 
Unlike the ironstone, the colliery was directly financed and managed by the 
Winn family, who took on the full capital risk of the venture. The thesis investigates the 
sources of the colliery capital, and considers the running of the colliery between 1866 
and 1914 from the perspectives of accounting policy, transport and logistics, marketing 
and management. It concludes that in establishing and running the colliery the Winn 
family combined the characteristic and in some ways contrasting approaches to 
entrepreneurialism and management of the landowning class, and of the personal 
capitalists who dominated contemporary British industry. The conclusion challenges the 
suggestion that the mid-late nineteenth century landowning class had an inherent dislike 
of all forms of industry. The thesis also attempts to contribute to the knowledge of the 
evolution of marketing and management in the Victorian and Edwardian coal industry.  
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This thesis examines aspects of the coal mining industry in west Yorkshire, 1850-1914, 
and centres on a case study of the collieries owned and operated by the Winn family on 
their estate at Nostell near Wakefield. It also addresses the discovery and early 
exploitation of ironstone on their land in Lincolnshire. The Winns’ mineral businesses 
are placed in the context of the family’s status as landowners, and the thesis considers, 
inter alia, the financing, management and marketing strategies employed in the Winns’ 
mining interests. This chapter outlines the archival sources that underpin the thesis and 
the use of case study methodology. It also introduces the thesis’s main themes.  To 
begin, a short introduction to the Winn family would be appropriate. 
The Winns: the family and its property  
 
NB: Appendix 1 includes a Winn family tree and short biographies of the main 
participants; Appendix 2 is a glossary of locations and significant dates; Appendix 3 is 
a map of the Winn estates, railways and population centres. 
 
The Nostell estate is located seven miles south east of Wakefield on the main road to 
Doncaster, and has been owned by the Winns since 1654. The house on the estate is 
named Nostell Priory because it is built near the site of a religious foundation that was 
closed during the dissolution of the monasteries. The Priory was built in the mid-
eighteenth century by Sir Rowland Winn, 4th baronet, and its interior was designed by 
Robert Adam. For much of the nineteenth century, Nostell was owned by Charles Winn 
(1795-1874) who inherited the estate in 1817, succeeded by his son Rowland (1820-
1893) to whom the property passed on Charles’ death. The Winns also owned land and 
a house at Appleby in Lincolnshire, where Rowland lived prior to his inheritance of the 
entire property. Subsequently Charles’ widow and unmarried daughters resided there. 
Charles Winn was a clergyman, collector and antiquary. Rowland, the elder of 
Charles’ two sons, had – aside from his industrial activities - a successful political 
career, serving as Member of Parliament for North Lincolnshire from 1868 to 1885. He 
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became Conservative Chief Whip and a Lord of the Treasury, and was created the first 
Baron St Oswald in 1885. His younger brother Edmund (1830-c1908) was active in the 
family’s industrial interests and was treasurer of the West Riding from 1868 to 1889. 
The second Lord St Oswald, also Rowland (1857-1919), inherited the estate and title 
from his father in 1893. Nostell Priory was given to the National Trust in 1954 but is 
lived in by the current Lord St Oswald. 
Coal has been mined at Nostell since at least the sixteenth century. In the early 
1830s the Winns sank a new colliery at Wragby, a village on the estate. The colliery 
was quite small, raising 10-15,000 tons p.a. and contributing modestly to the Winns’ 
income, over 90 per cent of which then came from agricultural sources. In the late 
1850s the Winns suffered a financial crisis that required them to increase the income 
from their estates. Their first thought was that the coal at Nostell could be exploited to 
greater effect, but in 1858 Rowland discovered ironstone on the Lincolnshire estate. 
Quarrying of the stone began in 1859-1860 and the Winns become prime movers in the 
foundation of the iron and steel industry in the Scunthorpe area. The ironstone 
generated a cash flow that greatly eased the Winns’ financial problems and quite soon 
the preponderant proportion of estate income came from minerals. To support their 
mining interests, the Winns promoted the West Riding and Grimsby Joint Railway 
(WR&GJR) from Doncaster to Wakefield, and the Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby 
Railway (TA&GR) in Lincolnshire. Both these railways opened in 1866. The success of 
the ironstone relegated coal to a less financially crucial role, but between 1864 and 1866 
a new colliery, named after the estate, was sunk a short distance from the Priory. Nostell 
Colliery began production in 1866, a few months after the opening of the WR&GJR 
that linked it to the national railway network. The pit at Wragby closed in 1869. Nostell 
Colliery’s shafts, originally 140 yards in depth and cutting the Shafton seam, raised 50-
60,000 tons p.a. and were deepened to the Winter and Beamshaw beds in the mid-
1880s. Average annual production rose to 200,000 tons after the deepening of the 
shafts. Until 1918, when a private limited company was formed, the colliery was the 
direct personal property of the estate owner. Edmund Winn managed the colliery on the 
family’s behalf until 1888 when he was succeeded by his nephew George (1863-1952), 
the fourth of Rowland’s five sons. George Winn remained managing director of the 






The bedrock of the thesis is the Nostell papers deposited in the West Yorkshire 
Archives Service. The papers comprise a large body of material relating to all aspects of 
the estate and the Winn family’s affairs, including the coal and ironstone. So far as can 
be ascertained, the Nostell collection has not previously been used as the basis for 
academic research of the Winns’ industrial interests. The records relating to coal are 
split between the Nostell Priory and Nostell Colliery collections, and date from the 
eighteenth century to the 1950s when the Nostell Colliery Company was wound up after 
nationalisation.1 They include runs of production, financial and sales data, some for 
extended periods. The statements of costs cover 1869 to 1914, virtually the entire pre-
First World War life of Nostell Colliery, and there are also long runs of the six-monthly 
profit/loss accounts and balance sheets.2 Financial, production and sales information on 
the Winns’ coal interests is therefore plentiful, but different sources for the same period 
quite often do not easily align. For example, a notebook probably produced as an aide 
memoire for Charles and Rowland Winn is a concise source of production and financial 
figures for the years 1854 to 1875.  However, the data in it are difficult to reconcile with 
the General Financial Statements ledger for the period, although ostensibly they convey 
the same information. In such cases the figures have been taken that are the most 
consistent with related corroborative evidence.  
The correspondence between members of the Winn family and with their 
employees, suppliers and customers is especially important to the thesis as there are no 
minutes of business meetings relating to the coal and indeed no evidence that any such 
formal meetings ever took place. For the most part, there are no collections of letters 
relating wholly to coal.3 Up to the First World War, the colliery was managed as an 
element of the estate owner’s personal property, and policy matters were resolved in an 
informal manner. Decisions relating to the colliery were made by members of the Winn 
family in private discussion or letters and not officially recorded. References to coal in 
letters between family members are sometimes plentiful but are usually scattered among 
a wide range of other subjects: domestic gossip, political and church affairs, general 
estate matters, the Lincolnshire ironstone and contemporary news items. It is unusual 
                                                
1 The collection references are WYL1352 and WYL523 respectively. 
2 Many of the runs of pre-1914 records continue well into the twentieth century. The statements of costs, 
for example, only terminate at nationalisation. 
3 The exceptions are two of George Winn’s letter books covering the early 1890s and from 1906 to the 
First World War, and a bundle of letters relating to the Carlton project mentioned later in this paragraph. 
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for both sides of a correspondence to be preserved, and the survival of letters is patchy 
over time. For example, there are over one hundred letters on Edmund Winn’s attempt 
to finance a colliery at Carlton in south Yorkshire during the 1850s, and events at 
Nostell Colliery in the 1880s are well covered, but correspondence relating to the early 
and mid 1870s is limited. Where possible, the evidence from letters has been 
supplemented from diaries and other subjective personal material.  
The survival of such a large body of documentation is unusual for a nineteenth 
century colliery. Such enterprises were often owned by companies whose business was 
exclusively, or largely, coal mining. When they ceased to raise coal the companies lost 
their key purpose and were liquidated, and their records were disposed of rather than 
retained by a continuing organisation. This was particularly true for colliery companies 
that survived until nationalisation.4 Nostell Colliery’s records formed part of the estate 
muniments, and therefore were preserved as part of the wider enterprise. The 
importance of this to the structure of the thesis is discussed later in this chapter. 
Themes of the thesis 
 
The first theme of the thesis relates to the socio-cultural mores of the landowning class 
in mid to late Victorian Britain, and in particular to its attitudes to the economic 
exploitation of landed property. A contrast is provided by the alternative attitudes to the 
achievement and maintenance of economic gain that were held by personal capitalists, 
the owner-managers who dominated Britain’s industry in the Victorian and Edwardian 
eras.5 An assessment is then possible of the extent to which the Winns applied 
conventional landowning attitudes to solving their financial difficulties by exploiting 
their mineral resources, or whether they were influenced by the conventions of personal 
capitalism. Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis begin this process by placing the Winns in the 
context of the landowning class. 
 Landowners constituted the social élite in mid-Victorian Britain, a status that 
was based primarily on their landed property. They also figured largely in the political 
leadership of the country, and took a prominent place in many sectors of its civil 
administration. In the mid nineteenth century there was a high proportion of landowners 
                                                
4 M. Dintenfass, Managing Industrial Decline: Entrepreneurship in the British Coal Industry between the 
Wars (Columbus, 1992), p. 8; M. W. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry, 1870-1946: a Political and 
Economic History (London, 1977), p. 5. 
5 R. Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial Revolution (London, 
1998), p. 84. 
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in Parliament, and they dominated some branches of local government – especially 
those outside the industrial cities – including the Justices’ benches and the county 
Quarter Sessions.6 Chapter 2 of the thesis begins by establishing the Winns’ credentials 
as landowners against the delineations of the class made by Cannadine and F. M. L. 
Thompson.7 By these criteria the Winn family of the 1850s enjoyed property and 
income that indicate a status on the cusp of the small to medium categories of 
landowner. They also took a place in political life and civil administration at a level 
appropriate to a family that was well established but not prominent in the counties in 
which it owned property.  
 Historians writing on the nineteenth century agree that a major objective of 
contemporary landowners was to maintain their influence and standing in society.8 
Because land was essential to this, the landowning class adopted a number of strategies 
to protect its property. These included conventions and legal constructs that enabled 
property to be transmitted entire between generations, and to be safeguarded from 
despoliation in a single generation through ill luck or poor management. The chief 
among these devices were male primogeniture and the strict settlement, under which the 
property was settled on a direct masculine inheritor as tenant subject to conditions that 
attempted to restrain his ability to dispose of land or excessively burden it with debt. 
However, each generation was also encouraged to enhance the property by expansion or 
improvement of its size, amenities or economic activities. In order to achieve this 
objective, and to make provision for the support of family members other than the 
inheritor, some ability for the tenant to raise funds was necessary, and many mid-
Victorian estates were heavily in debt.9 The conclusion of the analysis in Chapter 2 of 
the Winns’ approach to their property is that they conformed to landowner behavioural 
                                                
6 W. L. Burn, Age of Equipoise (London, 1968), pp. 261-262; D. C. Coleman, ‘Gentlemen and Players’, 
Economic History Review, 2nd sr., 26 (1972), pp. 92-116, this ref. p. 98 (quotation); D. Spring, The 
English Landed Estate in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, 1963), p. 119; D. Cannadine, The Decline 
and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London, 1996), p. 14. 
7 Cannadine, Decline and Fall, pp. 8-16, and F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society and 
Gentrification and the Enterprise Culture: Britain, 1780-1980 (Oxford, 2001), passim. 
8 References include H. J. Habakkuk, H, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System: English Landownership 
1650-1950 (Oxford, 1994), G. E. Mingay, Land and Society in England, 1750-1980 (London, 1994), D. 
Spring, The English Landed Estate and ‘English Landed Society in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century’, Economic History Review vol. 17 no. 1 (1964), pp. 146-153; Cannadine, Decline and Fall,  F. 
M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1963); L. & J. C. Stone, An 
Open Elite? England 1540-1880 (Oxford, 1986). 
9 Stone, An Open Elite?, pp.72-74, 266; Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 66-68; C. J. Napier, 
'Aristocratic Accounting: the Bute Estate in Glamorgan 1814-1880', Accounting and Business Research, 
vol. 21 no. 82 (1991), pp. 163-174; this ref. p. 164; Spring, D., ‘The English Landed Estate in the Age of 
Coal and Iron: 1830-1880’, Journal of Economic History vol. 11 no. 1 (Winter 1951), pp. 3-24,; this ref. 
p. 15. 
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norms, and were intensely aware of their estates’ vital importance in maintaining the 
family’s status and way of life. The property was passed between generations through 
processes that were similar to those employed by other landowners, and it was subject 
to strict settlement. The Winns’ attempts to improve their property and to live in the 
style appropriate to their status resulted, however, in a significant level of mortgage and 
bank debt. 
 A more contentious historiographical issue than the landowning class’s desire to 
maintain and advance its status, is its attitude to the development of industry on its 
estates. Up to the early nineteenth century, landowners whose property held appropriate 
resources – especially minerals – invested directly in industrial development. This was 
usually in primary industry like mining and metal smelting; very few landowners were 
involved in manufacturing except in the supply of land and access to coal or water 
power for factories. Most landowners’ investment in industry was restricted to the 
development of their own property, rather than through the seizure of industrial 
opportunities irrespective of location. A landowner might finance and operate a colliery 
or ironworks on his estate, but was unlikely to own a similar operation located on other 
people’s property. From the first quarter of the nineteenth century onwards, many 
landowners withdrew from direct investment in mining and other industry and preferred 
to lease mineral seams under their land for exploitation by capitalist entrepreneurs.10 
Some historians have attributed this trend to an endemic distaste for industry, which 
culminated in a general withdrawal to a rentier, essentially parasitic, status.11 The Winn 
family, however, retained ownership of Wragby Colliery into the 1850s, and, as is 
demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, when they came under financial pressure at the end 
of that decade, their thoughts turned to the mineral resources under their land – indeed, 
Rowland Winn made successful efforts to prove the presence of iron under their 
Lincolnshire estate in addition to the Yorkshire coal. The alternative interpretation of 
the landowners’ withdrawal from industry centres partly on evidence that the 
withdrawal was not as complete as depicted, and mainly on the argument that it was the 
result of the increasing scale, complexity and risk of industrial entrepreneurship. Direct 
                                                
10 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 263-265. P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An 
Economic History of Britain 1700-1914 (London, 1983), p. 107; P. Hudson, The Industrial Revolution 
(London, 1992), pp. 92-93; J. T. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth Century England 
(Oxford, 1974), pp. 42-43; D. Spring, ‘English Landowners and Nineteenth-Century Industrialism’, in 
Ward, J. T., and Wilson, R. G. (eds), Land and Industry: The Landed Estate and the Industrial Revolution 
(Newton Abbot, 1971), pp. 16-62, this ref. p. 21. 
11 For example Coleman, ‘Gentlemen and Players’, A. Offer, The First World War (Oxford, 1989) and 
Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Cambridge, 1981). 
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investment in a wholly-owned industrial enterprise on their property was simply beyond 
the resources of most landowners, who preferred to secure a reliable and predictable 
income through the lease of mineral seams and land for industrial development.12  
 This thesis contends that although most landowners in the mid-nineteenth 
century became rentiers of the minerals and other industrial resources on their estates, 
rather than direct participants in their exploitation, this was not a universal trend. It 
argues that the Winn family were enthusiastic and proactive industrialists, evidenced by 
their ownership and direct management of the colliery at Nostell throughout the period 
1866-1914, and by the leading role they took in establishing their ironstone business. In 
addition, the thesis suggests that the entrepreneurial and ‘hands-on’ approach taken by 
the Winns to their industrial ventures combined elements of the characteristic attitudes 
of both the landowning class and the personal capitalists found extensively among 
British industrialists. There was therefore no clear-cut dichotomy between the attitudes 
and behaviours towards industry of landowners and of middle-class entrepreneurs.  
These conclusions cast doubt on the intensity of the disdain of the landowning 
class for industry, which Wiener has argued in English Culture and the Decline of the 
Industrial Spirit, 1850-1950 was sufficiently strong to damage the entrepreneurial drive 
that had made Britain the first industrialised nation. There are extensive literatures on 
both Britain’s industrial performance in the period 1840-1914, of which coal mining 
was a key component, and on the cultures of nineteenth century landed and business 
classes. On the industrial side, the writing highlights the decline of British industry in 
relation to the performance of other countries, particularly the USA and Germany, in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and up to the First World War, and to the alleged 
parts played in this by a number of factors: an adherence to family ownership of 
companies, a reluctance to modernise and innovate (among other entrepreneurial 
failures), and an anti-business bias in British culture. The coal industry, despite its 
apparent success – production reached an all-time high in 1913, when Britain was the 
world’s largest exporter – has not escaped criticism of its performance during this 
period.13 With regard to the socio-cultural aspects of Britain in the Victorian era, the 
                                                
12 F. M. L. Thompson argues these points particularly strongly in Gentrification and the Enterprise 
Culture. 
13 Criticisms include those relating to transport (through the use of small coal wagons), failures to 
introduce mechanisation for specific processes and to integrate process mechanisation into high 
throughput technologies, entrepreneurial shortcomings including a reluctance to rationalise the units of 
production, and a decline in effort and therefore output by coalface workers. Critical references include 
A. J. Taylor, ‘Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry, 1850-
1914’, Economic History Review 14 (Aug. 1961), pp. 48-70, and ‘The Coal Industry’ in D. H. Aldcroft, 
The Development of British lndustry and Foreign Competition (London, 1968); Rhodri Walters, ‘Labour 
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literature focuses on the social, economic and political primacy of the landed classes, its 
rapid decline in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the degree to which 
the landed and business classes were integrated, and the wider influence of attitudes 
towards industry and commerce by landowners. The alleged effect of the latter on the 
national economy gave rise to an extended academic debate in the 1980s and 1990s.14  
The remaining four themes that the thesis addresses are in some degree related. 
They are concerned with the management and operation of collieries in the second half 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The themes focus on management 
structures and the development of technical expertise and functional specialisms within 
management; on the marketing and sale of coal; transport and logistics; and the 
accounting processes that recorded the outcomes of these activities.   
The development of management in the coal industry has received relatively 
little attention from historians, particularly when compared with the extensive literature 
on trade unionism and labour relations.15 Chapter 7 of the thesis is intended to 
contribute evidence from Nostell to the study of colliery management. Management in 
the coal industry has its origins in the landed estates by which many early collieries 
were owned and operated - for example, the use of the words ‘agent’ and ‘steward’ for 
managerial posts, and the division of management responsibility by geography rather 
than technical specialism.16 From the early nineteenth century and particularly after the 
railway network began to take shape, the market for coal greatly expanded in 
geographical and volume of output. Larger, deeper and more technically complex 
collieries were established as shallow seams became exhausted and high volume 
                                                
Productivity in the South Wales Steam Coal Industry, 1870-1914’, Economic History Review, 28 (May 
1975), pp. 280-303; N. K. Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry (London, 
1978); C. P. Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1964), and B. T. Hirsch, and W. J. Hausman, ‘Labour Productivity in the British and South Wales Coal 
Industry, 1874-1914’, Economica vol. 50 (May1983), pp. 145-59. McCloskey, Church, Dintenfass and 
others have argued that these criticisms are overstated. 
14 References include Thompson, Gentrification and the Enterprise Culture; W. D. Rubinstein, ‘Cultural 
Explanations for Britain’s Economic Decline’, in B. Collins and K. Robbins (eds.), British Culture and 
Economic Decline (London, 1990), and Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain, 1750-1990 (London, 
1993); Wiener, English Culture; Coleman, ‘Gentlemen and Players’; K. Robbins, ‘British Culture versus 
British Industry’, in Collins and Robbins, British Culture and Economic Decline, pp. 1-24; T. Nicholas, 
‘Clogs to Clogs in Three Generations? Explaining Entrepreneurial Performance in Britain since 1850’, 
Journal of Economic History vol. 59 no. 3 (Sept. 1999) pp. 688-713. 
15 This point has been made over the years; for example in H. L. Beales, ‘Studies in Bibliography: IV. 
The ‘Basic’ Industries of England, 1850-1914,’ The Economic History Review vol. 5 no. 2 (April 1935), 
pp. 99-112; this ref. p. 102; R. G. Neville and J. Benson, ‘Labour in the coalfields (II). A select 
bibliography’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History 31 (1975), p. 49, and A. Perchard, 
The ‘Black Jock’ Manager? Mine Management Professionals in the Scottish Coal Industry, 1911-1967, 
paper presented at the Economic History Conference, University of Nottingham, 28-30 March 2008.  
16 S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (London, 1965), pp. 23 and 29. 
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production required the exploitation of economies of scale.17 The market for coal 
became segmented by the uses to which it was put, and the number of product variants 
increased. New sales channels developed. The regional coal markets that resulted from 
the near ubiquity of the railway were highly price-competitive, and the industry was 
prone to cyclical booms and slumps. From the 1850s onwards, legislation came into 
force to improve safety and disseminate best practice, and regulation of management by 
government took shape. The Coal Mines Act of 1872 required that certain management 
required technical qualifications and assigned specific responsibilities to designated 
posts.18 
To successfully manage the pressure of these developments required managerial 
and technical expertise of various types within the enterprise. Colliery management 
structures broke away from the landed estate model and typically developed a tripartite 
pattern consisting of the owner or his representative, a consultant engineer (‘viewer’) 
and the resident manager. Engineering and technical departments usually reported to the 
manager, and sales to the owner.19 Chapter 7 traces the development of management at 
Nostell Colliery. In its early days the Colliery’s management was closely allied to the 
estate, and several managers had joint roles at the colliery and elsewhere on the Winns’ 
property. Edmund Winn as colliery general manager had multiple roles on the estate 
and in an external organisation. During the 1870s a sales function was established, and 
technically qualified staff were recruited for engineering roles. After the 1880s 
redevelopment, the colliery became organisationally separate from the estate, and had 
qualified, full-time managers in key posts, operating in a tripartite structure. The family 
member in charge of the colliery, George Winn, contributed to the technical expertise 
through his knowledge of electricity. This management team led the colliery through its 
most successful period, from 1895 to 1914, during which time it was notably open to 
new technical developments, particularly in electricity as an underground power source 
and the use of mechanical coal-cutting machines. The competence and level of 
engagement of the management team in the period after 1886 contrast markedly with its 
equivalent in the colliery’s early days. 
                                                
17 R. A. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3: 1830-1913 Victorian Pre-eminence 
(Oxford, 1986), pp. 387-389. 
18 B. R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914 (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 
268-273; Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 71-79; O. O. G. M. MacDonagh, 'Coal 
Mines Regulation: The First Decade, 1842-1852', in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas and Institutions of Victorian 
Britain: Essays in Honour of George Kitson Clark (London, 1967), pp. 58-86; this ref. pp. 75-78; J. 
Sinclair, Coal Mining Law (London, 1958), pp. 84-85. 
19 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 413. 
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The influence of transport on the coal trade is the third theme of the thesis and is 
explored in Chapter 5. A cheap and efficient means of moving a heavy, bulky product 
across inland areas was crucial to the expansion of the industry in the mid nineteenth 
century. Without it, collieries lacking access to river or sea ports were restricted to 
purely local markets because of the inadequacy of contemporary road transport.20 
Markets followed new canals and railways into non-coalbearing areas, and the railway 
supplanted sea transport as the prime mover of coal over distance.21  
Mitchell’s work on the work on the geographical markets supplied by Britain’s 
coalfields between 1816 and 1913 is a valuable yardstick against which the Nostell 
Colliery’s markets can be calibrated.22 From a largely local sale in the early nineteenth 
century, an increasing proportion of Yorkshire’s output went to other parts of Britain 
and the wider world. Nostell’s coal sold in the west Yorkshire/east Lancashire industrial 
area, East Anglia and London. These markets contrast with the hinterland barely ten 
miles across that was served by Wragby Colliery in the 1850s. The new markets 
enabled a far higher output - the annual sale of coal by Nostell Colliery in the 1860s was 
400 per cent of that achieved at Wragby a few years earlier, and the national market 
absorbed a further quadrupling of Nostell’s output in the 1880s. 
Because of the intense competition in the railway market for coal, small 
variations in transport cost and service levels could be crucial to a colliery’s 
competitiveness and profitability.23 Shifts in the relative cost and efficiency of using 
different forms of transport were therefore reflected in the market share that they 
carried. For example, coastal shipping gained ground in the London trade in the 1890s 
because of improved bulk loading techniques and faster journey times. To avoid being 
constrained by transport shortages, many collieries preferred to ensure that they had 
maximum control of the means of getting the product to the customer. Church in 
History of the British Coal Industry weighs the advantages and disadvantages to a 
colliery of owning a fleet of wagons, rather than relying on the customer or the railway 
company to provide them.24 Nostell Colliery owned its own wagons throughout the 
period 1866-1914, and contemporary sources were keenly aware of the importance of 
                                                
20 J. U. Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry (London, 1966), p. 359. 
21 G. R. Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 
168-169. 
22 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 16-17. 
23 Ibid, pp. 263-264. 
24 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 82-85. 
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effective management of this resource.25 Chapter 5 reviews Nostell’s experience of 
running a wagon fleet. Although their wagons made a loss in terms of delivery revenues 
generated against the cost of purchase and maintenance, this must be balanced against 
the competitive advantage of the ability to complete a sale quickly as the means to 
transport the coal were readily available. The small mineral wagons common on 
Britain’s railways in the Victorian and Edwardian eras, and the extensive use of private 
owner wagons have been cited as a source of lost economies of scale.26 Nostell’s 
wagons were small and non-standard, but Chapter 5 argues that this was a rational 
response to a distribution pattern of small quantities sent to multiple locations.  
The fourth theme of the thesis relates to the marketing and sale of coal from the 
1860s to the First World War, and is the subject of Chapter 6. As with the development 
of management, marketing in the coal industry has received little attention from 
historians, particularly for the period between the collapse of the Limitation of the Vend 
and 1914.27 Church’s History of the British Coal Industry vol. 3 and Mitchell’s 
Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914 are the main authorities 
on the subject, supported by studies of individual collieries and coalfields.28  
By the mid nineteenth century coal was not a commodity product and the market 
was differentiated into distinct segments. These segments were based on the uses to 
which the coal was best suited, which evolved as suppliers and users became better 
informed and more sophisticated on the attributes of different types of coal. The usages 
underlying the market segments were a function of the chemical and physical 
characteristics of the coal itself. In the early nineteenth century these characteristics 
were dependent on the nature of the coal when it was delivered ‘raw’ from the colliery. 
                                                
25 For example, Jonathan Hyslop’s Colliery Management, published in 1876, contains a lengthy section 
on buying, maintaining and managing wagons.  
26 T. Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (London, 1915); C. P. Kindleberger, 
‘Obsolescence and Technical Change’, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and 
Statistics vol. 23 no. 3, (August 1961), pp. 281-297; P. David, ‘The Landscape and the Machine: 
Technical Interrelatedness, Land Tenure and the Mechanisation of the Corn Harvest in Victorian Britain’, 
in D. N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 (London, 1971), pp. 145-
204. 
27 Benson et al’s comprehensive bibliography of the British coal industry has seven entries for marketing, 
most of which relate to the 1930s. Following P. M. Sweezy’s article ‘Monopoly and Policy in the English 
Coal Trade, 1550-1850’, published in 1938, there has been a steady flow of interest in the Limitation of 
the Vend. J. Benson, R. G. Neville and C. H. Thompson, Bibliography of the British Coal Trade: 
Secondary Literature, Parliamentary and Departmental Papers, Mineral Maps and Plans and a Guide to 
Sources (Oxford, 1981). 
28 For example, G. Rimmer, ‘Middleton Colliery, near Leeds (1770-1830)’, Yorkshire Bulletin of 
Economic and Social Research vol. 7 (1955), pp. 41-57; J. H. Morris and L. J. Williams, The South Wales 
Coal Industry, 1841-1875 (Cardiff, 1958); R. W. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business: The Third Marquis of 
Londonderry as Coalowner and Portbuilder (Durham, 1975); C. P. Griffin, ‘Robert Harrison and the 
Barber, Walker Co.: a Study in Colliery Management, 1850-1890’, Transactions of the Thoroton Society 
vol. 82 (1978), pp. 51-62. 
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As the century progressed, collieries increasingly began to improve and refine their coal 
because it enabled a higher price to be obtained. Coal was cleaned, graded by size and 
quality, mixed with other coal into a product of specified character, or processed into a 
by-product such as coke. Increasingly, coal became a manufactured product.29  
The Victorian coal market was dynamic, and new patterns of demand were 
driven by technical change or economic circumstances. For example, coke ceased to be 
used for railway engines in the 1860s, and a new category of steam coal emerged 
specifically for use in the boilers of locomotives and steamships. The outcome of these 
trends was the five market segments discussed in Chapter 6: steam, manufacturing, 
coking, gas and domestic coal. The nature of demand differed between segments – for 
instance, steam coal was in strong demand during the spring and summer, while 
domestic coal’s high season was autumn and winter. The pricing of each segment was 
largely market-driven, except in areas where transport difficulties gave some protection 
to a local supplier. Individual collieries had little ability to manoeuvre on price in a 
given segment, which was an incentive to improve coal quality so that it could compete 
in a higher-priced segment. In the late nineteenth century many collieries, including 
Nostell, adopted more sophisticated means of sorting and grading coal, so that the 
market was presented with a wide range of differentiated products. Chapter 6 also 
considers the channels to market and contractual arrangements through which coal was 
sold, which varied by market segment. In the late nineteenth century the length of the 
supply chain was reduced and end-users increasingly bought coal direct from collieries 
or through suppliers owned by collieries.30  
Various means were used to differentiate products in highly competitive 
markets. The capacity to deliver orders quickly was advantageous, as will be noted in 
Chapter 5. Channels appropriate to the target market segment were used. Coals were 
given distinctive names to highlight the supplier’s brand and inform the customer on 
their grade and size. Although in the 1860s and 1870s Nostell Colliery had sold a small 
number of generic coals, in the quarter century to 1914 it marketed a greatly increased 
range and adopted a naming policy that attempted to establish a clear market presence. 
As with the colliery’s managerial capabilities, Chapter 6 argues that although in its early 
days little attention was paid to the presentation of coal in the market place, after the 
                                                
29 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 266-268; Dintenfass, 
‘Entrepreneurial Failure Reconsidered: The Case of the Interwar British Coal 
Industry’, The Business History Review, vol. 62, no. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 1-34; this ref. p. 20. 
30 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 30, 71-78; Mitchell, Economic Development of 
the British Coal Industry, pp. 264-268. 
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late 1880s Nostell Colliery adopted marketing and sales practices that were attuned to 
best practice in the industry. 
The final theme of the thesis is addressed in the latter part of Chapter 4. It 
concerns the relative development rates of financial and management (cost) accounting, 
and the use of accounting information to inform managerial decision-making. This field 
of study has undergone a significant change in approach in recent years. Writings in the 
1960s and 1970s argued that financial accounts were the earlier to be developed and 
played a larger role in defining professional practice in nineteenth century accounting. 
Management accounts were considered to be the work of engineers rather than 
professional book-keepers, essentially ephemeral and mainly used for short-term 
purposes of individual process improvement. As such, they were more advanced in 
manufacturing – which had easily identified process steps – rather than extractive 
industry, and they only became widely used in any sector in the later nineteenth 
century.31 
Research undertaken since 1990 has challenged a number of these arguments. 
Evidence has been found of the use of cost accounting in Britain during the Industrial 
Revolution, and that it was employed in the coal industry as well as manufacturing. 
Integrated systems including both financial and management accounts have also been 
detected far earlier than was previously supposed, as has the incorporation of 
management accounting into accountancy professional training and standards. The use 
of accounting information can be detected in making ad-hoc decisions, although neither 
as a regular input to managerial activity, nor as a proven cause of better decisions.32  
Chapter 4 sets out the contribution of Nostell Colliery to this debate. Both 
financial and management accounts were produced for the Winns’ collieries from at 
least the last quarter of the eighteenth century. They continued to be produced in 
parallel after the establishment of a more comprehensive accounting system in the 
1850s, which brought in more elements of financial accounting but remained separate 
from the costing side. Accounting information was used to assist with managerial 
decision-making: there is clear evidence of its use in making ad-hoc decisions such as 
the installation of a steam-pump, and a strong implication that costing information was 
                                                
31 Particularly in Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management; also D. Solomons (ed.), Studies in Cost 
Analysis (London, 1968); S. P. Garner, Evolution of Cost Accounting (Alabama, 1954); A. Chandler, The 
Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) suggested that 
management accounting was largely invented by mid-nineteenth century US railway companies. 
32 The sources for the post-1990 work are summarised in R. K. Fleischman and V. S. Radcliffe, ‘The 
Roaring Nineties: Accounting History Comes of Age’, Accounting Historian’s Journal vol. 32 no. 1 
(June 2005), pp. 61-109. 
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used to determine production levels in the late 1860s. The accounts system introduced 
at the colliery in 1869 was relatively sophisticated, and had several characteristics 
indicative of contemporary best practice. These included the regular production of a 
profit and loss account and balance sheet. In other respects, however, the colliery’s 
accounts retained some old-fashioned aspects, especially in the treatment of capital. 
There is also little evidence of the full integration of financial and management accounts 
into a single system.  
Accounting records played an important role in the Winns’ oversight of their 
collieries and had been produced in a coherent and meaningful form since at least the 
late eighteenth century. With the reservations stated above, the evidence from Nostell is 
therefore in support of the interpretation that brings financial and management accounts 
into more equal roles in the development of accounting practice, and extends the origins 
and practical use of costing information back to the late eighteenth century at least.  
Methodology of the thesis 
 
The case study is the methodology selected for this thesis, as it enables the 
‘particularity and complexity’ of an individual instance to be understood within the 
holistic perspective of the various influences that bear upon it.33 It is also suitable for 
testing specific examples against theoretical propositions.34 The first theme described in 
the previous section requires an understanding of the Winns’ response to the interaction 
between the attitudes required to establish and manage an industrial organisation, and 
the socio-cultural values of a landed family. The thesis attempts to identify the linkages 
between the assumptions and values held by the Winns as landed gentry and the 
decisions made by them in the running of the colliery. In order to undertake such an 
analysis, the Winns’ activities must be observed from a variety of perspectives. A 
prerequisite for this holistic approach is the presence of sufficient source material to 
support a range of perspectives. The primary material described in the section on 
archival sources provides these perspectives. It is rich in financial and operational data 
but also allows insight to the decision-making process and the personal interaction 
between key players. 
                                                
33 R. E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, 1995), p. xi. 
34 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, 2003), pp. 10-13, 40-42. 
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Chapter 2 




In the mid-1850s the Winns were apparently securely situated as landed proprietors 
with estates in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. Their income was derived mainly from 
agriculture, although the small colliery at Wragby contributed a few hundred 
pounds of profit each year.1 In common with many landowners, however, their 
estates were heavily mortgaged, and cash flow problems in 1857 and 1858 
threatened their ability to maintain their standard of living and service their debts.  
The family was forced to confront its financial problems and look for potential 
resolutions. This chapter will explore three main themes. Firstly, it will position the 
Winns within a specific class context, by comparing their economic and socio-
cultural characteristics with those of the wider landowning class of mid-nineteenth 
century Britain. Secondly, the conventional behaviours of the landed class 
regarding the economic exploitation of its property will be used as a template to 
examine the Winns’ financial situation in the mid-1850s. Finally, the chapter will 
focus on the attempt by Edmund, Charles Winn’s younger son, to expand the 
estate’s involvement in coal mining by promoting a colliery concern. Edmund’s 
involvement in the coal business raises a number of issues. These include the extent 
of involvement of landowners in the detailed business of industry on their estate, 
capital formation in the coal trade, and the way in which landowners resolved 
conflicts between the objectives embedded in the socio-economic culture of their 
class.  
The Winns’ place in the landowning class in nineteenth century Britain 
 
The landowning class was the dominant elite in Britain up to the mid nineteenth 
century, in terms of wealth, social status and political influence. In addition to 
                                                      
1 Wragby Colliery had an associated brickyard. For a landowner with a mansion as large as Nostell 
Priory, an ‘in-house’ supply of fuel and building material could be a considerable money-saver. 
Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, p. 280.  
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substantial advantages of access to political and financial power, membership of the 
class implied responsibilities relating to participation in both local and national 
government, and the maintenance of the social displays that reflected and bolstered the 
class’s high status.2 As C. L. W. Hill defines it, a culture constitutes ‘a system of values 
and norms that are shared among a group of people and that when taken together 
constitute a design for living’.3 Landownership in the mid-nineteenth century carried 
predispositions to conventional behaviour in a number of contexts, amounting to a 
specific culture under this definition. 
In order to explore the Winns’ conduct and economic activities in the context of 
these values and norms, their standing as members of the class must first be established. 
This will be undertaken through a tripartite analysis of the Winns’ circumstances based 
on that described in Cannadine’s The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. It will 
also draw on F. M. L. Thompson’s examinations of the characteristics of nineteenth 
century landowners.4 The timing of the exercise will be the mid-1850s. It will first 
consider the Winns’ material status, and then the degree of political and administrative 
power exercised by the family. Finally, their social standing will be examined.5  
The British landowning class in the nineteenth century consisted of around 
7,000 families, who through the mid 1850s owned over half the land in the British Isles. 
Most landed estates were rural and their owners drew around 80 per cent of their 
income from agriculture, which up to the 1820s was Britain’s largest economic sector in 
terms of its contribution to total employment and to the national income.6 Despite 
agriculture’s subsequent decline from this leading position, landowners benefitted from 
the prosperity that farming enjoyed between the late 1840s and the mid 1870s. In some 
cases, they were able to augment their agrarian income by the mineral and 
manufacturing wealth arising from the new uses of the land created by the Industrial 
                                                      
2 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 1-3. 
3 C. L. W. Hill, International Business: Competing the Global Marketplace (New York, 2000), p. 79, 
quoted in J. F. Wilson, Business Cultures and Business Performance: A British Perspective (paper 
presented at the Posthumus conference on ‘The Impact of Culture on Economic and Social Evolution’, 
2000), p. 3. 
4 Cannadine, Decline and Fall, pp. 8-16, and Thompson, English Landed Society and Gentrification and 
the Enterprise Culture, passim. 
5 Cannadine’s analysis is set in the mid-1870s, when Bateman’s Great Landowners of Great Britain and 
Ireland and the Second Domesday Book were published. To use his figures and comparators might seem 
anachronistic when considering the Winns’ situation twenty years earlier. However, the Winns’ 
landholdings did not changed little between 1855-1875, and the value of the pound in 1875 was just 
under 10 per cent higher than twenty years previously (D. Hobson, The National Wealth: Who gets What 
in Britain [London, 1999], pp. 1185-1186). Because the Winns’ income was subject to the same general 
economic variations as that of other landowners, and as the intention is to gain a general sense of the 
family’s status, the inconsistency is considered justifiable for comparative purposes. 
6 F. Crouzet, The Victorian Economy (London, 1982), pp. 66-67. 
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Revolution.7 The most affluent among the landowners were collectively richer than any 
other contemporary social or occupational grouping and their wealth enabled them to 
spend substantial proportions of their time in artistic, sporting or leisure pursuits. In 
later years, however, the wealth of those proprietors who were predominantly dependent 
on their agricultural income was affected by reduced produce prices from the mid-1870s 
as a result of free trade and a general fall in world demand.8 In the sources of their 
income, the Winns in the mid 1850s were entirely typical landowners - a draft annual 
budget for their property in 1858 showed an income of £10,800, mostly derived from 
agriculture but including £500 from Wragby Colliery.9 
The landowning elite in Britain was a broad class in material terms, from a 
squire with a thousand acres to the magnate with extensive property in several different 
locations, and their incomes, politics and habits encompassed a spectrum of equivalent 
breadth. ‘The Duke of Omnium and the small squire were half a world apart’, but they 
had in common a sense of the rights and duties of the landed class, albeit exercised in 
greater or lesser settings.10 Both Cannadine and Thompson classified the British 
landowner of the 1870s into three broad categories.11 The upper 250 of the 7,000 
families were magnates with over 30,000 acres, generating annual incomes from 
£30,000 to more than £100,000. They would certainly have had property in several 
locations (including a large London house) and usually in more than one of the 
countries in the British Isles. Their income would be derived from a range of sources, 
and was very likely to include a proportion of non-agricultural origin.12 The second 
category of landowner constituted middling proprietors, around 750 families with 
holdings of 10,000 to 30,000 acres and annual incomes of £10,000 to £30,000. They 
were likely to have a main country seat, a London base, and perhaps additional estates 
and houses accrued by marriage or inheritance. Their income might be derived purely 
from agriculture, although the size of their property portfolios increased the likelihood 
                                                      
7 ‘Consciously or unconsciously, the landed aristocracy of England had come to terms, and profitable 
terms, with the Industrial Revolution.’ Burn, Age of Equipoise, p. 308. 
8 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 303-304. 
9 Budget for 1858, A/1/8/1/11, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Except when farm rentals were changed (as they 
were in 1854), the Winns’ income from agriculture in the 1850s was usually around a consistent level. 
The colliery was the most variable component. It should be stressed that the colliery was operated as a 
separate business, and the £500 represented the profit; income from the colliery was £2,100 in 1857 and 
£2,600 in 1858, representing 15-20 per cent of total income. Notebook containing colliery financial 
analyses, C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
10 Burn, Age of Equipoise, p. 316. 
11 Cannadine, Decline and Fall, pp.  9-11; Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 112-113. 
12 The value of land varied widely. In 1883 the 3rd Duke of Sutherland’s estates included c1,300,000 
acres in Scotland and 32,000 in England, and his annual gross income approached £200,000, the great 
bulk of which came from his English possessions. The Scottish land was largely moor. E. Richards, The 
Leviathan of Wealth: The Sutherland Fortune in the Industrial Revolution (London, 1973), pp. 12-13. 
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that they would also generate revenue from industrial, mineral or commercial sources. 
The Winns’ income of c. £11,000 in the 1850s placed them on the lower margin of this 
category, as did their possession of two estates and houses. Nostell Priory was a 
substantial eighteenth century mansion, while Appleby Hall on the Lincolnshire estate 
was a more modest structure. A London house had been sold in 1785 to help pay for 
building work on the estates.13  
The final category of landowners consisted of small proprietors, accounting for 
around 6,000 of the 7,000 landowning families, owning between 1,000 and 10,000 acres 
with annual incomes in the range £1,000 to £10,000. At the lower end, merging into the 
yeoman/freeholder grouping, an owner would have a single estate and residence, while 
the better endowed might own additional land holdings or houses. The Winns’ two 
estates totalled 8,000 acres, 2,500 at Nostell and 5,500 at Appleby, so that in terms of 
acreage as well as income they were at the margin of the small and medium categories. 
The smaller landowners’ incomes were often generated wholly by agricultural rents, 
although further up the scale a modest level of industrial or portfolio investment income 
was possible. Leasing of mineral resources or shareholding in local canal companies 
was not uncommon, and could provide a level of income that enabled an involvement in 
London society and politics.14 The Winns again were typical of their class, as apart from 
owning an estate colliery they invested in local ventures including the Barnsley Canal 
and the South Yorkshire Railway.15  
In terms of their property, therefore, the Winns were solid members of the 
landowning class, at the lower end of the spectrum but holding a significant presence in 
two counties. They maintained a similar position in their involvement with politics and 
civil government. Landowners formed the governing elite, dominating central 
government by a combination of entitlement and obligation: ‘Until the 1880s, the lower 
house of Parliament was essentially a landowners’ club…as late as the 1860s, it was 
claimed that one-third of the Commons was filled by no more than sixty families, all 
landed…The upper house was even more the monopoly of landowners’.16 Smaller 
landowners concentrated their social and political attentions exclusively on the affairs of 
                                                      
13 Appleby Hall was destroyed by fire in 1933. The National Trust, Nostell Priory and Parkland 
(Warrington, 2001), pp. 4-5, 50-51, 57-58; J. Bateman, Great Landowners of Great Britain (repr. 
Leicester, 1971), p. 485; R. Pacey, Lost Country Houses of Lincolnshire: Volume 5 (Burgh-le-Marsh, 
2002), page number unknown.  
14 ‘Only the richer members of county society could afford the London season.’ Geoffrey Best, Mid-
Victorian Britain 1851-75 (London, 1979), p. 262. 
15 Charles Winn’s diaries 1838-1850, A/1/8/1, A/1/8/26/16, A/1/8/26/18 and A/1/8/26/18, WYL1352, 
WYAS (W).  
16 Cannadine, Decline and Fall, p. 14.   
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the immediate locality of their estates. Landowners undertook the higher level local 
administration of the more rural parts of the country, largely at their own expense and 
from a sense of duty, and at the same time provided poor relief that supplemented, or 
sometimes replaced, the official arrangements. These activities contributed to 
attainment of ‘high esteem [by] the performance of unpaid public service’.17 Local 
tradesmen had the benefit of their patronage - sometimes doubtful because of the 
extended credit often taken - and social, sporting and charitable organisations in the 
environs of a landowner’s property looked to him for support. The Winns held a solid 
position in county society. Charles was High Sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1828, a post 
later held by his elder son Rowland, and Charles, Rowland and Edmund were all 
Justices of the Peace. Both these functions were largely reserved to members of the 
landowning class.18 The Winns took a close interest in Church of England diocesan 
matters, owning at least one advowson, and Charles’s bank records show that he was a 
conscientious supporter of charitable causes and sporting or social organisations local to 
his property. These roles, at county rather than national level, were commensurate with 
a secure if relatively modest position in the landowner hierarchy. 
After the middle of the nineteenth century, the apparent dominance of the 
landowner began to weaken at national level in the face of the rising power of the 
middle class. Landowner representation in Parliament shrank and a general acceptance 
of the landowning class’s natural right to govern was replaced by pressure to 
demonstrate that its continuing governmental influence gave ‘value for money’ to other 
sectors of the electorate.19 Although their hegemony lasted somewhat longer at the local 
level, even here the landowner-dominated Quarter Sessions, parishes and magistracies 
were reduced in power. Elected bodies were introduced to deal with public services, 
housing and schools, while the police and prison services were directed by central 
government. The creation of the county councils in 1888 brought many of these 
functions together.20 The Winn family was affected by the changes, as Edmund held the 
post of treasurer to the West Riding Quarter Sessions from 1868. When the Sessions 
                                                      
17 The corporate boroughs and the lower echelons of county functions (unless they were occupied by the 
landowner’s agent or other senior employee) were generally outside the control of the landowners. Burn, 
Age of Equipoise, pp. 261-262; Coleman, ‘Gentlemen and Players’, p. 98 (quotation); Spring, The English 
Landed Estate, p. 119. 
18 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 110-111.  
19 Best, Mid-Victorian Britain, p. 264; Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 278-279. 
20 The landowning interest long fought successfully against their loss of influence at local level. Nine bills 
were introduced into Parliament between 1832 and 1868 to introduce elected bodies that would assume 
various of the duties of the Quarter Sessions, but all failed. Mingay, Land and Society in England, p. 210; 
Burn, Age of Equipoise, pp. 312-313. 
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were abolished twenty years later he was able only with difficulty to obtain 
compensation for the loss of his salary.  
The final indicator of membership of the landowning class to be considered is 
that of social status. This was not defined purely by material possessions. Other factors 
were significant in establishing a family’s social standing, such as the manner in which 
it lived and conducted its affairs, the length of time it had held a particular estate, or the 
public offices held by its members. These aspirations manifested themselves in 
characteristic behaviours: the desire to preserve territorial integrity and longevity, to 
enhance the property, and a propensity for endogamy. If necessary, landed families 
undertook some manoeuvring to preserve the appearance of achievement of these 
objectives, as did the Winns in the early nineteenth century.21 The family had been 
landowners in both Lincolnshire and Yorkshire for nearly two hundred years, the estates 
having been the property of a succession of Winn baronets. On the death without issue 
in 1805 of the sixth baronet, Sir Rowland, the property was inherited by the eldest son 
of his sister, Esther. The youthful Esther had been ‘wayward and headstrong’, and had 
married a Manchester baker called John Williamson. Marriage to a man in trade had 
been considered by the family to be unforgivable, and the sister was estranged for many 
years. However, when Esther’s children – John, Charles and Louisa - were orphaned 
following her death in 1803, Sir Rowland adopted them to ensure that they were 
‘suitably brought up’ as successors to the estate. The property came to Esther’s elder 
son, John, who changed his name from Williamson to Winn on inheritance. At John’s 
early and childless death in 1817, his younger brother Charles inherited, and also took 
the surname Winn.22 Although the baronetcy went to another branch of the family, this 
did not hinder the Nostell Winns’ standing as landowners. A title was advantageous in 
the purely ‘society’ sense, but in the mid nineteenth century around 80 per cent of 
landowners were commoners, including a quarter of the largest proprietors.23 Charles 
established his ‘county’ ties by marrying the daughter of an East Riding baronet, while 
his elder son’s wife (m. 1854) was the niece of the Earl of Lanesborough and his second 
daughter’s brother-in-law (m. 1846) was the first Viscount Cross. In 1855 the Winns of 
Nostell were ‘Winns’ only by sleight of hand, but had retained their ownership of the 
                                                      
21 Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 103; Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, pp. 
253-254. 
22 Quotations from ‘Reminiscences of Nostell by Dr T. G. Wright’ (undated and unpaginated manuscript 
book), MS803, Yorkshire Archaeological Society; National Trust, Nostell Priory and Parkland, pp. 4, 51 
and 58-59 
23 Cannadine, Decline and Fall, p. 11; Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 14. 
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property, spent liberally on improving it – a considerable acreage was added by 
purchase in the 1820s - and established nuptial links with other landowners.  
Mid-nineteenth century landowning families had expectations of suitable 
occupations for their members. The landowner himself should personify the gentleman, 
definitively ‘a man who has no occupation’ other than the running of his property and 
such public duties as he wished to assume. His younger brothers could have careers in 
the church, army, law or civil service, which were ‘likely to be dignified [rather] than 
self-supporting’ at the land magnate level, but were more purposeful among less well-
endowed landowners.24 Charles Winn, before he inherited the estate when John died, 
was ordained and appointed rector of a church on Nostell estate. A clerical appointment 
in the locality of the family seat was a common career path for younger sons in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.25 Rather surprisingly, Charles retained the 
rectorship for a considerable period after inheriting the property, but following his 
resignation from this office had no occupation other than his public duties and a 
directorship of the Barnsley Canal Company. He spent his time as an antiquarian and 
collector, redecorating Nostell Priory and restoring Wragby church, and accruing large 
collections of paintings and stained glass among a wider acquisition of antiquities and 
curiosities.26 Such behaviour was entirely commensurate with the way of life of a 
landed proprietor, as was the educational background enjoyed by Charles and his sons - 
he and Rowland attended leading public schools and Cambridge University while 
Edmund was at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich and held a commission in the 
Royal Artillery. Daughters married within their social class, or, like Esther, risked 
excommunication. Unmarried girls usually remained at home to support their parents or 
brothers. Charles’ spinster sister Louisa lived on the estate, as did his daughters until 
their marriages. In summary, by the 1850s the Winns were well-established and 
conventional members of their class. They were on good social terms with their titled 
Yorkshire neighbours Lord Wharncliffe and the Armytage family.27 They had a 
longstanding presence at their houses in the Yorkshire and Lincolnshire countryside, 
and enjoyed an appropriate status in the society and civil administration of their home 
counties. In Stone’s term, they were ‘county gentry’, deriving their income largely from 
                                                      
24 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 17-22. 
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26 National Trust, Nostell Priory and Parkland, passim; S. Raikes, ‘’A Cultivated Eye for the Antique’: 
Charles Winn and the Enrichment of Nostell Priory in the Nineteenth Century’, Apollo (April 2003) fn. 2 
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agricultural sources and occupying themselves in local activities appropriate to their 
station.28   
 ‘Advance our family one step further’: The landowners and the land 
 
The culture of the landowning class was especially clear in relation to the passage of the 
family estate to the succeeding generation, entire and if possible enhanced in size and 
condition: ‘the outward and visible symbol of family continuity’.29 This lay at the core 
of the landowner’s values and was well expressed by the 6th Earl of Balcarres, who 
inherited a heavily indebted estate and restored it to financial equilibrium by astute 
exploitation of its coal reserves. Writing to his eldest son in 1818, Balcarres bestowed 
on him his first duty. It was ‘now your care and solicitude to advance our family one 
step further’.30 Enhancing the family inheritance could take a number of forms. The 7th 
Duke of Bedford, for example, followed Balcarres’s example in improving his 
property’s financial state, and repaid £500,000 of debt.31 Other types of improvement 
could be more substantive. Stone identified a wave of country house construction in the 
later eighteenth century, on a scale to which he attributed the term ‘gigantism’.32 The 4th 
and 5th Winn baronets were no exception, as exemplified by their construction and 
furnishing of Nostell Priory between 1736 and 1785.33 The Priory over-compensated for 
the modest estate on which it was located to the extent that it was said ‘that Lord 
Rockingham built a house at Wentworth fit for the Prince of Wales, that Sir Rowland 
Winn built a house at Nostel [sic] fit for Lord Rockingham, and that Mr Wrightson at 
Cusworth built a house fit for Sir Rowland Winn’.34  
Conspicuous expenditure could also be applied to the estate in the form of the 
high farming methods that were widely adopted by landowners in the mid-nineteenth 
century, especially from about 1840 to 1880.35 High farming necessitated substantial 
investment in soil fertility and drainage, in machinery, and in the construction of 
buildings suitable for the new methods. It had both a social aspect - demonstrating the 
                                                      
28 Stone, An Open Elite?, pp. 6-7. 
29 Stone, An Open Elite?, p. 69. 
30 Letter dated 10 June 1818, 6th Earl of Balcarres to Lord James Lindsay, quoted in D. Anderson and A. 
A. France, Wigan Coal and Iron (Wigan, 1993), p. 52.  
31 Spring, The English Landed Estate, pp. 38-39. 
32 Stone, An Open Elite?, p. 263. 
33 National Trust, Nostell Priory and Parkland, pp. 53-58. 
34 C. M. Gaskell, ‘The Country Gentleman’, Nineteenth Century vol. 12 no. 67 (September 1882), pp. 
460-474; this ref. p. 467. 
35 P. J. Perry, ‘High Farming in Victorian Britain: Prospect and Retrospect’, Agricultural History vol. 55 
no. 2 (April, 1981), pp. 156-166; this ref p. 156. 
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landlord’s dedication to scientific improvement - and an economic goal in enhancing his 
rental return.36 Charles Winn introduced some of these methods to his estates, spending 
£40,000 on ‘enclosing and improving waste land [in Lincolnshire] for future culture’ on 
land he bought in 1828.37 Ownership of land also stimulated exercises in social display 
and control that were as important as the property’s economic performance.38 Stone 
observed that the large new houses were reflected in the activities that took place in 
them: ‘more servants, more guests, more weekend parties, more mass slaughter of 
animals…’, while at a less ostentatious level the landowner was expected to mark 
family events with a suitable public celebration and maintain hospitality at appropriate 
times of the year.39 As a result, nineteenth century landowners often lived, frequently on 
credit, at the level that they believed was appropriate to their station, rather than at the 
level that they could afford. Because they were also slow to adjust to reductions in their 
income, by the 1840s it was estimated that up to two-thirds of land in England was 
subject to debt.40  Indebtedness could arise from poor management, high family 
payments, expenditure on improvements to the estate, or simple personal 
extravagance.41 The worst possible outcome was the forced sale of land. 
To sell an estate in order to pay debts, rather than to enhance a family’s standing 
through an advantageous purchase of property elsewhere, was a major transgression by 
a landowner against the ideals of his class. It risked losing the key to membership of the 
elite: ‘the social consequences of drastic sale were altogether abhorrent…bitterly 
unpalatable, it would be resorted to only under the severest adversity’.42 Even the loss 
of a part could significantly diminish the whole, a point made by Earl Fitzwilliam in 
1845 when advising the heavily indebted Duke of Devonshire against selling an estate 
in east Yorkshire: ‘[the sale] cannot fail to make a sensible inroad upon your influence, 
and the position you hold in the great national community’.43 A family’s standing was 
based on the intrinsic value of land ownership itself, rather than the wealth that it 
                                                      
36 J. D. Chambers and G. E. Mingay, The Agricultural Revolution 1750-1880 (London, 1966), pp. 167-
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produced: ‘the unbroken shell of a landed estate, even if in reality it was empty within, 
was the object that conferred position, authority and responsibility’.44 
Because continuity of property ownership was a crucial element of the 
landowning culture, the mechanisms by which estates were passed between generations, 
divided between family members, and deployed in the family’s overall interests are 
important to an understanding of the behaviours of the landed class. The passage of the 
entire property to single, clearly defined individuals in succeeding generations was 
considered the best safeguard for continuity and accrual of wealth. It prevented 
inheritance disputes or paralysis of action arising from shared ownership, and 
subdivided estates did not carry the same political and social status as a large property. 
Legal instruments and conventional practices facilitated the retention of property in a 
single entity. The preferred means of achieving this was male primogeniture, which in 
English inheritance conventions also associated the masculine family name with the 
estate.45 Descent through the female line occurred only if the male line failed, in which 
case continuity was often preserved by the inheritor changing his surname to that of the 
original family. Thus John and Charles Williamson became Winns.46  
Primogeniture was administered through the entail, which defined the order of 
precedence by which a property passed between generations - almost invariably the 
descendants of the original owner. From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, the 
entail was enacted by the strict settlement, a legal device that defined the property that 
descended to the entailed heir and that assigned to other family members.47 Under a 
strict settlement, the estate was settled on trustees and the succeeding family member 
became the tenant for life.48 The life tenant was usually given some room for financial 
manoeuvre, for example by being permitted to raise mortgages or by placing land out of 
settlement so that it could be sold to generate capital sums for expansion or 
improvement of the property - the Winn estate was subject to a strict settlement but 
Charles was able to make the 1828 land purchase through a mortgage.49 Because each 
life tenant was restrained from selling more than a small portion of the property, 
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successive inheritors were encouraged to improve their land’s productivity.50 
Settlements were arranged in each generation by discussion between the trustees, the 
current tenant of the property and his heir. This usually occurred at the heir’s coming of 
age or marriage, when the existing settlement would be broken and a new one set in 
place. This was not necessarily done immediately, and the incumbent and the heir could 
run the property jointly until they decided to resettle the estate. The next generation was 
groomed by gradual introduction to the responsibilities of landowning. Families with 
multiple properties often installed the eldest son, when he had come of age, as the 
châtelain of a secondary estate.51 Rowland Winn took charge of Appleby during the 
1840s, living on the income that it generated. The correspondence between Charles and 
Rowland indicated that they considered themselves joint masters of the entire property, 
with Charles exercising ultimate authority – particularly in financial matters - but 
increasingly deferring to Rowland’s leadership and decisions. The occasional 
suggestions on financial policy made to Charles by his younger son, Edmund, were not 
received sympathetically.52  
The strict settlement was intended to shield the family’s economic and social 
foundation, the estate, from damage by the mistakes, poor management or ill luck of a 
single generation.53 The trustees could constrain the actions of the life tenant with 
regard to disposal or splitting up of the property, and require him to follow the specified 
arrangements for financial support of family members. Male primogeniture failed to 
provide for younger sons, female siblings or dowagers, and both family affections and 
the desire to avoid internal strife required that their interests be protected.54 Other 
conventions were developed to address this omission. Strict settlements commonly 
earmarked portions of the family’s wealth to establish younger sons in a career, and to 
give daughters an independent income and a dowry on marriage. These payments 
became charges on the estate and were ‘the price paid by the landed classes for 
primogeniture’.55  
The possible consequences of the various strands of a landowner’s attitude to his 
estate and to its value in supporting the family were illustrated in the Winn family’s 
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experiences in the late 1840s. At that time their mortgage debt was £88,000, and 
Charles was overdrawn at Leatham’s bank in Wakefield by £14,000.56 The debts largely 
related to the 1828 purchase of land in Lincolnshire. It had been financed by a loan for 
£63,000 on which, according to a contemporary, Charles paid interest ‘at 4 or 4! per 
cent’.57 An additional £40,000 had been spent in the pursuit of the high farming ideal, 
with the intention of increasing the land’s output and income. Current agricultural 
history research considers it ‘unlikely that [such] investments made strict economic 
sense’.58 This was certainly the case with the Winns’ new land, which returned a profit 
of  ‘only 1! or 2 per cent’ so that the mortgage repayments bore heavily upon the 
income of the entire property.59 In 1846 Sir George Strickland, the Winn estate trustee, 
pressed Charles to re-settle the estates and raise capital for Charles’s children’s portions, 
including an income for Rowland.60 Reluctantly, Charles agreed to sell the Thornton 
Curtis estate in Lincolnshire in 1847.61 His preference was to dispose of Nostell, but the 
rest of the family wanted to keep it and he knew that it would not sell easily.62 Thornton 
was sold because it was smaller than Appleby and did not have the distinction of being 
the family’s sole substantial presence in a county, as did Nostell. The re-settlement 
earmarked an urban property at Pontefract for sale if further capital was needed.63 The 
decision to part with an estate was therefore only taken at pressing need and at the 
urging of the trustee. It was also carried out so as to minimise the damage on the 
family’s standing.  
The Thornton Curtis sale was only partly successful in paying down the debt. 
The timing of the sale - shortly before the repeal of the Corn Laws - was unfortunate as 
contemporary expectations for the future of grain farming were low.64 The proceeds 
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permitted the mortgage debt to be reduced by less than half, from £88,000 to £48,000, 
cutting the annual interest payments from £3,740 to £2,050.65 The 1846 re-settlement 
also initiated children’s allowance payments that became charges on the estates. These 
amounted to £500 per annum in 1858.66 Charles’s two unmarried daughters each 
received £50 per annum, which rose to £105 on marriage. Two other daughters already 
received the higher rate. Edmund’s annual allowance was £140, and Charles and 
Rowland were conscious of the need to find an occupation for him that would make him 
financially independent, which would also require a capital sum for his patrimony.67 
As this example demonstrates, the joint objectives of preserving the integrity of 
the estate and providing for those insufficiently fortunate to be born the eldest male 
were not always compatible. A life tenant might receive little of his estate’s income 
because it was assigned to the support of other family members. The 6th Earl of 
Balcarres, for example, had to pay jointures to two dowagers and provide for ‘ten 
brothers and sisters, whose interests…lay with me to protect in their several careers of 
life’.68 If the payments could not be met from income, the life tenant might have to use 
his ability under the strict settlement to raise cash through mortgages or land sales, 
further burdening or decreasing the property.69 It was, however, unusual for a strict 
settlement to be circumvented simply to benefit the life tenant at his relatives’ or 
successors’ expense. This was partly because of the trustees’ oversight but mainly 
because the assumptions underlying the strict settlement were embedded in the 
landowners’ psyche and widely accepted because they believed in primogeniture and 
support of the wider family.70  
The system was not without critics. Radicals and law reformers such as Richard 
Cobden attacked the settled estate on the grounds that it prevented the free sale or use of 
land, encouraged monopolism and placed non-landowning residents in a position of 
servitude. Cobden argued that economic development was hampered by the strict 
settlement, which was in the interest of neither the owner nor the country as a whole. 
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Despite these criticisms, the landowning interest was largely successful in preventing 
any significant changes in landed property law until the Conveyancing and Settled Land 
Acts of 1881-1882, and the characteristic practices of the settled estate were commonly 
followed throughout the first three quarters of the nineteenth century.71  
On all issues relating to the preservation of their property, its transmission 
across succeeding generations and its division among family members, Charles and 
Rowland Winn adhered closely to traditional practices – great efforts were made to keep 
the property together, and it was inherited in its entirety by the eldest son or other 
conventional heir with specific provision for the interests of other members of the 
family. The following section will look in more detail at the causes of the financial 
difficulties that compromised the Winns’ ability to apply these practices, and at their 
potential solutions. 
Balancing the books: The Winns’ finances in 1857-1858 
 
In 1857 the administration of Charles Winn’s property was divided because of 
Rowland’s occupation of Appleby. The accounts of the Yorkshire and Lincolnshire 
estates were separate, and Charles at Nostell and Rowland at Appleby each banked 
locally and employed discrete legal advisors and estate managers. In spring 1857 
Charles Winn departed for an extended tour of Europe. Rowland continued to lived on 
the Appleby estate and manage its affairs, but in his father’s absence was also 
responsible for the oversight of the entire property. Edmund had resigned his army 
commission and was employed as estate steward at Nostell, reporting to his brother.72 
Rowland had been involved from youth in the management of the Winn estates, 
including the 1847 sale of Thornton Curtis. He had been aware of some financial 
difficulty in early 1857, but did not appreciate the true financial situation until Charles 
had left England.73 In July Rowland wrote to his father to express his concerns: 
I am sorry to say that we shall have the very greatest difficulty in 
making ends meet…Edmund is in a quandary about the outstanding 
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bills, as he is frequently pressed for payment and I have no means of 
helping him…I really hardly know what to do about money. There are 
some bills that must be paid and there is £50 to Mr. Smith the 
clergyman besides some taxes…at present I have nothing to meet 
them.74 
The problems centred on Nostell. The interest payments on the family’s 
mortgage debts were charged to the income for that estate, resulting in a chronic 
shortage of cash. Ten years after the mortgages on the property had been reduced to 
£48,000, further borrowings had brought them back up to £90,000. Interest payments 
had of course risen in proportion.75 Charles’ account at the bank of Leatham, Tew & 
Co. in Wakefield was seriously overdrawn and the bank was pressing for a reduction of 
the deficit.76 It was difficult to make substantial or rapid increases in income because 
the majority came from farm rents, adjusted annually and paid six-monthly. Only 
ancillary activities like Wragby Colliery and the sale of timber or game generated 
revenue at times other than rent days.77 The Appleby estate was solvent, but was 
insufficiently profitable to meet all the family’s obligations. Despite the repugnance of 
landowners to selling their most valuable and prestigious asset, in 1857 the Winns faced 
this possibility for the second time in a decade. 
Through the summer and autumn of 1857, Rowland’s letters to his father 
repeatedly refer to the ‘fear and dread’ that he felt at the prospect of the property being 
sold out of Winn ownership: ‘I cannot tell you how it weighs on my mind’.78 Rowland’s 
concern was no doubt the greater because this would have been the second land sale that 
he had experienced, and his intense anxiety at the possible loss of their way of life was 
clearly expressed. He felt it his duty to confront the head of the family with the reality, 
writing to Charles that:  
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I really greatly fear that nothing short of an entire breaking-up of this 
place can ever put us on a safe footing, I quite dread looking the thing 
in the face, tho’ it is quite necessary to do so.79 
Apart from the implications of a sale for the family’s domestic and social 
circumstances, Rowland’s hopes for his own future were under threat. He had political 
ambitions in the Conservative Party, and membership of the landowning class was a 
substantial advantage for an aspiring Tory politician. Habakkuk remarked that 
‘Economy compromised more than [a landowner’s] standard of living’, and both 
Rowland and Charles believed that the retention of the estate and of their accustomed 
style of life were linked objectives.80  
Stone described the sale of an estate as a ‘failure in family strategy’, and 
Rowland tried to avoid a second failure in ten years through urgent attempts to raise 
cash.81 Railway shares were sold at a loss, and Rowland obtained loans from friends, 
relations, and through their solicitor John Marsden of Wakefield.82 Marsden’s loan offer 
was accepted by Rowland ‘with very great reluctance’, as he suspected that the 
solicitor’s advice had contributed to the downturn of the family’s fortunes.83 Timber 
harvests were taken from each estate, raising cash at the expense of future years. 
Finally, Charles was persuaded to agree to the auctioning of paintings and household 
effects from Nostell Priory ‘for the best prices they could get…If we could at once sell 
the pictures at anything like Holder’s [an auctioneer] valuation we should be able to pay 
a considerable proportion of the bills’. Rowland was reluctant to transfer more money 
from the Lincolnshire estate account as it would simply relocate the indebtedness: ‘I 
cannot do more from Appleby than pay the rest of the Bond interest and perhaps the 
half-year’s interest to Leatham without overdrawing the Brigg bank considerably which 
will never do’.84 In October 1857, however, Rowland cut costs in Lincolnshire in order 
to pay expenses at Nostell. At Christmas of that year, Rowland took stock of the 
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financial situation when he drew up a budget for 1858 that combined income and 
expenditure for both estates (Table 2.1). This proved a turning point in the crisis. 
 Table 2.1: Projected income and expenditure for 1858  
Income   
Nostell Agricultural rents £3,060 
 Wragby Colliery profit £500 
 Tithes, felled timber etc £443 
 Sub-total £4,003 
Lincolnshire Agricultural rents £6,827 





Nostell  £1,253 
Lincolnshire  £2,564 
Family payments  £500 
Interest on £90,000 mortgages  £3,403 
Interest on £8,200 bonds  £400 
Total  £8,120  
Balance  £2,710  
Source: Budget for 1858, A/1/8/1/11, WYL/1352, WYAS (W). 
 
Estate expenditure included only wages and fixed outgoings - rates, taxes, tithes etc - 
and no maintenance or living expenses. Rowland warned his father that the budget 
might be too optimistic, because ‘Edmund has put nothing in the Nostell statement in 
the shape of bills for the Estate’. This was a sensible caveat, because bills payable at 
Christmas 1856 had amounted to £2,000 of which £1,150 remained outstanding the 
following October, and the situation was unlikely to be better in 1858.85 Mortgage and 
bond interest was the largest outgoing, and combined with family payments constituted 
nearly 40 per cent of income.86 The annual profit payable by the colliery was highly 
variable - in the 1840s and 1850s it occasionally reached £1,000 but in other years fell 
to under £500.87 The Lincolnshire income, all from agricultural sources, was largely 
consistent over the medium term.88 Rowland commented cautiously that ‘I do not think 
that the available balance after allowing for…contingencies can safely be put at more 
                                                      
85 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 24 December 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
86 The mortgages were: £40,000 (Earl of Scarborough) at 4 per cent; £25,000 (Brown & Scarlett) at 4 per 
cent; £20,000 (Brown) at 3" per cent; £5,000 (Hadwen) at 41/8 per cent. Budget for 1858, A/1/8/1, and 
letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 24 December 1857, A1/8/1; both WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
87 The colliery profit, including the 6d per ton royalty paid to the estate, was £1,017 in 1855, £510 in 1856 
and £400 in 1857. Personal account and cheque books, c. 1813-1871, A1/8/27/1; Nostell and Wragby 
records of coal got, etc, C/3/1/9/1; both WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
88 The average Appleby annual rental was around £5,300 p.a. in the early 1850s, £6,400 in the mid and 
late 1850s (following a sharp rise in 1854, presumably from a rental review), and £7,000 (exclusive of 
ironworkers’ housing) in 1870. A/1/8/57 and A1/8/[787]; both WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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than £3,000 at the most if so much’.89  This surplus gave limited opportunity for the 
reduction of debt, or for accumulation of capital for improvement to the property. 
There is no indication that the problems of summer 1857 were caused by some 
sudden disruption in the Winns’ affairs. They arose instead from longstanding factors, 
often related to adherence to typical landowner policies. As Habbakkuk remarked, it 
was very common for landowners to ‘drift into debt in course of time by following 
the[ir] traditional activities…with a little too much vigour and by laxity in estate 
management’.90 The main problem for the Winns was the inability of the property to 
meet, without further borrowing, both the financial demands of their lifestyle and the 
terms of the settlement made in 1846-1847. The estate in 1857 had to support a number 
of significant charges in addition to the debt interest. The first was Nostell Priory itself. 
Charles described it as ‘a place that has always been a burden to the property’ because 
of its size and grandeur relative to the small estate on which it was built, and we recall 
his preference in 1846 for selling Nostell rather than the Thornton estate for that 
reason.91 Rowland reiterated the problem in 1857, stating that the house would be 
impossible even to let rent-free: ‘It is too large for anyone to take, and anyone able to do 
so would have a place of his own, and secondly it wants so much doing in the way of 
painting, lead work and repairs generally’.92 As we have seen, the £500 family 
payments were the outcome of the 1846-1847 resettlement.93 All these outgoings 
stretched the property’s resources. 
To compound the problems, Charles had been an inattentive custodian of his 
property’s financial affairs. The 1857 crisis was not the disaster that attended other 
cash-strapped landowners, but it severely stretched the Winns’ relatively limited 
resources.94 Although Charles was in holy orders and took a keen interest in diocesan 
affairs in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, there was a hint of an expansive Georgian attitude 
to his management of his property, and particularly to its adornment.95 He may have 
been unlucky in his foray into the land market, but his management of the property 
                                                      
89 Budget for 1858, A/1/8/1/11, WYL1352, WYAS (W). In the original document, Rowland 
miscalculated the balance as £3,710. One hopes that he realised his error quickly - it is unclear whether 
the £3,000 in the letter represented a rounding down from the incorrect figure or up from £2,710. 
90 Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, p. 294. 
91 Letter Charles Winn to John Marsden, n.d. (almost certainly 1846), A/1/8/9, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
92 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 21 October 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
93 Assuming a return of 5 per cent, the interest from £10,000 of capital went to family payments. 
94 For example, the 2nd Duke of Buckingham and 6th Duke of Newcastle were bankrupted. Thompson, 
Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, pp. 33-34. 
95 As well as undertaking building work on the Priory, he extensively redecorated the house, collected 
numerous works of art and antiquities, and restored Wragby Church. National Trust, Nostell Priory and 
Parkland, pp. 59-60.  
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added to its debts at the rate of over £4,000 per annum between 1848 and 1857.96 
Certainly record-keeping was not his strength. Rowland discovered that the bond debt 
was £2,200 higher than his father had told him prior to departure on his European 
tour.97 Charles had handed many aspects of the management of the Nostell estate and 
his own finances to a solicitor/land agent, a common practice among his contemporaries 
and a subject that will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3. Rowland Winn, 
however, conformed to Habakkuk’s characterisation of the generation of landowners 
that ‘came of age about or after 1830…[who] evinced greater outward decorum, were 
more serious and businesslike…and included more informed industrialists’.98 He was 
certainly, in the words of the historian Spring, ‘more careful about how [his] money was 
spent and more careful about how it was earned’ than his father.99 Once he had 
recovered from the shock of discovering the Winns’ true financial state, Rowland began 
to apply these sober perspectives to the management of the property.  
Rowland took the preservation of the estate in its entirety to be his over-riding 
objective. Other aspects of typical landowner behaviour – especially those relating to 
expensive displays of social status – were to be avoided. He believed that the family 
could live at their existing standard on the current income, but they would not be able to 
reduce the debt burden. Furthermore, any reduction in revenue would be awkward, at 
the very least. It is likely that by excluding share income and under-forecasting colliery 
profits – which actually realised £650 in 1858 – Rowland had compiled a ‘worst case’ 
budget. However, irrespective of any spin on the figures, Rowland took care to state the 
situation bluntly to his father: 
I think it is quite possible to live, as things now are, in a quiet way, 
without exceeding the Income, but I don’t think any material saving can 
be effected, and if times should come anything like what they were in 
1849 and ’50, [and] a 10 per cent reduction has to be made, I am afraid 
you will find great difficulty in making ends meet.100 
‘In a quiet way’ is a key phrase in this letter. 
A good housekeeping policy was put in place, an approach used by many landed 
families ‘under pressure of debt but not by any means at crisis point’, and this certainly 
                                                      
96 Charles’ debts of £98,200 equate to over £4,000,000 at current values. Hobson, The National Wealth, p. 
1185. 
97 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 4 July 1857, A1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
98 Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, p. 351. 
99 Spring, ‘The English Landed Estate in the Age of Coal and Iron’, p. 15.  
100 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 24 December 1857, A/1/8/1/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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contributed to the improvement of the Winns’ position.101 Edmund was prevented from 
selling a parcel of land to pay off the bank overdraft, because Rowland preferred to 
retain the land for a more constructive purpose. A consequence of keeping the overdraft 
was that Rowland as Charles’s representative had to sign cheques drawn on the account 
and could therefore control expenditure for both Appleby and Nostell, albeit at the 
expense of continuing bank charges.102 Charles’ overseas trip allowed Rowland to rein 
in his father’s spending by limiting money transfers to him.103 By taking personal 
control, raising and redeeming short-term loans, cutting costs and transferring funds 
from the Lincolnshire estate, cash flow was improved and by mid 1858 the immediate 
difficulties were over.104  
Rowland considered the family’s options. Further economies were impossible 
without fundamental changes to the manner in which the Winns were accustomed to 
live, thereby endangering their social standing. He concluded that ‘I can see nothing for 
it but arranging for the payment of some part of the debt without diminishing…yearly 
income, for this latter is absolutely necessary I am quite certain’.105 The sale of land was 
ruled out, as this would certainly ‘diminish the income’.106 The difficulty was to repay 
debt from existing resources, while avoiding risk: ‘With things in their present state I 
could never for a moment consent to the smallest speculation or risk of any kind 
however trifling.’107 Rowland’s use of the personal pronoun in this statement illustrates 
that over the course of 1857-1858 there had been a shift of leadership and power in the 
family. Rowland was initially shocked by the seriousness of their money problems, and 
the tone of his letters to his father implied that he looked to Charles for guidance. 
Charles’ replies, however, suggested that he was overborne by the problems, and indeed 
his lengthy European trip may have been designed to distance him from them. Rowland 
accepted that he had to deal with the situation, and displayed an increasing grasp on the 
detail and a determination to approach the issues positively. An important example of 
Rowland’s assumption of power, and a clear demonstration of his willingness to 
overturn customary practices, was the marginalisation and eventual dismissal of 
                                                      
101 Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, pp. 328-329. 
102 Until the overdraft was paid off, Edmund was not authorised to sign cheques. This caused some 
resentment on his part, but Rowland, perhaps pointedly, did not hurry to alter the situation. Letter 
Rowland to Charles Winn, 16 April 1858, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
103 Letters Rowland to Charles Winn, 24 July 1857, 23 January, 8 March, 10 and 16 April 1858, A/1/8/1, 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
104 Letters Rowland to Charles Winn, 21 October 1857 and 4 January 1858, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS 
(W). 
105 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 7 October 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
106 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 21 October 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
107 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 7 October 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Marsden as the family solicitor, in which Rowland got his way despite Charles’ 
reluctance to part with a longstanding and trusted advisor.108 Although all major 
decisions and expenditure had to be sanctioned by Charles as proprietor, in practice 
Rowland quickly became the mainspring of policy and, behind a show of deference to 
the head of the family, his proposals were usually acted upon. During spring 1858, as 
his economies brought him into calmer financial waters, Rowland began to consider 
how the resources of the property might be better exploited.  
Making more money from land 
 
Landowners could increase their income in a variety of ways. Some of these methods 
were inappropriate to the Winns’ circumstances: Rowland was married and so a match 
with an affluent heiress was not an option, and the Winns had no presence in national 
politics and therefore had little opportunity of obtaining a financially rewarding central 
government appointment, a diminishing market in any case after the introduction of the 
Civil Service Commission in 1855.109 Professional employment other than in politics 
was out of the question for the owner of 10,000 acres – or for his heir - and there were 
few opportunities for a landed gentleman to profit from adding social tone to the board 
of a public company.110  
The most likely means of increasing a landed family’s income was through the 
‘deliberate exploitation of the resources of the estate’.111  However, this was subject to 
the nature of the estate’s natural resources, location and transport connections. It was 
also dependent on the landowner’s ability to raise capital, a subject that will be 
considered in more detail in the next chapter. The Winns’ opportunities to generate 
more income were limited. Turning first to the potential of the land surface, it was 
unlikely that they could significantly improve their agricultural revenue. The family had 
raised its farm rents in 1854, and a further increase would require support from capital 
that they did not have. In any case, the timescale to receiving a return from improved 
agricultural output was, as Charles Winn had discovered, both long and uncertain, while 
                                                      
108 Letter John Marsden to Charles Winn, 8 November 1861 and reply (no day given) November 1861, 
A/1/8/13/2, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
109 S. J. Checkland, The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885 (London, 1964), p. 313; G. R. 
Searle, Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain (Oxford, 1993), p. 113. 
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Australian Oil Co. 
111 Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System, pp. 304-305. 
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its cost was immediate and real.112 Victorian landowners exploited a number of 
alternatives to traditional forms of agriculture, particularly the supply of perishable 
foodstuffs and diary products to urban areas. These markets were ‘small islands of 
success’ in ‘the unparalleled decline of late nineteenth century British agriculture’, but 
they required excellent transport systems or very close proximity to major centres of 
population.113 Other landowners developed their property for residential or industrial 
purposes, or exploited the potential of coastal estates for ports or seaside resorts.114 
Land was an asset that held out the potential to exploit space to build industrial plant 
and transport infrastructure.115 The Winns’ estates were in thinly-populated rural areas 
in which there was no demand for manufacturing premises, little residential or leisure 
potential, and poor transport connections. In 1858 no railway crossed the Appleby estate 
and the closest line to Nostell was sufficiently distant that carting costs decimated profit 
margins. This was made clear by Rowland when discussing the felling of a plantation 
for timber:  
[The plantation] is so situated that it is very difficult to get rid of the 
wood at all because the railway stations are so far off that it takes half 
the value of the wood to pay for the leading [i.e. carting], and it is so far 
from the collieries that they will not fetch it for prop wood.116 
Nostell was distant from a canal, and although the Lincolnshire land was close to the 
River Trent, it did not generate any agricultural or industrial activities that would 
benefit significantly from water-borne transport - much of the estate consisted of sandy 
heath land.  
As the surface of the Winns’ land did not offer any obvious opportunities, 
consideration had to be given to its mineral resources. Nineteenth century landowners 
inherited a tradition of proprietorial entrepreneurship in industrial ventures on their 
estates, and particularly in mining. This had long been a staple on suitably endowed 
property because of the scarcity in earlier centuries of independent entrepreneurs with 
                                                      
112 Rent day remittances from the Yorkshire and Lincolnshire land stewards indicate that a rent increase 
of c. 15 per cent took place in 1854. Charles Winn’s bank books, personal and mineral accounts c. 1846-
1871, A1/8/[787], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
113 Turner, ‘Agriculture, 1860-1914’, p. 134. 
114 Thompson, Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, pp. 29-40 passim; Spring, ‘English 
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£286 million invested in British railways between 1830 and 1855, 25 per cent had been spent on the 
purchase of land. Bédarida, Social History of England, p. 44. 
116 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 4 January 1858, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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sufficient capital to undertake the task: ‘many estate owners developed large industrial 
enterprises [in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries]. The link was most direct in the 
case of mining’.117 Mining might not be limited to coal: the Beaumont family and the 
Duke of Devonshire mined lead and other metals in the Pennines and Wales, and 
several landed families were active in Cornish tin and copper. Earls Dudley and 
Glanville were ironmasters, exploiting the coal and iron ore found under their land.118 
Coal, however, was the most commonly mined mineral as it was widely distributed and 
in demand for industrial and domestic purposes.119 Earl Fitzwilliam and the Duke of 
Norfolk were both colliery operators in south Yorkshire, and the Duke of Bridgewater 
owned several collieries linked by an extensive network of subterranean waterways in 
south Lancashire and Cheshire.120 The value of mineral assets was secured by Britain’s 
land law, which conveyed the right to the landowner of excavating the subsoil for all 
minerals except precious metals.121 The use of land for industrial purposes was therefore 
considered a legitimate aspect of a landlord’s desire to exploiting his property’s natural 
assets, and did not carry any stigma of ‘trade’.  
Rowland was willing to think expansively on the subject of mineral potential 
and to test out any possible opening. In October 1857 he advertised the fireclay under 
the Appleby estate for lease, ‘as it was thought a desirable opportunity in consequence 
of the London potters being driven from…London by the new Smoke Act’.122 Nothing 
came of this, and it was unlikely that a consumer-goods industry would move to rural 
Lincolnshire from London, where it was co-located with a large market and on excellent 
transport routes. The coal under the Nostell estate was a more realistic potential source 
of income. The Winns had been involved in the coal trade for many years, although 
their existing colliery at Wragby was of modest size and was treated as a minor element 
of the estate’s activities.123 The demand for its coal was strongly seasonal, and was 
                                                      
117 Thompson, Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, p. 36; Pollard, Genesis of Modern 
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118 Spring, ‘English Landowners and Nineteenth-Century Industrialism’, pp. 28-32. 
119 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 28-30. 
120 Ward, J.T., ‘Landowners in Mining’, in Ward, J. T., and Wilson, R. G. (eds), Land and Industry: The 
Landed Estate and the Industrial Revolution (Newton Abbot, 1971), pp. 63-116; this ref. pp. 70-75. 
121 Spring, ‘English Landowners and Nineteenth-Century Industrialism’, p. 17; H. F. Bulman, ‘Mineral 
Holdings’, in W. S. Boulton (ed.), Practical Coal-Mining vol. 5 (London, 1907), pp. 123-142; this ref. p. 
123. It was possible (particularly under enclosed common land) for the ownership of the surface and the 
minerals to become separated, but usually they were co-owned.  
122 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 29 October 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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therefore probably sold largely for domestic use.124  The shallow seams the colliery 
worked were unlikely to be able to support a sufficiently increased output to raise the 
level of profit, and the lack of transport links other than public roads constrained 
Wragby’s market to its immediate locality.125 In any case, the Winns lacked the capital 
to develop a new colliery.  
Despite this apparently unpromising situation, however, by the 1850s the rising 
demand for coal, coupled with improved mining techniques and expansion of the 
railway network, had stimulated a search for coal at deeper levels in the area east of 
Wakefield. Economically viable reserves had been confirmed, and the focus of the west 
Yorkshire coal industry began to shift to a district north of Nostell, around Castleford 
and Featherstone.126 Alert to these developments, the Winns had for several years been 
making trial bores to establish whether the deeper seams were present under their 
land.127 Nostell was a few miles distant from the axis of the newly-developed coalfield 
but shared the same geological characteristics, and when the Barnsley seam was proved 
under a estate at nearby Woolley the West Riding press asserted that ‘at least half a 
million of money’ had been added to the estate’s value.128 A febrile ‘Gold Rush’ 
atmosphere prevailed in the area in the late 1850s, with rumours of coal discoveries at 
different locations and depths. Rowland maintained a sceptical attitude but kept his 
father informed on events: 
Some Wakefield people I hear have put down a bore hole half way 
between Nostell and Normanton and have it is said at less than 100 
yards [found] a 6’ bed but this latter I do not believe tho’ I fancy there 
is no doubt they have come to coal.129 
The deep seams presented a real opportunity. The railway network - crucial for access 
to high-volume markets - was reaching the Wakefield area. During the 1840s and ‘50s, 
Wakefield, Doncaster and Pontefract all gained railway connection. These towns were 
too distant for a dedicated branch to a colliery at Nostell, or for road transport to the 
                                                      
124 A. J. Taylor, ‘Productivity and Technological Innovation’, p. 50.  
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railhead to be economic. However, a relatively short link between the existing lines at 
Wakefield and Doncaster, passing close to the Priory itself, would give access from 
Nostell to the West Riding, Lancashire and the south and east of England.130 In early 
1858 Rowland stated unequivocally to his father that: ‘Our greatest hope must rest in 
the coal at Nostell, which if it proves as good as it promises, and a railway is eventually 
made, may be of very considerable value’.131 Other landowners – for example the Duke 
of Norfolk and the Rockingham-Fitzwilliam family in the Sheffield area – developed 
collieries because their coal fed local metal-based industry that produced high rents for 
the estates.132 Rowland had grasped that the value of a new colliery to the Winns would 
lie in its ability to sell coal in distant markets reached by rail, and that a railway was an 
essential element of the preparation to develop a new colliery. 
Carlton: an apprenticeship in the coal trade 
 
Prior to the financial crisis of 1857, the Winns largely conformed to landowner culture 
in their social characteristics, the use of their property’s resources and the passing of its 
ownership between generations. The crisis forced the family to re-evaluate the way in 
which they ran their estates, and they turned to the conventional practice of exploiting 
their land’s mineral resources. An aspect in which the Winns were not conventional, 
however, was in still owning and operating Wragby Colliery in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when most landowners leased out their mineral resources rather than 
take the risk of direct ownership of mining activities.133 In considering the possibility of 
a new, larger colliery at Nostell, the Winns would have to decide whether to finance the 
colliery themselves or lease out the deeper seams to a third party. They had some 
experience of the practicalities of entering the coal market at regional or national level 
as they had learned a number of valuable lessons in entrepreneurship in the coal trade 
through a bid submitted by Edmund in 1854 to sink a new colliery at Carlton, a few 
miles south of Nostell. The bid had eventually failed but will be considered in detail 
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because it strongly influenced the Winns’ determination of a strategy for sinking a new 
colliery on their home estate.134  
By 1854, Edmund had returned to civilian life from the Army. He needed to find 
another career and was interested in owning and managing a commercial concern, 
stating that he ‘should like the constant employment it would afford’.135 The first half of 
the 1850s was a period of rapid expansion and rising prices in the coal trade, and the 
burgeoning coal industry around Barnsley was an attractive milieu for an aspiring 
entrepreneur.136 Colliery ownership as a career was less socially outré for the son of a 
landed family in the West Riding than it might be elsewhere – as we will see, a number 
of other gentlemanly families were prepared to launch a son in the coal trade. The 
Winns had experience of mining on their estate and contacts among Yorkshire 
landowners. These advantages were brought into play in spring 1854 when Lord 
Wharncliffe advertised a lease of the coal reserves under 1300 acres of his Carlton 
estate near Barnsley.137 The Winns agreed that, backed by a contribution of family 
capital, Edmund would bid for the lease.  
Edmund obtained first refusal on the lease from Wharncliffe, granted largely on 
the basis of their social connection. The families were on friendly terms, and – for the 
initial period at least – this link overrode considerations of mining expertise and 
financial strength.138 When the development of Carlton was first mooted, Rowland 
assumed that the upper coal seams could be opened out for around £10,000 cash plus a 
modest amount of borrowing:  
If we manage well, by the time the four [rent-free] years are out from 
the beginning of the lease we ought to be almost ready to go down to 
the Barnsley bed, and have paid off a good portion of our borrowed 
money at least as I hope.139 
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This was optimistic, even naïve. It assumed that in a four-year timescale not only could 
a shaft be sunk to over 100 yards’ depth, surface plant and worker housing built, a 
workforce of several hundred recruited in a rural area, and a connection made to the 
canal or railway network, but also sufficient coal sold in a highly competitive market to 
meet running costs and debt interest, and repay the majority of the borrowed capital. 
Rowland’s estimate was not based on recent or directly comparable experience.  The 
Winns’ existing colliery at Wragby had been sunk in the 1830s at a cost of under £2,000 
fully funded by the family. The shaft was around 50 yards deep and supplied a local 
market, providing the Winns with what was effectively a monopoly because of transport 
limitations.140  
Rowland’s plans were put into perspective by a report on Carlton produced by a 
Wakefield mining engineer, John Walker. Rowland and Edmund had been advised by 
Henry Holt, the mining agent for Nostell estate, to obtain an independent report on the 
coal.141 Walker’s opinion was that because the new colliery would operate in a highly 
competitive, price-driven market, the project held significant risks relating to geology, 
the cost of transport, and the minimum rent demanded by the landowner. He 
recommended that before signing a lease, the Winns should sink boreholes to prove the 
location, thickness and quality of the coal, and obtain assurances from canal and railway 
companies that transport could be provided to the colliery site.142 Walker followed up in 
early 1855 with his estimate that the minimum capital necessary to sink and equip the 
colliery would be £40,000, substantially higher that Rowland’s expectation. It was also 
more than the capital sum that Charles was prepared to pay to establish Edmund in an 
occupation. Rowland and Charles concluded that ‘a large amount of capital will be 
required, and it will therefore be quite necessary that Edmund shall get two or three 
partners to join with him’.143  
Negotiations on the coal lease took place by correspondence and face-to-face 
meetings between the Winn brothers and the 2nd and – from autumn 1855 - 3rd Lords 
Wharncliffe.144 F. M. L. Thompson has suggested that the involvement of many 
landowners to industrial activity on their estates was often slight and distanced from 
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commercial reality, but this was not the case at Carlton.145 Although matters of detail 
were referred to the mineral agent, the negotiations took place directly between Lord 
Wharncliffe and the Winns. The outcome was important to each party and the 
exchanges were brisk and business-like. The Wharncliffe family’s long experience in 
the north-east coal trade had given them firm opinions on commercial matters.146 For 
example, the 2nd Lord refused to contribute to the cost of cottages for the Carlton 
workforce because ‘they would very probably [be] worse than useless to me when they 
became so to you’. He also declined to reduce the annual coal rent below £1,500 or to 
extend the lease to thirty years from the twenty-three in the draft lease: 
This appears to me to be as low as I can go [Wharncliffe had agreed a 
decrease of £500 per annum]. The coalowner’s object is generally a 
large certain rent…in my own case I have lately obtained £2,000 
without difficulty, after having been advised to ask more, on workings 
which cannot be so extensive as these should be…I do not think [long 
leases] can be fairly called for when the risk is inclosed [sic] within 
such narrow limits [because the quality of the seams is] well-known…I 
must repeat that I think Colliery lessees have very little claim on the 
plea of risk under such circumstances as these, when I am doing all I 
can to reduce it to a minimum.147 
The negotiations demonstrated that landowners discussed issues with a clear business 
mind, but the concessions given by Wharncliffe suggest that they were based on the 
principle of being social equals among the gentry class. When it came to financial risks, 
however, Wharncliffe was a businessman at heart.  
A potential incompatibility between commercial reality and the landowning 
class’s conventions was brought to the fore when the project ran into difficulties over 
Edmund’s financial standing. In late 1855 the 3rd Lord Wharncliffe took over the 
negotiations, assuming that either Charles or Rowland would be the lease signatory and 
the cost of the colliery underwritten by the Winns’ entire estate. The Winns, for their 
part, claimed that it was always intended that Edmund would be the leaseholder and that 
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the 2nd Lord Wharncliffe had been aware of this.148 The 3rd Lord wanted a soundly 
capitalised lessee who would produce a reliable return for his estate, and, as a 
landowner himself, understood the weakness of Edmund’s position. Once the Winns’ 
intention was clarified, Wharncliffe bluntly stated his objection to Charles. He required 
a lessee who: 
…is at once a sufficient security and guarantee for the proper working 
of the field. Your son Edmund is only a second son, and in consequence 
of our wish to have really responsible persons to deal with, it did seem 
to us that his name alone would hardly be a sufficient guarantee.149 
Wharncliffe wanted Charles or Rowland to be the lessee. Rowland convinced 
his father not to agree to this, because the colliery might become an unlimited charge on 
the entire Winn property: ‘a smash, from unforeseen events, in the colliery, must 
produce the same as regards the Estate’.150 Even before the financial problems of 1857, 
the risk of being exposed to the collapse of a commercial venture was intolerable to the 
elder Winns. The priorities of the landowning class were asserted and the objective of 
securing employment for Edmund was placed second to that of protecting the financial 
stability of the property. As with other contemporary landowners, the high capital 
requirement and high risk of mining was too much for a single family, and the Winns 
proposed to Wharncliffe that Edmund assemble and lead a partnership to finance the 
bid. Lord Wharncliffe reluctantly agreed in principle to grant a lease to a partnership, on 
condition that his solicitor approved the proposed partners as being of adequate 
financial standing.151  
Partnerships of the type that Edmund hoped to recruit had become popular in the 
mid-eighteenth century and were common in the Yorkshire mining industry in the 
1850s. A well-balanced partnership could supply finance, technical expertise, and 
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manpower for the management of the enterprise.152 Edmund explained to a potential 
investor that he intended to take the role of joint managing partner: 
…Works on such scale as I have supposed would require a considerable 
outlay of capital, larger perhaps than my father or I should think any 
single individual would like to embark, but if we can establish a 
company of four or five, this difficulty would be at an end, and I should 
propose to get one of the proprietors to join with me in the 
management, as I object to the idea of leaving the management of such 
concerns altogether to agents.153 
Rowland suggested that Edmund should contribute only £7,000 of his quarter share of 
the £40,000 capital proposed by Walker, the balance of £3,000 being met by the other 
partners to recompense him for setting up the company and managing the enterprise; 
Edmund would still be entitled to 25 per cent of the profits. Rowland probably got this 
idea from John Marsden, the Winns’ solicitor, who was also managing partner in the 
Woolley Coal Co. Marsden’s stake in the Woolley company was £9,000.154 He had paid 
only £6,000 of this, the remainder being remitted by his partners as reward for carrying 
out the same services that Edmund would at Carlton.155  
Other than through a partnership, Edmund’s options for finding the balance of 
the capital were limited. He was in his mid-twenties, and was handicapped by his youth, 
lack of contacts in the commercial world, and absence of practical experience of mine 
management other than the oversight of Wragby Colliery. Yorkshire banks at this 
period were prepared to lend money to colliery ventures – although usually for short-
term working capital and for sums substantially less than £33,000 – while life insurance 
companies occasionally lent money on mortgage to industrial companies, but any form 
of loan would require security, preferably against real estate.156 As a younger son, 
Edmund had no property of his own, and Charles’s refusal to act as leaseholder 
precluded the estate’s use as loan security for Carlton. Rowland did not want the family 
to assume any further debt, advising Edmund that ‘if a mortgage can be done 
                                                      
152 John F. Wilson, British Business History, 1720-1994 (Manchester, 1995), pp. 27-28. 
153 Letter, Edmund Winn to William Aldam, 19 November 1855, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
154 Letters, Rowland to Charles Winn, 31 March 1855, A/1/8/1, and Rowland to Edmund Winn, 24 March 
1856, both C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Crouzet suggests that a managing partner entitled to a 
disproportionate share of the profits was a common arrangement. F. Crouzet, The First Industrialists: The 
Problem of Origins (Cambridge, 1985), p. 113. 
155 The total capitalisation of the Woolley Coal Co. was £30,000. John Goodchild, Coals from Barnsley 
(Wakefield, 1986), p. 26. 
156 P. L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830-1914: The Finance and Organization of English 
Manufacturing Industry (London, 1980), pp. 215-216. 
 45 
without…it will be the best and save a great deal of expense’.157 An informal market-
place for entrepreneurs seeking partner capital for industrial ventures developed in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, often mediated by accountants and solicitors using 
newspaper advertisements and specialist investor magazines, but this did not exist as 
early as 1855. The London stock exchange at this period was largely concerned with 
government securities and railway shares. It had little interest in provincial industries, 
particularly one as risky as coal. Although the Joint Stock Companies Act had passed 
into law in 1856, to set up a public company for a venture like the Carlton colliery 
would have been an unusual and pioneering step for a youthful member of a provincial 
landed gentry family.158 The great majority of capital in the coal industry in the 1850s 
was arranged informally by private investors, and Edmund followed this path in his 
search for funds.159 
In late 1855 Edmund set out to find partners to contribute the full £40,000. In so 
doing, he ignored John Marsden’s advice, which was that sinking and equipping should 
be undertaken at minimum expense so that coal could be raised quickly. The resultant 
revenue could then be used to expand production and improve facilities:  
I strongly advise you not to talk of so large a sum as capital. It will in 
these days frighten people…There is a manifest difference between the 
capital actually required to open out a concern in the first instance, and 
what may be afterwards be deemed desirable [to get the largest 
output]…the latter should come from accumulated profits.160 
Rowland considered this ‘most absurd’ and attributed it to Marsden’s fear that a new 
sinking at Nostell would compete with his own colliery.161 In fact Marsden’s advice was 
sound and was based on personal experience. Carlton was in a new coalfield and 
therefore a high-risk investment, and a low initial outlay would make it a more 
attractive proposition for potential investors.  
Edmund’s attempts to find partners for Carlton were restricted to a small number 
of friends and family, mostly in Yorkshire. Two of the main contacts through whom he 
hoped to identify potential investors were Thomas Faulconer - a member of a Yorkshire 
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family living in London and associated with the Stock Exchange - and William Aldam, 
a family friend and chairman of the Aire and Calder Navigation Company.162 Both sent 
polite but negative responses. Gentry families were not a naturally receptive audience 
for a speculative company working leased coal, because of the limited enthusiasm 
shown by most landowners for industrial ventures not directly connected to their own 
property.163 Aldam simply remarked that ‘I should not be sanguine that any of them 
[directors of the Aire & Calder Navigation] would be willing to embark in it’.164 
Faulconer replied that ‘London money’ was not interested as southern investors had 
little knowledge of or trust in colliery speculation, leaving Edmund to conclude that 
‘comparatively few people out of the coal districts know much or take interest in 
collieries...’.165  
The networks through which Edmund sought investors were restricted to his 
own social class, and there is no evidence that he attempted to reach a wider audience 
by advertising in the press or approaching any established mine-owners. However, in 
his letter to Thomas Faulconer, Edmund noted that he had received some positive 
approaches: 
I have already had applications from two parties, the one a banker and 
the other a railway contractor both men of money but not Gentlemen, 
and I would greatly prefer associating myself with a gentleman if 
possible.166 
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This comment did not represent simple snobbery. Although no doubt influenced by the 
‘acute sense of social distinction’ that Burn attributed to the mid-Victorians, Edmund 
pursued the Carlton bid with determination and expressed several times his enthusiasm 
for industrial management.167 It is unlikely that he would have done so if he considered 
the industry itself so distasteful that he had to insulate himself from it with partners 
from a landowning background. As Casson observes, there are advantages in the 
congruities of values and conduct - the ‘impersonal trust’ - between members of the 
same social group.168 The Wharncliffes showed this trust when they negotiated directly 
with the Winns in ways that they probably would not have done for middle-class 
applicants. These congruities enabled business partners to develop a collective will and 
reduce the inefficiencies and tension caused by conflicting attitudes and goals -
important criteria in an organisation with unlimited liability, operating in a risky 
industrial sector.169 Edmund was seeking to increase the likelihood of business success, 
rather than practicing social exclusion, but the outcome was to substantially reduce his 
chance of finding investors.  
After being rebuffed by Aldam and Faulconer, Edmund made some further 
desultory attempts to recruit partners from a gentry family in Yorkshire who were 
involved in mining, plus a number of ‘friends of friends’.170 Several of those expressing 
an initial interest also had the aim of launching a younger son in the coal trade and 
proposed similarly financially cagey terms as the Winns, without bringing any relevant 
experience to the partnership. The applicants who were willing to invest were 
unacceptable to Edmund, and those with whom he would have been happy to join in 
partnership were not interested. The informality of this process is striking and the 
‘personal, local and informal nature’ of the formation of capital was a characteristic of 
English industry up to the First World War.171 Edmund sent diffident letters describing 
the Carlton project to a network of family friends and acquaintances, the majority of 
whom lived within a short distance of Nostell. The surviving responses to Edmund’s 
letters rejected his proposal on the economically rational basis of its risk and the size of 
the capital, and perhaps also the inexperience of the potential managing partner. 
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Landowners were leasing the coal under their own estates, and not making high-risk 
investments in collieries on other peoples’ land. In July 1856 Edmund wrote to Lord 
Wharncliffe to surrender the option on the lease and withdraw his interest in Carlton, an 
embarrassing retreat from a business deal with a wealthy and socially prominent titled 
neighbour. Edmund stated in his letter that people were ‘afraid of embarking in the 
speculation when made aware of the terms’, not because it was, prima facie, an 
unbecoming activity for people of their social background, but because it was too risky 
for individuals with other outlets for their capital. Wharncliffe’s reply was courteous but 
suggested relief that an uncomfortable episode had been brought to a conclusion.172 The 
experience was not, however, wasted. In the following years, developments on the 
Winn property were to benefit from the advice John Walker gave on Carlton, and from 
Edmund’s experiences in trying to raise capital.  
After the collapse of the Carlton venture, the Winns’ attention was diverted by 
the financial difficulties of 1857 and 1858. Towards the end of the latter year, however, 
developments on the Lincolnshire estate began to offer hope for the resolution of the 
Winns’ money problems. These came to fruition so quickly that by 1860 the Winns 
were on the threshold of a new era in the family’s history, in which the economic basis 
of their wealth would change from agriculture to industry. This change would be 
initiated by the family, managed by it, and to a large degree financed by it, so that when 
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Chapter 3 considers the factors that influenced the Winns with regard to the method and 
timing by which the ironstone at Appleby and the coal at Nostell were turned to their 
financial advantage. It reviews the contributions made by Rowland Winn and his 
mineral agent, John Roseby, to the realisation of the strategy, and the consequent effect 
on the Winns’ finances. The focus of the chapter then moves to the family’s debts, and 
assesses Rowland’s attempts to reduce the burden of interest payments on the estate. 
This introduces the role played in the Winns’ financial affairs by John Marsden, Charles 
Winn’s solicitor and agent to the Nostell estate. The issues of moral hazard and the 
principal-agent relationship are central to this discussion. Finally, the chapter considers 
the practical issues – particularly transport - that had to be resolved before a new 
colliery at Nostell could be sunk, and concludes with an analysis of the sources from 
which the colliery’s capital was obtained. 
Developing a mineral strategy, 1859-1860 
 
By January 1858 Charles and Rowland Winn had agreed that a new, larger colliery at 
Nostell was the most promising opportunity for increasing the income from their two 
estates.1 There were several barriers to realising this aspiration. The largest was the 
capital required for the colliery, which was beyond their financial resources, so that 
apart from drilling to prove the extent of the coal reserves, the project was in abeyance 
throughout 1858. However, in mid-1859 Rowland surprised his father with a ‘somewhat 
unlooked-for piece of intelligence’. He had found economically viable ironstone 
deposits on the Lincolnshire estate. Rowland described the find to Charles in a terse and 
cautious manner:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 4 January 1858, A1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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I have been for some months past looking for ironstone here…A few 
weeks since I found two beds of undoubted ironstone, the reports on 
both of which on analysis are certainly satisfactory…I begin to hope it 
may be turned to some account. We are to have some of the ironmasters 
from Rotherham and that neighbourhood and also one from Durham to 
look at it…it may prove of considerable value. 
Rowland had not mentioned the iron previously, in order not to raise false hopes, ‘as 
until now I have felt so very skeptical [sic] on the subject of it being worth anything’.2 
His prospecting activities echoed those of many eighteenth and nineteenth century 
landowners who hoped to increase the income from their property. A few were 
instrumental in opening up an entirely new field of coal or metal ore. Earl Fitzwilliam, 
for instance, proved the eastern extension of the Yorkshire/Derbyshire coalfield in the 
Doncaster area.3 More modest proprietors also saw the commercial benefit of 
confirming the presence of minerals. For example, in 1857 the executor of the 
Beaumont estate near Huddersfield instructed its land agent that: 
If there is any chance of coal or ironstone being found under Meltham 
Moor I should certainly advise its being bored for…coal and iron if 
found would materially advance the Crossland estate’s value either for 
sale or for letting.4 
Rowland’s discovery had a lengthy gestation, as the first evidence of ironstone 
on the estate had been found in 1854. He had not pursued the matter because analysis 
had shown the stone to have an uneconomically low metal content. In 1858, under 
pressure from the estate’s financial problems, Rowland’s methodical approach to 
assessing the economic potential of the Lincolnshire property had led him to the 
conclusion ‘that the geological position of this part of the county corresponded very 
much with Cleveland and that portion of Yorkshire in which ironstone is worked 
largely’.5 Further searches were made on the estate and ironstone was found that had a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Both quotations from letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 3 June 1859, A1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
Note Rowland’s tactful use of the phrase ‘a few weeks since’. He had actually found the ironstone at least 
six months previously and presumably did not wish to admit that he had concealed the information from 
his father for so long.  
3 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 172-173; Ward, ‘Landowners in Mining’, pp. 70-71. 
4 Letter, Sir Digby Cayley to Thomas Dunderdale, 18 February 1857, WBC/382 (Whitley Beaumont 
papers), WYAS (K). 
5 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 3 June 1859, A1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Rowland was assisted 
in the discovery by Rev. J. E. Cross, the vicar of Appleby and a  geologist. D. C. D. Pocock, ‘Stages in 
! 51!
higher metal content than the samples tested four years previously.6 A twentieth century 
history of the iron and steel industry described Charles Winn as ‘far-sighted’ because 
the ironstone was found under common land that he had enclosed, but the enclosures 
were made without awareness of the land’s mineral wealth and until 1858 the area was a 
burden to the property. A large proportion of the ironfield was on sandy ‘warren land’ 
with little agricultural potential, whose ‘chief economic activity was the sale of skins at 
the Brigg fur market’ from commercial rabbit farming.7 Rowland’s 1858 budget showed 
that the average yield per acre of agrarian activities at Appleby was less than that of 
Nostell, realising £1-5-0d per annum compared to £1-8-0d for the Yorkshire estate.8 
The discovery soon became known locally, a newspaper reporting that ironstone 
had been found ‘in such quantities…as to lead to the expectation that mines will shortly 
be opened in the locality’.9 The Winns greeted the news with enthusiasm, delighted by 
the prospect of relief from their financial troubles. Their comments were compatible 
with the view that profiting from the extraction of minerals was, as P. Hudson argued, 
‘an aspect of estate improvement’, and that involvement in this form of industry did not 
compromise a landowner’s social status.10 Rowland’s mother described the sensation in 
the Winns’ social circle: 
I believe you are astonishing some people at present with the wonders 
of your works in Lincolnshire – at least we hear of Dick Lee being full 
of our wonderful wealth, which he is talking about since he returned 
home from Appleby.11 
Rowland’s brother-in-law added his congratulations: ‘I am delighted to hear such a 
good account of the iron affairs, it really has become a great fact and there can be no 
mistake that I can see’.12 Charles Winn described the discovery as ‘a triumph’, and 
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wrote to his son Rowland in the warmest terms, but behind his words lay his concern at 
the estate’s indebtedness: 
Your report has certainly given me a most agreeable surprise…the truth 
of which I can yet scarcely realise to myself, though it be an established 
fact. You have worked hard, and with great tact, in this matter, and I am 
well satisfied with all that you have done, indeed I should be hard to 
please were I not. I cannot tell you, my dear Rowley, what a load of 
anxiety will be removed from my mind if, in the course of a few years, 
we are able to pay off the large mortgage.13 
Buttressed by the applause of his family, Rowland worked to confirm the value 
of the mineral resource and the ways in which it could be realised. The Winns had 
deposits of two minerals under their estates, doubling the opportunity to stabilise their 
finances. In the late 1850s the markets for both coal and iron were expanding rapidly. 
Coal production rose by 15 per cent between 1855 and 1860, and, following a brief peak 
in 1853-1855, the price of coal remained steady and on a slight upward trend into the 
1860s.14 There was a strong demand for iron ore as a number of Britain’s older 
ironfields were becoming exhausted.15 The market for pig iron was buoyant and output 
increased by one third between 1855 and 1865, a period during which the iron and steel 
industry saw the beginnings of a number of major innovations, including the Bessemer 
convertor and the Siemens-Martin open-hearth furnace.16 The Lincolnshire stone was 
not as rich as that from many established fields, but the Middlesbrough iron industry 
had given British smelters experience in dealing with lower-grade ore.17 Given adequate 
transport access, it was likely that a ready market could be found for both coal and iron.  
Mining the minerals on their own account could potentially net the largest return 
for the Winns, but required capital that they could not easily get and exposed the family 
to a variety of market and operational risks. Leasing the minerals for extraction would 
realise a lower but predictable income with much reduced risk, and was the route taken 
by most of their peers in the late 1850s. The Winns’ background was a factor. They had 
a longstanding presence in the coal trade – albeit at a local level – and had recent 
experience at Carlton of the issues involved in establishing a colliery. Ironstone, on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Letter Charles to Rowland Winn, 10 November 1859, A1/10/[1808], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
14 Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 86; Church, History of the British 
Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 54. 
15 Crouzet, Victorian Economy, p. 238. 
16 Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, pp. 378-379. 
17 Crouzet, Victorian Economy, p. 239. 
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other hand, was new to them. In 1859 Rowland appointed the mining engineer and 
geologist John Roseby as mineral agent for the Lincolnshire estate, to assist with the 
development of the iron ore. Roseby was chosen because of his knowledge of the 
Cleveland ironstone field, which Lincolnshire was likely to resemble.18 He provided 
technical and commercial advice, and access to contacts in the iron trade. Acting on his 
advice Rowland adopted a rational economic strategy based on the characteristics of the 
estates and the minerals, in the context of the Winns’ overall financial situation.  
A number of factors favoured exploiting the ironstone before the coal. The iron 
deposits were extensive, underlying much of the Winns’ property and substantial areas 
of neighbouring estates. The stone was self-fluxing, thus saving the ironmasters the cost 
of limestone, and occurred in thick, unfaulted beds overlain by light sandy soil so that it 
could be worked easily on the outcrop or by opencast.19 As a result, the ore could 
generate income quickly for the Winns because shafts did not need to be sunk, an 
expensive and time-consuming exercise. It also reduced capital investment. The main 
items of fixed capital would be the means of transport from the ore-field to the River 
Trent, about six miles away, and the construction of suitable loading facilities on the 
riverbank. Finally, ironstone gave the opportunity for the development – as at 
Middlesbrough – of furnaces co-located with the ore, generating industrial and urban 
revenues from land that was of limited value for agricultural purposes. The coal at 
Nostell was unlikely to attract industry in the same way. It was an important as a fuel in 
many industries, but was relatively cheap and easily transported by rail to the site of 
scarcer and more expensive factors of production. The ironstone had greater potential 
for generating rents from industrial and residential development. 
In the short term, therefore, the coal at Nostell was a less attractive proposition 
than the ironstone. There were other reasons to delay the exploitation of the coal. The 
Winns did not have available the capital to finance a colliery themselves, and Rowland 
did not wish to increase the family’s borrowings. If the coal was leased, the rental was 
unlikely to be high because of the location and nature of the estate. In the late 1850s 
there was no immediate prospect of a railway being built close to Nostell. The high !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Roseby and/or his father were variously credited by the newspapers by having discovered the 
Cleveland iron ore deposits, and certainly were among the first to exploit them. Northern Echo, 7 October 
1881, and North Eastern Daily Gazette, 25 January 1882. 
19 Birch, Economic History of the British Iron and Steel Industry, pp. 347-348. 
Rowland initially preferred the ore to be mined, presumably to preserve the surface, but this proved 
impractical and no mining – as opposed to quarrying - of stone took place on the Winn estate until 1938. 
T. Daff, ‘The Establishment of Ironmaking at Scunthorpe’, in M. E. Armstrong (ed.), An Industrial 
Island: A History of Scunthorpe (Scunthorpe, 1981), pp. 31-38; this ref. pp. 31-32. 
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transport costs that would have to be paid to get the coal to market would be reflected in 
a lower lease rental. The size of the estate was also problematic. It was quite small at 
2,500 acres, and included a major fault that prevented the full acreage from being mined 
from a single location. The Winns were unlikely to permit mining under the Priory and 
its environs, further reducing the area available for lease. A small ‘take’ made it 
difficult for entrepreneurs to recoup their capital expenditure unless the price of coal 
was particularly high, as John Walker pointed out in his report on Carlton in 1854, and 
this consideration would diminish the Nostell coal’s potential rental. The ability to 
maintain a high rental over the medium term would therefore require an extended period 
of buoyant prices, and the coal market was notoriously subject to price cycles. In 1854 
Lord Wharncliffe had been prepared to accept £1,500 minimum annual rental for 1,350 
acres of coal at Carlton, during a period of elevated coal prices.20 The coal seams at 
Carlton were the same as those at Nostell, and the acreage would probably also have 
been similar. In these circumstances, the highest minimum annual rental that the Winns 
would be able to demand would probably have been £2,000 to £2,500. The higher figure 
would be a useful contribution to the Winns’ income, but not one that would make a 
substantial reduction in their debts. Leasing the coal would not bring in revenue quickly, 
because the normal terms of a coal lease included a period of shaft sinking during which 
no rent was paid.21 The main advantage of leasing was its low risk, but in this case the 
return was also likely to be unacceptably low. 
Rowland concluded that the Nostell coal was not a viable short-term option, 
whether it was leased out or mined by the Winns on their own behalf. A self-financed 
colliery had the potential to be more remunerative, but only in the longer-term and at 
significant capital cost. Leasing the Appleby iron ore, on the other hand, represented an 
attractive opportunity in terms of speed of return, low risk, and limited capital 
investment by the Winns. This strategy was recommended by Roseby, and reflected his 
experience in Cleveland where ironmasters held many of the ore leases, rather than 
independent mining companies who sold the stone on to smelters.22 Rowland therefore 
put the coal aside for the time being, and adopted a rentier approach to the iron ore. 
Parcels of land were designated for lease to ironmasters who would transport the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For the Carlton rent, see Chapter 2, p. 42. Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 54. 
21 Caleb Pamely, The Colliery Manager’s Handbook (London, 1904), p. 42. The Winns assumed a rent-
free period during the Carlton bid. Of course, the necessity to sink shafts would also meant that a self-
financed colliery would not produce any revenue until the coal had been reached. 
22 Letter, John Roseby to Rowland Winn, 4 May 1859, WYL1352, WYAS (W). William Fordyce, A 
History of the Coal, Coke, Coalfields and Iron Manufacturing in Northern England (Newcastle, 1973; 
facs. of original publ. 1860), pp. 141-143. 
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extracted ore via the Trent/Aire/Ouse waterways to their furnaces in Yorkshire.23 
Although leasing the ironstone reflected the established trend to withdrawal from direct 
involvement in mining by landowners, the decision was taken as the most appropriate to 
the Winns’ situation rather than to conform to the practices of the family’s peers.  
Ironstone, financial resurgence and capital accumulation, 1859-1865 
 
Rowland and Roseby set about monetising the Lincolnshire ironstone. A history of the 
Scunthorpe iron and steel industry accurately describes Rowland as ‘a man of 
considerable vigour and determination, willing to work hard and long to achieve his 
aims’, and he threw himself into his task.24 Throughout the start-up period he 
participated in all business matters, attended meetings and negotiations with potential 
lessees, worked with legal advisors on mineral rights disputes, and was active in the 
promotion of a public railway to serve the quarries. He travelled extensively, domestic 
life taking second place to the pursuit of the family’s commercial interests.25 Thompson 
remarked that ‘railway travel was a convenience to the aristocracy, who could move 
their plate and servants back and forth…with ease’, and it was equally convenient for 
entrepreneurial landowners.26 Rowland’s letters were frequently written on trains and 
posted at intermediate stations, and the speed with which he was able to bring his plans 
to fruition was materially assisted by railway travel. He dealt personally with 
ironmasters from Leeds, Rotherham and Birmingham – realising that he had to deal 
with the middle-class businessmen who owned most of England’s ironworks - and did 
not assert his social dignity. For example, his usual London hotel was in St James St., 
convenient for his base at the Carlton Club, but he was willing to forgo it for business 
reasons: ‘If I find it will facilitate matters I will stop at the Tavistock where Mr Dawes 
[a potential lessee] is’.27  
In the light of the Stones’ remark that ‘before 1880, [the landed elite’s] personal 
contacts with the entrepreneurs of the great Victorian economic revolution seem to have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Daff, ‘The Establishment of Ironmaking at Scunthorpe’, p. 32. 
24 F. Henthorn, ‘The Coming of the Railway’, in M. E. Armstrong (ed.), An Industrial Island: A History 
of Scunthorpe (Scunthorpe, 1981), pp. 39-45; this ref. p. 39. 
25 Rowland’s correspondence 1859-1861 shows that he travelled frequently between, inter alia, London, 
the west Midlands, Cleveland, Lincolnshire, Nostell and Leeds. The letters make clear his regret at the 
frequent separations from his family, to whom he was closely attached. 
26 Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 190. 
27 Letter from Rowland Winn to John Hett, 7 November 1860, reproduced in F. Henthorn (ed.), Letters 
and Papers concerning the Establishment of the Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby Railway, 1860-1862 
(Lincoln Record Society vol. 70, Lincoln, 1975), p. 7. Hett was a partner in a Brigg, Lincs, legal firm that 
acted for Rowland. 
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been curiously remote’, Rowland Winn was a pioneer in his willingness to engage in the 
world of industry.28 Thompson characterised the landowners who owned and ran their 
own industrial enterprises as participating in commercial matters ‘conducted at arm’s 
length through agents and managers, and it was not a business providing their sole 
source of support’.29 This was not the case with Rowland in the late 1850s and 1860s, 
when his immersion in commercial affairs differed little from that of a busy middle-
class entrepreneur. The ironstone was not his ‘sole source of support’, but it was the 
source of the money that would preserve his status and way of life.  
The ironstone was quickly leased. Nearly a dozen iron manufacturers came to 
view the Appleby ore and Messrs Dawes, ironmasters at Elsecar, Yorkshire, signed the 
first lease in autumn 1859.30 Joseph Cliff of Leeds and Samuel Beale of Rotherham 
were also early lessees.31 Transport was as important for ironstone as for coal, so that 
after a short period during which the stone was taken to a loading point on the Trent by 
horse-drawn cart, the Winns donated land and cash for a tramway from the iron deposits 
to the river.32 Rowland also worked to ensure that the iron field was linked to the 
national railway network, a more reliable and flexible form of transport than the inland 
waterways.33 He was the driving force behind the Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby 
Railway, a 14-mile line that passed through the Appleby estate and connected the South 
Yorkshire Railway’s route to Doncaster with the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincoln 
Railway’s Grimsby line.34 It gave direct access from Appleby west to the industrial 
areas of Lancashire, Yorkshire and the Midlands and east to the port of Grimsby, 
benefiting Rowland’s Yorkshire-based iron lessees and opening up the possibility of 
sea-borne markets for the ore. Rowland personally negotiated with the South Yorkshire !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Stone, An Open Elite?, p. 291. 
29 Thompson, Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, p. 40.  
30 Pocock, ‘Stages in the Development of the Frodingham Ironstone Field’, p. 106; Daff, ‘The 
Establishment of Ironmaking at Scunthorpe’, pp. 31-32. Because of problems with the mortgagors of the 
Appleby estate, the Dawes lease was not finally confirmed until 1862. In the meantime the draft 
agreement was sufficient for the Dawes to begin working the stone. 
31 Memorandum in Rowland Winn’s handwriting, undated c. 1865? C/3/1/6/[330], WYL1352, WYAS 
(W).  
32 Pocock, ‘Stages in the Development of the Frodingham Ironstone Field’, p. 107. The cost of the 
tramway was just under £10,000. Agreement proposal dated 27 October 1859; C/3/1/6/[328], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). To provide funds for expenditure relating to the ironstone, Rowland sold some Australian 
and Turkish bonds. Letter, H. Downer to Rowland Winn, 12 November 1859, C/3/1/6/[330], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
33 The disadvantages of using water transport were demonstrated as early as January 1861, when frozen 
rivers prevented ironstone being shipped. Edmund wrote to Rowland that ‘we are getting something by 
[the cold weather]…the sale of coal is good and I’ve put up the price to 5/10d and 2/- for slack, so that is 
better than nothing, though I’m afraid it will be a very poor make up, from the stoppage of the iron 
works.’ Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 8 January 1860 (probably mis-dated for 1861), A/1/10/[1808], 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
34 See Appendix 3. 
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and the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincoln Railways (SYR and MS&LR), discussions 
that were probably assisted by the close connections between the various parties: 
Charles Winn was a shareholder of the SYR and the MS&LR chairman, Lord 
Yarborough, was a fellow Lincolnshire landowner.35 The Act authorising the railway 
received parliamentary approval in 1861 - once again a rapid rate of progress - but poor 
project management delayed the opening of the line until 1 October 1866.36  
Despite the delay to the railway, the iron ore soon began to pay. The first surplus 
reached Charles Winn’s personal account in September 1861, less than two and a half 
years after Rowland had informed his father of the iron’s discovery.37 Table 3.1 lists the 
profits paid between 1861 and 1867 to Charles as estate owner, from the minerals 
account at Smith, Ellison’s Bank in Brigg, Lincolnshire.38  
Table 3.1: Transfers from the Lincolnshire Minerals Account to Charles Winn’s 













Source: All information from A/1/8/[787], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
Note: the figure for 1864 is under-stated as the records for that year are incomplete. 
 
These payments represented a substantial addition to the Appleby estate’s 
annual gross income, which had been assessed as £6,800 in 1858, and compare 
favourably with the potential revenue from leasing the Nostell coal.39 Building on this 
promising start, Rowland’s longer-term strategy was to encourage the establishment of 
furnaces in Lincolnshire on land leased from the Winns, using the railway to import fuel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Lord Yarborough’s interests no doubt also would profit from the new railway. Charles Winn owned at 
least 25 £20 shares in the SYR; letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 10 April 1858, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
36 The Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby Railway Act was approved on 22 July 1861. Henthorn, ‘The 
Coming of the Railway’, pp. 39-41.  
37 The first ironstone was shipped from a quay on the River Trent on 21 June 1860. Henthorn (ed.), 
Letters and Papers concerning the Establishment of the Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby Railway, p. xvi. 
38 In the early 1860s, Charles Winn had a personal bank account in Wakefield with Leatham, Tew & Co, 
and a ‘Lincolnshire Minerals’ account with Smith, Ellison & Co. of Brigg. After the commencement of 
sinking at Nostell, a Colliery account was opened with Leatham, Tew. A/1/8/[787], WYL1352, WYAS 
(W). 
39 See p. 54. 
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and distribute the finished product. This would generate rents from industrial and 
residential development, and enhance the capital value of the estate.40 The first furnace 
was lit in early 1864, and others followed in later years. Rowland also began to quarry 
ironstone on his own account, and the land leases to ironmasters for furnaces on the 
estate included the obligation to buy their ore from the Winns.  This link to the end-user 
helped the Winn family to become the largest producer of ironstone in the Lincolnshire 
field by 1880.41 Rowland’s strategy was therefore incremental; the original mining 
leases quickly brought in income to ease the Winns’ financial problems, improved 
transport enhanced the area’s attraction as an industrial centre, co-located iron-smelting 
was encouraged, and the family’s role evolved from rentier to active producer of iron 
ore. By these means they gained a swift and increasing income from the ironstone, 
albeit at the expense of some capital investment and attendant risk. The success of the 
strategy can be seen from Charles’s bank account (Table 3.1) and in the trebling of the 
income from the Appleby estate between 1858 and 1869 (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Income from the Appleby estate, 1858 (estd.) and 1869 (actual) 
Year   Iron Brick/clay Housing Agriculture Total 
1858     £6,800 £6,800 
1869 £10,600 £100 £520 £7,980 £19,200 
Sources: A/1/8/[787] and budget for 1858, A/1/8/1/11, both WYL/1352, WYAS (W). 
 
Industrial and housing receipts represented the great majority of the increase, as 
agricultural revenue in 1869 was only 15 per cent higher than the 1858 estimate.42 In a 
letter to his father, Rowland permitted himself a justified moment of self-
congratulation: 
…every one [sic] tells me that we have got on more rapidly here than 
ever was accomplished before and that whereas Middlesbrough was ten 
years before it was fairly going we shall only be about five or six.43 
The discovery of the ironstone and Rowland’s speed in realising its value 
transformed the Winns’ fortunes in a remarkably short time. However, the improvement 
in the Winns’ finances did not relate solely to events on the Appleby estate. Rowland !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 The rural location of the furnaces required housing and services to be provided for the quarry and 
furnace workforces. 
41 Daff, ‘The Establishment of Ironmaking at Scunthorpe’, p. 33; Pocock, ‘Stages in the Development of 
the Frodingham Ironstone Field’, p. 108. 
42 A/1/8/57, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Over half of the increase in agricultural income was generated by a 
large fall of timber, a bonus that would not be possible every year. Agricultural rental income on the 
estate was in fact lower in 1869 than 1858. 
43 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 5 June 1865, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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found time during the ironstone launch to deal with an issue of longstanding concern. 
This was his suspicion of the quality of the advice given to Charles Winn by the family 
solicitor and Nostell land agent, John Marsden, and in particular the financial 
arrangements that Marsden had made on Charles’s behalf 
Loans, a lawyer and moral hazard  
 
During the Carlton negotiations and Charles’s absence in Europe, Rowland had become 
familiar with the services that John Marsden provided to the Nostell estate, and his 
influence on Charles. Marsden had a legal practice in Wakefield and was Charles’s 
personal solicitor. He was also Solicitor to the West Riding, an investor/manager in a 
colliery, and agent to a number of local estates, including Nostell.44 A member of the 
Institution of Surveyors remarked that solicitors as land agents were ‘little more than 
receivers’, with very limited knowledge of agricultural techniques or economics.45 They 
received no greater plaudits from the tenantry with whom they dealt, who were 
allegedly ‘very much plagued by attorney stewards who must have business or 
otherwise make it’.46 Whatever his competence as a land steward, Marsden’s pluralism 
made it hard not to suspect that he was ‘making business’, especially as – like many 
provincial lawyers - he augmented his other activities by acting as a broker in the 
regional loans market. 
During the eighteenth century and nineteenth centuries, lawyers were an 
important conduit through which mortgages and bonds were arranged for private and 
business purposes, particularly in Lancashire and Yorkshire.47 The legal profession’s 
customary activities - particularly as land agents and trustees of wills – conferred 
knowledge of those holding capital and of those requiring it, and they also possessed the 
legal expertise to complete the necessary agreements. To establish their credentials as 
loan intermediaries, solicitors had to assure private individuals and fund trustees of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Goodchild, Coals from Barnsley, p. 30. Marsden was probably appointed as agent to the Nostell estate 
in 1845. 
45 Quotation from Transactions, Inst. of Surveyors (1868-1869), quoted in Thompson, English Landed 
Society, p. 160; Spring, The English Landed Estate, p. 59; 
46 R. Brown, General View of the Agriculture of the West Riding of Yorkshire (1794), quoted in G. Firth, 
‘The Roles of a West Riding Land Steward, 1773-1803’, Yorkshire Archaeological Journal vol. 51 
(1979), pp. 105-115; this ref. p. 105.  
47 L. Neal, ‘The Finance of Business During the Industrial Revolution’, in R. Floud, and D. N. 
McCloskey (eds), The Economic History of Britain since 1700 vol. 1: 1700-1860 (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 
151-181; this ref. pp 167-168. 
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fiscal propriety of lending substantial sums of money to strangers.48 They also had to 
overcome a longstanding suspicion of their professional activities, which were 
considered, well into the nineteenth century, to be ‘wanting in integrity’.49 John 
Marsden had achieved a position of trust with Charles Winn. Marsden had arranged 
several loans for Charles, secured on land at Nostell, in addition to the legal and 
administrative services he provided. In the mid-1850s, Rowland became sceptical about 
the propriety of some of the transactions that Marsden had made on Charles’s behalf. In 
1854, at the beginning of the Carlton project, Rowland advised Edmund to discuss 
financial matters with Marsden as he was ‘the best person to consult’, but a year later he 
told Charles that ‘we are quite as well able to judge as he [Marsden] is’ about money. 
This change of mind, perhaps coloured by traditional misgivings about solicitors’ 
motives, arose from Marsden’s advice that it would be a mistake to quote £40,000 to 
potential investors as the capital required for Carlton: ‘It will in these days frighten 
people’. Rowland believed that this opinion arose from Marsden’s fear that a new mine 
at Carlton would compete with his own colliery investment.50   
Rowland’s distrust of Marsden increased during his father’s European trip in 
1857 to 1858. He reached the conclusion that Marsden, in his role as land agent, had 
failed to propose ways in which the estate’s financial performance might be improved, 
but rather encouraged Charles to take out further loans to cover shortfalls in the estate’s 
annual balance sheet. This contrasted with the endeavours of many of the leading land 
agents in the mid-Victorian period to reduce their employers’ debts.51 Marsden obtained 
commission from the loan transactions, for which he held the land deeds as security on 
behalf of the lender and thereby tied the Winns to a relationship that was rewarding to 
the lawyer, but less so for the Winns.52 Moreover, Marsden’s professional standing 
appeared to be under threat. He had lost the position of agent for the estate of Sir John 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Wilson, British Business History, p. 52; P. Hudson, ‘The Regional Perspective’, in P. Hudson (ed.), 
Regions and Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial Revolution in Britain (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 5-
38; this ref. pp. 16-17; M. Miles, ‘The Money Market in the Early Industrial Revolution: The Evidence 
from West Riding Attorneys, c. 1750-1800’, Business History vol. 23, 2, no. 1 (July 1981), pp. 127-146; 
this ref. p. 127; M. B. Rowlands, ‘Continuity and Change in an Industrializing Society: the Case of the 
West Midlands Industries’, in Hudson (ed.), Regions and Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain, pp. 103-131; this ref. p. 127. 
49 Spring, The English Landed Estate, pp. 59-60. 
50 Letters, John Marsden to Edmund Winn, 25 March 1856, WYL1352, C/3/1/9/3, Rowland to Edmund 
Winn, 30 May 1854 and Rowland to Charles Winn, 31 March 1855; WYL1352, C/3/1/9/3 and A/1/8/1, 
all WYAS (W).  
51 For example, George Loch and Christopher Haedy. Spring, The English Landed Estate, pp. 36-37, 128-
129.  
52 Letters Rowland to Charles Winn, 21 October 1857, 16 January and 10 April 1858, A/1/8/1, 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Lister-Kaye, a prominent Wakefield landowner, and his longstanding legal partnership 
had been dissolved.53 The Woolley Coal Company, of which he was the managing 
partner, was in severe financial difficulties. Rowland wanted to withdraw the Winns’ 
affairs from him as soon as possible: ‘I am decidedly in favour of getting out of 
Marsden’s hands as soon as we can quietly manage it, because I am convinced that 
besides the Colliery failing his business is going off as well’.54 
Rowland’s objection to Marsden was based on the issues of trust and moral 
hazard in the principal-agent relationship between Charles and his solicitor. The 
decisions and actions of an agent affect the value received by a principal, which the 
principal wishes to maximise against the payment made to the agent. Conversely, the 
agent is concerned with the value received from the principal in relation to his costs in 
working on the principal’s behalf. Most agent/principal relationships require an element 
of trust between the parties involved, as it is very difficult for either party to have full 
visibility of the intentions, objectives and actions of the other, or to create a contract that 
defines an agent’s required behaviour in every eventuality. Once one party perceives the 
other as being untrustworthy, he is likely to behave in ways designed to protect himself 
from that untrustworthiness, increasing the possibility of a sub-optimal outcome. For 
instance, Rowland ignored Marsden’s counsel regarding the level of capital for the 
Carlton colliery – which was in fact good advice - because he suspected that Marsden 
only expressed that view because he wanted to discourage a competitor from entering 
the market. The multiplicity of Marsden’s dealings with the Winns led him into moral 
hazard, in which the agent behaves differently when acting in the principal’s interest 
than he would do in a similar situation on his own behalf, knowing that the principal 
will take any resulting loss.55 Marsden advised Charles to take out loans rather than 
make greater efforts to balance the books at Nostell, which increased the expenses of 
the estate without generating additional income and benefited the agent at the expense 
of the principal.  
Rowland’s solution was to place the legal and loan brokerage aspects of 
Nostell’s affairs with separate firms of solicitors, to reduce the likelihood of an agent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Marsden dissolved the partnership in 1857 when he gave up (or was dismissed from, for negligence) 
the agency of Sir John Lister-Kaye’s estate. Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 6 August 1857, A/1/8/1, 
WYL1352, WYAS (W); J. Goodchild, A New History of Caphouse Colliery and Denby Grange 
Collieries (Wakefield, 2000), p. 26. 
54 Letters, Rowland to Charles Winn, 20 February 1858, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
55 This section is based on D. Besanko, D. Dranove, M. Shanley, and S. Schaefer, Economics of Strategy 
(New York, 2004); J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser, ‘Principals and Agents: An Overview’, in J. W. Pratt 
and R. J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, 1985), pp. 1-35; K. J. 
Arrow, ‘The Economics of Agency’, in Pratt and Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents, pp. 37-51. 
! 62!
manipulating different types of business to his own advantage. Marsden’s services were 
terminated by late 1861, despite his emotional personal appeal against dismissal to 
Charles.56 Another Wakefield law firm - in fact, Marsden’s ex-partners - was appointed 
to handle the estate’s purely legal business. For the arrangement of loans, Rowland’s 
brother-in-law, William A. Cross, recommended to him a Preston (Lancashire) solicitor, 
James B. Dickson: 
I consider [Dickson] a most honorable [sic] and agreeable man to do 
business with, and very reasonable in his charges. He has a good deal of 
business of the best sort…What he may be as a very ‘cute’ attorney I do 
not know. I think the best thing you could do would be to come over 
here next week and see him yourself.57 
Cross stressed the importance of Dickson’s gentlemanly demeanour – implying 
trustworthy - which was reflected in the social origin of his clients (‘the best sort’) and 
the modest, ‘unpushy’ nature of his charges. These attributes made Dickson the 
antithesis to Marsden, and to Cross they were more important than Dickson’s 
professional expertise. The main objection to Dickson was his location. Most lending 
arranged by solicitors took place between principals living in the same county or 
region.58 Rowland showed his sensitivity to the local nature of this capital market when, 
in discussion with Charles about the options for replacing Marsden, he speculated 
whether a London solicitor or ‘a county man’ would be preferable.59 Dickson’s contacts 
were in Lancashire, but nonetheless Rowland engaged him to carry out the Winns’ 
financial business.  This was representative of a loosening of regional ties into a more 
broadly based market for private capital. Borrowing outside Yorkshire may also have 
had the attraction of more flexible interest rates, as a Bank of England survey showed 
that even as late as 1909, banks in rural areas, and especially in Yorkshire, continued to 
use the traditional 5 per cent interest charge on loans irrespective of the Bank rate.60 
Lancashire may have been more flexible in this regard, and Dickson was indeed able to 
arrange loans at a lower rate than Marsden’s. Once Dickson was engaged in 1860, the 
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56 Letter John Marsden to Charles Winn, 8 November 1861 and reply (no date given) November 1861, 
A/1/8/13/2, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
57 Letter W. A. Cross to Rowland Winn, 1 November 1859, WYL1352, C/3/1/6/[328], WYAS (W). 
58 Based on the period 1780-1871. P. Hudson, ‘Capital and Credit in the West Riding Wool Textile 
Industry c. 1750-1850’, in P. Hudson (ed.), Regions and Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 69-99; this ref. pp. 78-82. 
59 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 6 August 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
60 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830-1914, pp. 207-208.  
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threat of moral hazard receded and the overhaul of the Winns’ borrowing arrangements 
began.  
Rowland redeemed the loans obtained through Marsden as quickly as possible, 
to reduce the cost of borrowing and curtail the solicitor’s involvement in the family’s 
affairs. Charles Winn’s main debts in late 1857 were four mortgages totalling £88,000 
at interest rates between 3! and 41/8 per cent, which were reasonable for the period.61 
The mortgages were borrowed from private individuals, the largest (£40,000) being 
from the Earl of Scarbrough. Rowland and Charles were particularly concerned about 
the Scarbrough mortgage, because of a possibility that it could be foreclosed.62 In 
addition Charles had borrowed £8,200 in five bonds from private lenders, all through 
Marsden and at 5 per cent interest. Rowland remarked to Edmund in 1854 that ‘about " 
to ! per cent more interest might have to be paid’ by borrowing through a bond rather 
than a mortgage, so that the bonds arranged by Marsden were somewhat overpriced. 
Rowland intended to replace them with other loans of the same type because they 
offered greater flexibility in repayment and were cheaper to set up than a mortgage.63 In 
November 1861 Rowland brought his father up to date with progress on repaying the 
money borrowed through Marsden: 
In January we shall pay off Miss Tennant’s bond [£3,500] and there 
will then only remain in Marsden’s hands the £1,500 bond of Miss 
Armytage’s, and as soon as I can manage to get money together for this 
I should like to pay it off and then ask Marsden again for the papers he 
has in his possession. I have arranged with Dickson for paying off Miss 
Tennant by borrowing the money at 4" per cent instead of 5 per cent as 
is now the case…64 
During the 1860s Rowland reduced the amount of annual debt interest that the Winns 
paid by over 25 per cent. In 1869 annual interest payments were £2,650 compared to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 A contemporary solicitor calculated in the mid-1850s that the typical return on a mortgage on real 
property was 4 per cent. Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830-1914, pp. 46-47.  
62 Letters Rowland to Charles Winn, 7 and 21 October 1857, A/1/8/1, and Charles to Rowland Winn, 10 
November 1859, A1/10/[1808], both WYL1352, WYAS (W). Under the contemporary mortgage terms, 
loans could be called in simply because the lender had a better investment for the money. For example, in 
1820 a landed investor called in £2,000 that he had out on mortgage as he wished to invest the money in 
the Hetton Coal Company instead. M. Sill, ‘Landownership and Industry: The East Durham Coalfield in 
the Nineteenth Century’, Northern History vol. 20 (1984), pp. 146-166; this ref. p. 153. 
63 Letter, Letter Rowland to Edmund Winn, 30 May 1854, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
64 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 11 November 1861, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Dickson had 
said that he could obtain the money at 4 per cent on a mortgage, but Rowland preferred to pay 4.5 per 
cent for a bond as he only wanted the money for a short time, and ‘desired to avoid the expense of a 
mortgage’. Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 9 January 1862, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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£3,800 ten years previously.65 This was achieved both by repaying capital and re-
financing other loans at a more favourable rate. Almost as importantly, Rowland was 
now dealing with legal agents in whom he had confidence, and he was free from any 
involvement in Marsden’s potential bankruptcy. As the income from the ironstone 
began to rise in the mid 1860s, Rowland could turn his attention to a new colliery at 
Nostell. 
A new colliery at Nostell – laying the foundations 
 
Once the ironstone business was well established, Rowland renewed his interest in the 
coal at Nostell. The new colliery would be financed and managed by the family, 
assisted by the ironstone income. This approach gave the Winns the opportunity to gain 
the maximum return from the resources of the Nostell estate, rather than be satisfied 
with a moderate rent from leasing. A colliery managed by the family provided an 
opportunity to fulfil an important element of the landed family’s ethos, of investing part 
of its wealth to secure employment for a younger son. A number of contradictory 
elements come into play at this point. Rowland remarked that ‘I have always looked on 
it [Nostell Colliery] more as a future source of income for [Edmund] than anything 
else’, which suggests that the decision not to join their class’s flight from direct 
investment in mining was made for a reason that was founded firmly in the traditional 
habits of landowners.66  At the same time, the Winns were following the practice 
widespread among businesses owned by middle-class entrepreneurs of appointing a 
close relative to run an important branch of the family business, because professional 
managers were distrusted. Both Rowland and Edmund had expressed their dislike of 
agents having control of their affairs, and Edmund’s appointment was a practical 
demonstration of this distrust, which ran counter to the landowning class’s tradition of 
delegating responsibility for management of their property to professional agents.67  
These nuances of attitude and action support Thompson’s argument that there was ‘no 
one, single, unchanging set of aristocratic values’, and that personal disposition, 
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65 A/1/8/1 and A/1/8/57, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
66 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 30 October 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
67 Rowland wrote to his father that the prospect of the Carlton colliery being run by an agent was ‘an 
arrangement that I could never feel satisfied with’. Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 6 February 1856, 
A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). By early 1855 Rowland was already encouraging his father to make his 
own decisions rather than refer all financial questions to John Marsden. Edmund had expressed his 
reservations about professional managers during the Carlton bid; see Chapter 2, p. 44.   
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circumstance and opportunity were important influences on the behaviour of the landed 
classes.68 
The decision to sink a new colliery on their own account having been taken, two 
major issues had to be resolved before work began in earnest. The first was to prove the 
coal’s location, depth and economic viability. There were several seams at varying 
depths in the area east of Wakefield, of which the best was the Barnsley at c400 yards 
depth. The test bores at Nostell had only proved the Shafton seam under the Winns’ 
land. This was the first significant seam below the bed worked by Wragby Colliery and 
was much shallower – and therefore cheaper to reach - than the Barnsley and Stanley 
Main coals tapped by other collieries in the area.69 It was decided to sink only to the 
Shafton seam in order to minimise costs, a decision that would have significant 
implications for the output achievable by the colliery.  
The second issue to be resolved before proceeding with a new colliery was the 
construction of a railway.70 A proposal for a line from Doncaster to Wakefield, passing 
close to Nostell, had failed at the parliamentary committee stage in summer 1857, and 
Rowland remained pessimistic for the following few months about its prospects in view 
of the general economic conditions: ‘There is no chance of the Doncaster and Wakefield 
Railway going on, the Bank of England has just raised their rate of discount to 8 per 
cent’.71 By January the following year he was more hopeful, and his optimism was 
rewarded.72 It is uncertain whether the Winns were involved in the earlier schemes, but 
by 1860 Rowland was among the leading figures in the West Riding and Grimsby Joint 
Railway Company.73 This proposed a railway from Barnby, on the SYR Doncaster to 
Goole line, to the existing GNR main line at Wakefield, and included several branches, 
including a south-facing connection to the GNR’s east coast main line at Doncaster and, 
of course, a short spur to the new colliery at Nostell. Both of the Winns’ estates would 
benefit from the WR&GJR. The colliery would be directly connected to London, 
Lancashire, the Midlands and the rest of Yorkshire.74 The WR&GJR was a variant on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Thompson, Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, pp. 43-44. 
69 The Nostell seam was found at 50 yards depth, the Shafton at 140 yards, and the Stanley Main and 
Barnsley at 350 to 400 yards. W. H. Wilcockson, Sections of Strata of the Coal Measures of Yorkshire 
(Sheffield, 1950), pp. 352-353. 
70 The reader is reminded of the map at Appendix 3. 
71 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 21 October 1857, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
72 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 26 January 1858, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
73 Rowland was certainly a director of the company (for which he was required to have invested at least 
£500) and probably the chairman, as his name appears at the top of the directors’ list in the WR&GR Act. 
West Riding and Grimsby Railway Act, 1863; 25 & 26 Vict. – session 1862, DZMD/590/5, Doncaster 
Archives. 
74 It also gave the West Riding a direct link with Grimsby and Immingham.  
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an unsuccessful Doncaster-Wakefield line proposed by the GNR. A West Riding 
newspaper commented that ‘to our legislators, however, “the rose” under another name 
was…“sweeter”, though perhaps they were mollified by the addition of the Grimsby 
[Barnby] branch, which, indeed, is an improvement on the original scheme’.75 Rowland 
remarked to his father in 1860 that the railway ‘will be a great thing for our colliery, and 
will enable us to get the coal both into this part of the world or London as well’.76 It also 
had benefits for the ironstone, as the junction at Barnby would give a link into the West 
Riding from the Lincolnshire ore field, via the TA&GR 
In mid 1860 the WR&GJR bill was going through Parliament and Edmund 
attended the committee hearings - the customary Winn hands-on approach to promoting 
their industrial interests. The parliamentary process prompted an incident that confirmed 
Rowland’s suspicions about John Marsden. The supporting evidence for the bill cited 
the opening up of the coal reserves south-east of Wakefield, which included Nostell. 
Taking benefit from the lucrative opportunities that railway schemes opened up for 
professional men, especially surveyors and solicitors, Marsden had been retained by the 
GNR to record evidence for the committee hearings.77 Rowland described to his father 
Edmund’s meeting with Marsden to register the Winns’ evidence: 
Marsden said…that the Nostell coal must on no account be alluded to. 
Edmund told him he certainly should allude to it, and made him take 
down what he wished to say…A copy of this he [Marsden] of course 
had to send up to London to the Great Northern solicitors, but instead 
of sending a true copy, he made a number of additions which E[dmund] 
had never heard of and I believe omitted all about the coal; at the same 
time sending a fair copy to E[dmund] of the original evidence – we 
have exposed the whole of this to the Great Northern people…and 
[Edmund] believes it is the last job he [Marsden] will get for the Great 
Northern.78 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Bradford Observer, 18 January 1866. The WR&GR was backed by the South Yorkshire and 
Manchester Sheffield & Lincoln Railways, but following its acceptance by Parliament was quickly 
brought into by the GNR as it substantially shortened the length of the latter’s route between Doncaster 
and Leeds. A. J. F. Wrottesley, The Great Northern Railway vol. 1: Origins and Development (London, 
1979), pp. 160-161. 
76 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 3 May 1860, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Both lines promoted 
by Rowland Winn remain part of the national railway network.  
77 T. R. Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, 1830-1914 (London, 1980), p. 22. The GNR was 
also closely involved in the WR&GR hearings. 
78 Emphasis in the original. Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 3 May 1860, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS 
(W). 
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There is an element of hearsay about the story, but Marsden’s legal and entrepreneurial 
activities were sufficiently entangled to give credence to suspicions of conflict of 
interest. Rowland believed that Marsden was ‘extremely jealous about our coal field 
because he thinks if the railway is carried it will seriously interfere with coal about 
Wakefield and Woolley. He has therefore taken the line of crying down our coal’.79 As 
a result Marsden lost the trust of the Winns and probably that of the GNR. Such 
behaviour encouraged the high level of regulation of solicitors’ activities introduced 
over the course of the nineteenth century, much of which, ‘conceived in an intolerant 
spirit’, was intended to reduce conflict of interest with clients’ affairs.80  
Despite Marsden’s alleged efforts, the WR&GJR Act received royal assent on 7 
August 1862 and the line opened in February 1866. The independence of the new 
railway was nominal. It was to be worked by the MS&LR in return for 45 per cent of 
the receipts, and that company also guaranteed an annual dividend of 4" per cent and 
the interest payments on its debenture debt, and nominated four of the twelve directors. 
In fact shortly after opening the WR&GJR was jointly vested in the GNR and the 
MS&LR,81 ‘advantageous negociations [sic] having been conducted by Mr Winn’.82 
Rowland had probably been working on this arrangement from July 1864 at least when 
he advised his father not to dispose of his WR&GJR shares because if the company 
made an alliance with the Great Northern, their value would rise to parity with that of 
the GNR and matching shares would be issued.83 These financial manoeuvrings were no 
doubt merely a fringe benefit to the Winns’ confidence from summer 1862 onwards that 
that a railway would be built near their coal at Nostell and that they could keep close 
track of its progress. The WR&GJR’s shareholders were well satisfied with Rowland’s 
efforts. After the line opened in February 1866 they awarded him £400 and additional 
free shares, and in the following year donated £25,000 to be divided among the board 
members at the winding-up of the company.84  The Winns now had a railway to 
transport their coal. 
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79 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 3 May 1860, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
80 Burn, Age of Equipoise, p. 211, fn. 
81 West Riding and Grimsby Railway Act, 1863; 25 & 26 Vict. – session 1862, DZMD/590/5, Doncaster 
Archives; D. Joy, A Regional History of Railways vol. 8, South & West Yorkshire (Newton Abbot, 1984), 
p. 220. 
82 Leeds Mercury, 22 February 1866; report of the eighth half-yearly meeting, West Riding and Grimsby 
Railway Co. Ltd. 
83 Insider dealing? Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 9 July 1864, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
84 Leeds Mercury, 22 February 1866 and 24 June 1867; reports of the eighth half-yearly and special 
general meetings, West Riding and Grimsby Railway Co. Ltd. 
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A new colliery at Nostell: finding the capital  
 
Hawke’s comment that ‘the siting of railways, especially in Yorkshire and the 
Midlands, was influenced by potential coal traffic, and railways in turn facilitated the 
opening of mines’ was fully justified in Nostell’s case.85 Once the passage of the 
WR&GJR bill had been secured the Winns lost no time in accumulating the capital to 
sink a new colliery, despite the economic slump of the early 1860s.86 The ironstone 
profits provided an increased cash flow but would not support the full cost of the 
colliery, so that part of the capital would have to be obtained elsewhere. As the new 
colliery was to be part of the Nostell estate, partner capital was irrelevant. Other means 
would have to be found to raise money, although neither the sale of property nor the 
raising of additional loans was attractive to Rowland. He did not wish to subvert his 
policy of reducing debt while maintaining income, and the Carlton project had shown 
that institutional sources of capital for provincial collieries were limited.  
The timing of capital formation for the colliery was influenced by practical 
considerations. The establishment of a mine was often a lengthy process, because of the 
time required for shaft-sinking. However, because the labour and some materials costs 
of this process could be paid for as they were incurred, there was no operational 
necessity for all the capital to be available at the outset.87 Landlords often required 
applicant lessees to demonstrate that they had sufficient resources to bring the colliery 
into production, but as the Winns were sinking on their own land they had no 
operational or contractual need to ‘front up’ capital.88 The typical capital spend pattern 
for a new colliery was that once the main shaft had reached the required depth and the 
coal was confirmed as workable, there was a period of substantial expenditure to install 
plant above and below ground, and to sink the second shaft required under the 1864 
Coal Mines Act.89 Church estimated that the composition of mining capital between 
1870 and 1913 was 40 per cent shafts and 35 per cent colliery plant, with the balance 
expended on railways, wagons, tradesmen’s workshops and other ancillary functions.90 
Capital expenditure at Nostell followed these patterns. Work began in August 1862 and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth, p. 398. 
86 Crouzet, Victorian Economy, p. 56. 
87 J. Hyslop, Colliery Management (London, 1876), p. 134. The sinking at Nostell was carried out by 
contractors, who were paid monthly over the period of the work. 
88 For example, Lord Wharncliffe had required Edmund’s potential partners at Carlton to demonstrate that 
that they had the necessary resources.  
89 Hyslop, Colliery Management, pp. 131-133. The requirement for two shafts applied only to collieries 
employing more than thirty men. 
90 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 112. 
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the first three years were occupied in shaft-sinking, on which rather over £11,000 was 
expended.91 In 1865-1866, following completion of the shafts, £12,000 was spent on 
opening out the colliery. Production began in 1866 and a further £12,000 was invested 
between 1867 and 1871.92 
Table 3.3: Sources of capital for Nostell Colliery to 31 December 1871 
Source   Amount Per cent of 
total 
Interest rate p.a. 
(per cent) 
 
Loans:      
 Mrs Thornber £9,825 27.5 4  
 Rev. Cookson £1,550 4    4"  
 Mr Shaw £3,500 10 4  
 Sub-total: £14,875 41.5 4.05   
Internal:      
 Timber from Lincs. estate £473 1.5 n/a  
 Coal from Wragby Colliery £2,938 8 n/a  
 Transfers from Estate Account £6,430} 
32 
n/a  
 Transfer from Estate Account 
(note 2) 
£5,096}  n/a  
 Wagons (note 1) £6,136 17 n/a  
 Sub-total: £21,074 58.5   
 Total £35,929 100 1.7  
Notes: 1. The payments for wagons on lease purchase were charged to revenue when production started 
but included in capital in order to calculate the colliery’s return on investment. 2. The balance of £5,096 
was resolved by a further transfer from the Estate Account in 1872.  
Source: All information from ‘Receipts and expenditure on capital account’ except the wagon capital 
which is from the Wagons account, both in General Financial Statements Book 1866-1882, 2/1, 
WYL523, WYL1352, both WYAS (W). 
 
The capital was raised from the sources shown in Table 3.3. 40 per cent were 
loans, which the Winns obtained through a solicitor (J. B. Dickson) in the traditional 
provincial landowner’s manner. Dickson’s business was largely conducted by personal 
contact with lenders, rather than through a centralised and organised market. For 
example, he wrote to Rowland in 1865 that he had failed to obtain a suitable loan in 
Preston, but would try in Liverpool ‘when he went there soon’.93 Although all the 
colliery loans were obtained from private individuals, Dickson’s range of contacts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 £8,250 of the £11,000 was spent on shaft sinking. The two main shafts were sunk consecutively rather 
than simultaneously, standard practice in the interest of proving the ground so that the project could be 
abandoned at minimum cost if excessive water was discovered, the coal was found to be of poor quality, 
or some other insuperable difficulty was encountered. 
92 The £12,000 spent between 1867 and 1871 included £6,000 paid out of revenue for railway wagons, 
but treated for revenue purposes as a capital expenditure. Abstract of drawings on capital account, 1862-
1883, 5/7, WYL523, WYAS (W).  
93 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 28 August 1865, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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included corporate bodies such as the London, Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co., as 
by 1860 insurance companies were important commercial lenders.94 The loans for the 
colliery were taken as the need arose, £6,000 being borrowed for shaft sinking in July 
1864, a further £1,500 for cottages in September 1865, and the remainder in 1867.95  
The cash flow from the ironstone and the competitive loan rates obtained by a 
trusted agent reduced the burden and risk of capitalising the colliery, and Rowland 
attempted to further minimise any threat to the estate’s financial stability by offering 
collateral other than land. A loan was taken on the security of the Trent, Ancholme and 
Grimsby Railway Co. shares, and Rowland tried to secure the loan from Mrs Thornber 
on the colliery plant and coal seams.96 The lender, who preferred the solidity of land, 
rejected the proposal. Rowland expressed his irritation to his father:  
I am sorry the money is not borrowed on the works and the coal, as I 
should have preferred it very decidedly to giving land…tho’ I could 
never see why there should be [a difficulty with other security] for if it 
is not possible for a coal owner to borrow on his coal and on his own 
colliery works, how can a lessee ever do so; but everyone knows this is 
done every day – however perhaps a trifle higher rate might have to 
have been paid.97 
Rowland’s final comment confirmed that money could be more cheaply borrowed on 
solid security. This would appear to give an advantage to a landowner seeking a loan for 
commercial purposes, as he would have land to offer as security rather than the assets 
and goodwill of the enterprise itself – albeit at the cost of encumbering the estate. For 
his part, Rowland was reluctant to take loans on security that he considered excessive, 
telling Dickson to reject the London, Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co.’s demand for a 
life assurance policy in addition to land to secure a loan for the construction of miners’ 
cottages. The proposed arrangement fell through and was replaced by the £1,550 loan 
from the Rev. Cookson.98 Rowland clearly preferred the familiar character of the 
traditional private loan, but the failures to secure the Thornber loan on the colliery or to 
agree terms with the insurance company suggest that a landowner borrowing money for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830-1914, p. 253. 
95 Letters Rowland to Charles Winn, 9 July 1864, 28 August 1865 and 20 December 1867, A/1/8/1, 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
96 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 9 July 1864, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
97 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 20 December 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
98 Letters Rowland to Charles Winn, 28 August and 12 September 1865, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS 
(W). 
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industrial purposes was a combination that did not fit comfortably into either the 
commercial or private loan markets. 
The Winn estates acted as surety for the loans, and 9.5 per cent of the colliery’s 
capital was supplied in kind from the estates’ human and physical resources. Coal from 
Wragby was provided free of charge to the sinkers to power their machinery, and to 
Whitham & Co. as payment for two pumping engines. Timber from Appleby was used 
in the construction works, probably for shaft lining during sinking and in erecting the 
surface buildings. The miners’ cottages were built by estate staff rather than contractors, 
which Rowland believed was ‘decidedly the cheapest plan’.99 The cottages were built in 
batches as required so that money need be raised only as operationally necessary: 
‘Edmund told me that…twenty cottages would do for the present, after the Colliery 
begins to pay a few additional houses might be added yearly if necessary’.100 Marsden’s 
recommendation for Carlton that facilities be added at need and the money raised 
accordingly – a view that had attracted Rowland’s scorn - was in fact applied to the 
colliery. The Winns were open to any ‘special offers’ that were available, and in 1867 
they considered the installation on approval of a Lemielles ventilation fan, a new 
product trying to establish itself in the English colliery market.101  
All these manoeuvres suggest the close involvement of the Winns in the project, 
and their willingness to adopt unconventional tactics. The Winns’ own cash 
contribution was £11,500, under 40 per cent of the total, which was sourced without 
selling land, although during 1866 Rowland realised £4,000 in WR&GJR shares.102 The 
remainder of the cash originated either from ironstone profits or the surplus on 
agricultural activities, so that ‘the plough-back of company profits’ constituted as 
important a source of capital for the Winns’ industrial ventures as it did for commercial 
organisations without landowning connections.103 Like the loan capital, the cash was 
supplied as necessary through the course of the project. The transfers from the Estate 
account to cover capital expenditure took place from mid-1866 to mid-1872, a timescale !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 General Financial Statements Book 1866-1882, 2/1, WYL523, WYAS (W); letter Rowland to Edmund 
Winn, 27 May 1866, quoted in letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 10 October 1888, A1/10/[291], 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). Rather surprisingly, there is no record of estate bricks being supplied from the 
Wragby brickyard. 
100 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 28 August 1865, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
101 The apparatus would be removed without cost to the Winns if it subsequently failed specified tests. 
Letter Ellis Lever to John Roseby, 20 December 1866, C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Only a small 
number of Lemielle fans were fitted in English collieries, despite its success in France and Belgium, and 
the Winns probably did not proceed with the installation. A. Hill, The History and Development of 
Colliery Ventilation (Matlock Bath, 2000), p. 75.  
102 ‘Nelson has sold some more shares so the colliery difficulty is got over’. Letter, Rowland to Charles 
Winn, 1 June 1866, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
103 Newton, ‘Capital Networks in the Sheffield Region’, p. 132. 
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implying that the Winns took full advantage of suppliers’ and bankers’ credit 
facilities.104 The annual outlay on interest and bank charges for the colliery rose from 
nearly £700 in early 1867 to over £1,300 in 1870, of which £600 was loan interest and 
the remainder overdraft charges.105  The colliery maintained a hefty overdraft on its 
account for many years at a period when banks were generally less accommodating to 
mines owned by partnerships or companies. Hudson suggested that in provincial areas 
there could be an uncertain differentiation between fixed and circulating capital in the 
minds both of the banks and their customers, so that short-term loans were repeatedly 
extended.106 In this instance it is more likely that the long-term maintenance by Charles 
Winn of an overdraft on his personal account – a typical landowner characteristic – 
habituated Leatham’s Bank to the use of this form of borrowing by the Winns as 
industrialists as well as landowners.107 
Church notes that private funding in the coal industry by 1855 was largely 
provided by various forms of partnership, spreading the cost and risk of an industry in 
which sole funding ‘either by landowner or petty capitalist, became subject to 
increasing limitations in the context of technological and commercial developments’.108 
The Winns swam against this tide. By funding a colliery on their own land, they were 
able to source capital as it was required. They had no need to seek sizeable inputs of 
capital from partners or the members of a company to reassure a landlord of their 
financial standing, or to enter into formal arrangements that would enable the 
enterprise’s profits to be assigned between shareholders or partners. The Winns 
capitalised a modern industrial unit in a piecemeal fashion: variously through the means 
by which estate improvements were made, by loans sourced through traditional routes, 
and by using income and resources from other estate activities, wholly owned by the 
proprietor. Capital formation for Nostell Colliery differed from its earlier counterpart at 
Wragby largely only in scale. Contrastingly, the proposed colliery at Carlton had been 
conceived as a stand-alone commercial enterprise for which a partnership with other 
capitalists was an appropriate financial and management vehicle. However, that venture !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 ‘Receipts and expenditure on capital account’ in General Financial Statements Book 1866-1882, 2/1, 
WYL523, WYAS (W); letters, Rowland to Charles Winn, 9 July 1864 and 12 September 1865, A/1/8/1, 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
105 C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
106 Hudson, ‘Capital and Credit in the West Riding Wool Textile Industry’, pp. 69-99; this ref. p. 80; 
Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 168-170. The colliery had an overdraft with 
Leatham’s Bank in Wakefield of around £4,000 in 1867, rising to £8,200 in 1872. Letters Rowland to 
Charles Winn, 7 October 1867, and Edmund to Rowland Winn, 15 August 1872, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
107 Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, p. 5; Spring, The English Landed Estate, p. 15. 
108 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 125. 
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foundered on the landowner’s instinct to avoid risk, whether the risk was incurred by 
exposing the family estate to the possibility of failure by a colliery or by accepting a 
‘non-gentleman’ as a partner.  
The Times in the mid-1850s suggested that ‘your modern English peer is a sharp 
land agent or conveyancer’, and this was a fair description of Rowland Winn in the 
decade after the discovery of the Appleby ironstone. His careful attention both to 
commercial strategies and to the financial detail of loan security and capital investment 
implied that while he might not have considered his behaviour as a landowner to be 
‘regulated by the opinions of the middle classes’, as Bagehot put it, it was certainly 
influenced by their habits and aspirations to entrepreneurship, efficiency and profit.109 
Rowland’s striving after economy and modest personal habits made him the model of 
the ‘sobriety and prudence’ that was characteristic of the mid-Victorian aristocracy.110 
At the same time, he was strongly influenced by the traditional landowner traits of the 
preservation of the estate from external economic threats, and the need to support all 
members of the family. The following chapters will examine the outcome of these 
various influences on the success of the colliery, and the Winn family, from 1866 to the 
outbreak of the First World War. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Walter Bagehot quotations: The Times from 1854, and Literary Studies, published in 1879. Both 
quotes from D. Spring, ‘English Landed Society in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century’, Economic 
History Review vol. 17 no. 1 (1964), pp. 146-153; this ref. p. 152. 
110 Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 286. 
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Chapter 4 
An outline history of Nostell Colliery, 1866-1914 
Introduction  
 
This short chapter summarises Nostell Colliery’s history from its opening in 1866 until 
the First World War, an outline that serves as background to the remainder of the thesis. 
Two key periods are identified, 1866-1888 and 1889-1914. Prosperity in the inflated 
prices of the early 1870s was succeeded by a lengthy run of poor returns, so that in 1883 
the Winns decided to redevelop the colliery to achieve a higher level of production. 
Once the redevelopment had been completed and the new colliery came into full 
production, the Winn family derived a consistent profit from its coal during the quarter 
century from 1889 to 1914.  
Nostell Colliery, 1866-1888 
 
Nostell Colliery commenced production in autumn 1866, roughly six months after the 
opening of the WR&GJR, excellent timing for a project that had been contemplated for 
nearly a decade. From 1866 to 1888 the colliery was profitable in only five years, 
cumulative losses amounting to nearly £17,000.1 This deficit would have been larger 
but for the high prices and profits of the early 1870s ‘coal famine’, of which a 
contemporary remarked that ‘hills of rubbish became valuable gas coal…heaps of dross, 
all green with age, disappeared into the hungry market’.2 However, because the colliery 
paid to the Nostell estate a royalty of 6d per ton of coal produced, the benefit to the 
Winns from their coal was always more favourable than the financial performance of 
the colliery alone.3 The total return from the coal business was positive in nine years 
between 1866 and 1888, during which the Winns received a cumulative profit of 
£6,500. Including the coal royalty, the Winns’ investment in the colliery of around 
£55,000 over this period therefore earned an average annual rate of return of only 0.5 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This figure includes the profit/loss from railway wagon hire and cottage rentals, which were accounted 
for separately from the colliery but were closely associated with its operation.  
2 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 507. 
3 The royalty is also referred to in this chapter as the coal rental. This payment was included in the 
colliery costs. 
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per cent over twenty-three years.4 Figure 4.1 presents the profitability of the colliery and 
the coal business as a whole. 
Figure 4.1: Annual profit and loss of Nostell Colliery and overall benefit to the 
Winn family, 1866-1888 
 
Note: ‘Overall benefit’ is the annual profit/loss by the colliery, wagon hire and cottage rents plus the coal 
royalty.  
Source: 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6, and 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
The colliery in its 1866 form was profitable only during periods of high prices. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates this point, and also the tendency - particularly noticeable after the 
period of price inflation – for costs to rise and fall more slowly than prices. Costs 
lagged at the start of the boom, but between 1873 and 1876 the average price fell over 
50 per cent while the cost of production decreased by little more than a quarter.5 Wages 
constituted 70-80 per cent of total working costs at Nostell in the 1870s and 1880s, and 
the ‘stickiness’ of costs is largely attributable to delays in the adjustment of miners’ pay 
to the cycles of the coal market.6 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The figure of £55,000 is the undepreciated capital invested in the colliery to the end of 1888, including 
wagons. It excludes cottages, which were not treated as part of the colliery capital between 1878 and 
1894, and the expenditure on deepening the shafts. 
5 Colliery data from C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, and 2/1, WYL523, both WYAS (W). 
6 Other industries, including the railways, experienced a similar refusal by wage rates ‘to adjust…to 
downward movements in…revenue and the general price level in the later 1870s’. R. J. Irving, ‘The 
Profitability and Performance of British Railways, 1870-1914’, Economic History Review vol. 31 no. 1 
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Figure 4.2: Average pithead price and production cost of coal per ton at Nostell 
Colliery, 1866-1888 
 
Source: 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6, and 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
Edmund was the general manager of the colliery from 1866 to 1888. Initially, 
responsibility for the technical aspects of the colliery lay with Edmund and the 
underground manager. However John Roseby, who had an advisory role during the 
colliery’s sinking and fitting out, was appointed viewer in the summer of 1868, 
responsible for the engineering aspects of the operation.  
The early 1870s boom provided windfall profits for Nostell, but also attracted 
substantial new investment into the coal industry. As a result, later in the decade ‘new, 
enlarged, deeper and more capital-intensive pits disgorged supplies onto a market in 
which prices had stabilised at levels below those current in the 1850s and 1860s’.7  
From 1877 into the early 1880s the Winns’ royalty receipts did not cover Nostell’s 
mounting losses. During this period both Edmund and Rowland were much involved 
with the ironstone, and the colliery received little attention in the brothers’ 
correspondence. Roseby was dismissed in 1880, by which time the losses at Nostell 
were becoming unsustainable.8 Following a debate between the brothers on the 
colliery’s future, it was decided to deepen the shafts to the lower coal measures, which 
promised a higher output of a better class of coal. Sinking began in spring 1884 and the 
shafts had been extended to the Beamshaw and Winter seams at around 400 yards depth 
by autumn 1887, at a cost of £10,250.  Production increased substantially in 1888 after a 
period of low output during the deepening operations (Figure 4.3), and in that year the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 60. 
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Winns’ losses were halved in comparison to 1887. This was achieved despite a 15 per 
cent fall in the pithead price. 
Figure 4.3: Annual production at Nostell Colliery, 1866-1888 
 
Note: Output in 1884-1887 was adversely affected by the development works. 
Source: All information from 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6, and 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W).  
 
A significant event in 1888 was the appointment of George Winn, Rowland’s fourth 
son, as successor to Edmund as general manager of the colliery. It therefore ended the 
1880s under new management and with a higher productive capacity. 
Nostell Colliery, 1889-1914 
 
Production rose swiftly following the deepening of the shafts, so that the average annual 
output at Nostell of 175,500 tons for 1889-1914 was nearly four times that for 1866-
1888 (46,500). The consistency of the colliery’s output up to the First World War is 
shown in Figure 4.4, punctuated by lengthy strikes in 1893 and 1900. The financial 
position of the coal business was revolutionised by the shaft deepening, and - in contrast 
to the struggle to break even in earlier years - the Winns realised an average annual 
profit of nearly £9,000 over the period 1889-1914. The colliery recorded a profit in all 
but four years in the period, while the overall benefit to the Winns was in surplus in 
every year. The impressive turnaround in the colliery’s fortunes after 1888 can be seen 























































































Figure 4.4: Annual production at Nostell Colliery, 1889-1914 
   
Note: The strikes in 1893 and 1900 each lasted over five months. 
Source: 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6, and 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W).  
 
Table 4.1: Cumulative colliery profit/loss and overall benefit to the Winns, 1866-











1866-1888 (£16,779) £23,240 £6,461 £281 
1889-1914 £125,252 £105,328 £230,580 £8,868 
1866-1914 £108,473 £128,568 £237,041 £4,837 
Source: 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6, and 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
Figure 4.5: Annual profit and loss at Nostell Colliery and overall benefit to the 
Winn family, 1889-1914 
 
Note: ‘Overall benefit’ is the annual profit/loss by the colliery, wagon hire and cottage rents plus the coal 
royalty.  
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Prices in the coal market generally rose from 1889 to 1914 and although average 
production costs at Nostell also increased, they were kept under control. Nostell’s 
average sale price in 1914 was over 75 per cent higher than that of 1889, outperforming 
the corresponding average national pithead price rise plotted by Church.9 Figure 4.6 
illustrates the cyclical nature of the coal market in the quarter century preceding 1914. 
Prices peaked in the early 1890s, in 1900-1901, 1907-1908 and 1911-1913, and these 
events were reflected in the colliery’s profit performance.  
Figure 4.6: Average pithead price and cost of coal per ton at Nostell Colliery, 1889-
1914 
 
Source: All data from 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6, and 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
As output increased at Nostell so did employment. In the early 1870s the 
underground workers at the pit totalled around 100.10 This figure probably remained 
stable until the shaft deepening in 1884-1887, and then increased in line with the 
colliery’s production. By 1894, Nostell’s annual output was touching 200,000 tons and 
employee numbers had risen to 600 underground and around 150 on the surface. After 
the colliery redevelopment the Winns modernised various aspects of its work practices 
and equipment. Long-wall mining was introduced to replace the traditional room-and-
stall method. Electricity was used to power lighting above and below ground. 
Electrically powered coal cutters were used from 1888 onwards. At senior level the 
management of the pit changed little over the period. George Winn was general !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Church postulated a rise of around 50 per cent over the period 1889-1913. Church, History of the British 
Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 53. The average price realised for Nostell’s coal was affected by the changes in 
the nature of the coal sold by the colliery that are discussed in Chapter 5.  
10 During a prosecution brought by the Winns of Nostell miners who were in breach of their contract by 
failing to report for work, Edmund stated that ‘it was no uncommon thing to see only about 50 men 
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manager throughout, supported by William Spencer as viewer until his replacement in 
1910 by G. H. Ashwin. The resident management at the colliery was also stable. In 33 
years there were only three colliery managers - William Hay (1881-1896), James 
Linday (1897-1898) and George Kenyon (1899-1914) – and on the commercial side the 
sales manager was of very long standing.11  
The success of the colliery in the early years of the twentieth century, and the 
profits accrued from the ironstone, enabled the Winns to build up a share and bond 
investment portfolio of over £500,000 by 1917. Their holdings were in a wide range of 
locations and industries but primarily in colonial, American (north and south) and Asian 
mines, railways and ports, in central and local government bonds.12 This was far from 
the late 1850s when Rowland sold paintings for cash to meet the family’s bills. 
In 1914 Nostell Colliery was one of the few in Britain that remained the 
personal possession of a landowner and aristocrat. Although its output was moderate by 
the standards of the eastern extension of the West Yorkshire coalfield on which it was 
located, the colliery was a prosperous operation with an experienced and technically 
competent management that was willing to try modern methods. It formed part of a 
portfolio of industrial enterprises and investments that had transformed the Winns’ 
financial status. The pathway to success had not been entirely smooth, and the 
following chapter will examine the capital asset and accounting policies that 
underpinned the colliery’s commercial performance. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 All staffing information from Home Office, List of Mines (London, 1881 onwards), passim. 
12 A1/10/[291] 1st and 2nd Lords St Oswald, misc. corres, 1875-1894, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Chapter 5 
‘A proper analysis of what the money has been expended for…’:1 
capital expenditure at Nostell Colliery 1866-1888 and accounting for 
Nostell’s coal  
Introduction  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the colliery’s capital in more detail. Firstly it examines the effect 
that the restrictions of capital spend on the colliery in the 1860s had on its 
competitiveness, and moves on to investigate the proportions of capital spent on 
different types of equipment and facility at Nostell. Comparison is made with coal 
industry norms for expenditure on shafts, worker housing, transport facilities and other 
forms of capital. The final section of the chapter examines accounting practices at 
Nostell’s collieries from the late eighteenth century up to 1914, and places them in the 
context of the evolving discourse on accounting history.  
Spending the capital: fixed assets at Nostell Colliery 1866 to 1888 
 
By late 1871 Nostell Colliery was in the condition in which it largely remained until the 
redevelopment of 1884-1888: two shafts sunk 140 yards to the Shafton seam, a third, 
shallower shaft for ventilation and drainage purposes, and sufficient plant and siding 
accommodation for an output of around 1,000 tons per week. The total capital invested 
was just under £36,000. While direct comparisons are difficult because of the variables 
involved, in 1860 most British collieries selling more widely than local landsale 
possessed capital in the range £8,000 to £25,000, although in the north-east of England 
expenditure on a new colliery might reach well over six figures.2 This suggests that 
Nostell was heavily capitalised for a colliery of modest output. Another indicator also 
hints at this conclusion. Nostell’s average annual net production of around 50,000 tons 
between 1866 and 1885 was 20,000 tons fewer than John Walker believed would be 
necessary for a £40,000 investment at Carlton to be profitable.3 It will be recalled that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 5 July 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
2 Fordyce, History of the Coal, Coke, Coalfields and Iron Manufacturing, p. 44; Church, History of the 
British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 122. 
3 Letter, John Walker to Rowland Winn, 5 September 1854, and production notebook 1854-1875, both 
C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, and 2/1, WYL523, all WYAS (W). 
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Nostell was sunk only to the shallow Shafton seam because of the limitation that 
Rowland placed on the capital that he was able to raise without over-stretching the 
family’s resources. By working the Shafton seam the cost of the colliery was reduced 
compared to sinking to the deeper measures, but the potential output was also reduced. 
Output was largely dependent on the quality and thickness of the coal being worked, 
and the Shafton seam was not as productive as the Barnsley and Stanley Main beds that 
lay 250 yards below it.4 These seams were being worked by most of Nostell’s local 
competitors, the numerous large collieries that were established in the late 1860s and 
early 1870s in the Castleford-Featherstone area and in south Yorkshire, and whose 
output dwarfed Nostell’s.5 
A crucial element of a colliery’s likelihood of financial success was its 
productive capacity, as although price fluctuations influenced return in the short run, 
over the longer term ‘tonnage was regarded as the primary factor influencing potential 
profitability’.6 A high level of production enabled economies of scale that compensated 
for the expense of shaft-sinking and equipment. At Nostell the Shafton seam contained 
two dirt partings that made it expensive to work and to prepare for sale. It also had 
difficulties in commanding a good price for its products. The coal market was highly 
differentiated by grade and coal from the deeper seams could command a higher price 
than those of the Shafton, which produced some good gas coal but whose output was 
mainly steam coal of moderate quality.7 
Between 1866 and 1888 the average pithead price of coal at Nostell remained 
fairly stable at around 5/- to 6/- per ton, while the average cost per ton consistently 
exceeded this price by between 10d and 20d. The exception to this rule was during the 
price inflation in 1873-1875 (Table 4.2). In order to secure consistent profitability when 
working the Shafton seam, Nostell Colliery required one or more of the following 
conditions to be fulfilled: a very high market price to be maintained; a reduction to be 
made in the colliery’s operating costs to compensate for the high fixed overhead; or an 
increase in production and sales volumes to be achieved while controlling variable cost. 
However, unless it could find a quasi-monopolistic niche market, Nostell was unlikely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 HMSO, Geology of the Country round Wakefield (London, 1940), p. 87. 
5 Collieries sunk 1865-1875 included Manvers, Sharlston, Woolley (new), Featherstone Main, Rothwell 
Haigh, Whitwood and Carlton Main. C. L. Baylies, The History of the Yorkshire Miners, 1881-1918 
(London, 1993), p. 10. Middleton Colliery, east of Leeds had raised around 60-100,000 tons p.a. 
throughout the period 1810-1840. Rimmer, ‘Middleton Colliery’, p. 55. 
6 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 511. 
7 The ‘all–important’ Barnsley seam was the ‘thickest, most constant and most valuable seam in the 
coalfield’, yielding steam, gas, house and coking coal. J. V. Elsden, and J. Griffiths, Analyses of British 
Coals and Coke (London 1924), pp. 98-100. 
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to have much control over the selling price for its product. It sold in the railway market, 
a regime of intense price competition to which all suppliers were subject.8 The nature of 
the Shafton coal and its production difficulties prevented sufficient improvement in 
working costs, product quality or output volume to meet the other conditions. The 
issues of transport and market pricing will be considered in the next two chapters, so for 
the moment it is sufficient to reiterate that maintenance of consistent profitability at 
Nostell was a problem for the Winns from 1866 to the late 1880s. 
The colliery’s predicament brings into focus the alleged shortcoming of the 
family firm. Critics of personal capitalism argue that by restricting capital formulation 
to a single family’s resources, the resulting enterprises may be too small to take full 
advantage of economies of scale.9 This could be a particular disadvantage in an industry 
like coal mining, in which the entry cost became higher as the industry matured and 
easily accessible seams became worked out. Capital expenditure on collieries was also 
liable to incremental stages, so that a relatively small additional investment to reach a 
richer seam could realise a much higher level of production.10 Production at Nostell 
quadrupled when the colliery’s shafts were deepened to the Stanley Main seam in the 
1880s. The cost was approximately £15,000, or less than half the original investment. 
The increased production enabled the overhead of fixed costs per ton to be reduced to 
under 20 per cent from the 25-30 per cent that had been the standard from 1869 into the 
1880s.11 Nostell Colliery in its original form was effectively hamstrung by the amount 
of capital that the Winns were able to spend. 
To place Nostell more precisely in the context of the contemporary coal 
industry, the colliery’s capital cost will be assessed from the perspective of the types of 
asset purchased. For this purpose Church’s analysis of the nineteenth century coal 
industry’s capital deployment will be used, which identified three categories of asset in 
which capital was invested.12 The first category was the mining assets: items of fixed 
capital necessary to raise and process the coal, including shafts, surface plant, railways, 
wagons, horses and ancillary functions such as coke and brick works. Church included 
coke works in this category because coke could be a colliery’s sole product. The 
inclusion of brick-making is less compelling because although it was a by-product of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914, p. 294. 
9 Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain, p. 124; A. Colli, The History of Family 
Business, 1850-2000 (Cambridge, 2003), p. 9. 
10 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 294. 
11 General charges included rent of coal, salaries and office expenses, discounts, rates and taxes, overdraft 
and loan interest, sundries, rent of wagons); 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
12 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 108-111. 
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the frequent co-existence of fireclay and coal, it was rarely the raison d’être for 
collieries of significant size.  
The second category comprised the colliery assets, which added to mining assets 
items such as workers’ housing, land and farms. Church noted that housing could be 
crucial to collieries in rural areas that would otherwise be unable to maintain an 
adequate workforce.13 In the 1840s Seymour Tremenheere, the first Mines Inspector, 
observed that the urban location of many collieries in the West Riding meant that 
miners’ housing was integrated with that of other industrial workers. However, in the 
following twenty years, the expansion of the coalfield east of Wakefield took mining 
into a previously agricultural area in which new housing had to be built for the 
workforce. As a result, many single-industry colliery settlements were established, a 
phenomenon little known in the western part of the coalfield.14 Rowland’s plans for 
Nostell recognised that housing was an essential part of the colliery’s capital, and he 
built miners’ rows in Wragby and the nearby village of Crofton. Company housing did 
not merely ensure adequate numbers of workers. It also enhanced the colliery’s 
efficiency through a stable body of pitmen familiar with local mining conditions. As 
Edmund remarked to his brother, working the Shafton seam meant that ‘lodgers are 
little use [because] as soon as work improves they are off’, to a colliery in which coal-
getting was easier.15 For many collieries in rural locations, houses were not, as Church 
suggested, ‘complementary’ to profitable mining operations, but an essential element of 
the enterprise that might appropriately be included in the mining assets.16 However, for 
comparative purposes with Church’s aggregate figures, the houses at Nostell will be 
incorporated in colliery assets.  
The final category of asset identified by Church was total company assets, 
encompassing mining assets and all the other items in a corporate asset structure. This 
category will be ignored because Nostell was a small organisation relative to the large 
joint stock companies increasingly common in the later nineteenth century coal trade, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The coalfields mentioned by Church were north-east England, the East Midlands and Scotland. 
14 Tremenheere believed that the integration of mining with other industrial pursuits encouraged the 
miners to ‘partake of the general habits of the labouring classes in Yorkshire, which are those of attention 
to domestic propriety and cleanliness’. British Parliamentary Papers, Reports from Commissioners on 
Mining Districts, 1839-1849: Mining Districts 1 (Shannon, 1971), p. 20; Buxton, Economic Development 
of the British Coal Industry, p. 134. 
15 By ‘lodgers’, Edmund meant men without their families working at Nostell and livings in lodgings 
because they could not find a job in a colliery with easier working conditions or in their home area. Letter 
Edmund to Rowland Winn, 19 January 1882, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
16 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 108. 
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and the development of a corporate infrastructure servicing a number of operational 
units was unnecessary. 
Most of Nostell Colliery’s major individual assets can be identified, although a 
brickyard, which certainly existed from the earliest days of the colliery, was not 
accounted for independently until 1893. A breakdown by asset description of the 
colliery’s capital at 31 December 1871 is shown in Table 5.1.  
 








Shafts £8,250 28 23 
Underground and surface plant £11,700 40 33 
Railways and roads £3,100 11 9 
Wagons £6,300 21 18 
Mining assets £29,350 100 83 
Houses £6,100 n/a 17 
Colliery assets £35,450 n/a 100 
Notes: 1. The financial reporting procedures at Nostell for this period did not depreciate capital and the 
figures represent cumulative actual capital spend;  
2. ‘Underground and surface plant’ includes £1,000 for ‘Management and interest’. 
Source: General Financial Statements Book 1866-1882, 2/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
Church calculated mean figures for each asset category in a sample group of enterprises 
for the period 1870-1913. The sample consisted of nine middling to large collieries, 
including two from Yorkshire, although Church asserted that ‘there are no obvious 
reasons why the mass of smaller middle-sized firms…should have possessed a 
noticeably different asset structure so far as mining assets are concerned’. It contained 
collieries with and without the ‘optional’ elements, such as coke works and housing.17 
The national figures for mining and colliery assets from Church’s calculations are 












17 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 110. 
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Table 5.2: Nostell Colliery’s mining and colliery capital, 1871, in comparison with 
a national sample of collieries, 1870-1913  











Shafts 40 28 32 23 
Underground and surface plant 44 40 36 33 
Railways 11 11 9 9 
Wagons 5 21 5 18 
Houses n/a n/a 19 17 
Sources: Nostell information from Table 3.3; sample figures from Church, History of the British Coal 
Industry, vol. 3, pp. 112-113. 
 
The most noticeable discrepancies between Nostell and Church’s sample are the 
proportions spent on the shafts and on railway wagons. The average depth of new 
sinkings in England in 1870-1913 was substantially greater than earlier in the nineteenth 
century, as easily accessible seams became worked out and deeper beds had to be 
exploited.18 As we have seen, in Nostell’s district most new pits were sunk to the 
Barnsley coals, necessitating shafts nearly three times the depth of Nostell’s, so that 
expenditure on Nostell’s shafts was low in comparison with the sample.19 
In contrast, the proportion of Nostell’s capital spent on wagons was significantly 
above Church’s mean. Several factors influenced this. Firstly, the capital spent on non-
wagon assets was reduced because of the relatively low spend on sinking, which would 
account for some of the proportional variance. Secondly, the capital cost of wagons to 
the coal trade may be underestimated in Church’s figures. Wagon costs appeared in 
some colliery companies’ accounts as a working expense and not as capital because 
they hired rather than bought or leased their rolling stock. In addition, joint-stock 
colliery companies used various methods to keep wagon purchase costs off their 
balance sheets so that the apparent rate of return on capital was enhanced – an attractive 
policy if capital was not depreciated and the management wished to impress 
shareholders with the value of their investment.20 Nostell Colliery, as Charles Winn’s 
personal property, had no need for such ploys. Finally, the colliery was probably over-
provided with wagons. Nostell’s output suggests that the colliery required 150-200 
wagons, but they owned c250. They were also not being used with the greatest 
efficiency. Discussions between Edmund and Rowland in the 1880s suggest that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 113. 
19 Dintenfass, Managing Industrial Decline, pp. 52-54 
20 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 158-159. 
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average number of journeys undertaken by each wagon was below the optimum, due to 
slow turn-round on deliveries and their use to store unsold coal at the pit.21 A 
combination of these factors resulted in a higher proportion of Nostell’s capital being 
spent on wagons than in Church’s sample. Issues relating to the deployment of wagons 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
Accounting for coal: definitions and historiography  
 
The remainder of this chapter examines the process of accurately measuring costs, 
revenue and profitability at the Winns’ collieries. The coal trade in England in the 
second half of the nineteenth century was a difficult one in which to achieve consistent 
commercial success. The industry was highly competitive, and had rising entry barriers 
and elevated levels of physical and commercial risk. It was prone to sharply defined 
price/demand peaks and troughs associated with economic cycles.22 In the 1860s the 
Winns also had to meet challenges at more personal and local levels. The ironstone was 
flourishing, but the success of the new colliery remained significant to the family. Its 
failure would reduce annual revenue from the estate and require another career to be 
found for Edmund, at additional expense. It would also leave an external debt of 
£15,000 to be supported out of other estate activities. An important influence on the 
colliery’s performance, as with any commercial enterprise, was an accounting system 
that delivered accurate, relevant and timely information to the management.23  
Financial information in a commercial enterprise originates from two distinct 
sources: the financial account and the management account. The former is the recording 
and balancing of the external interactions between the organisation and its customers, 
suppliers and investors, a synthesis that enables the trading and capital performance of 
the enterprise to be defined through periodic formal statements, particularly the profit 
and loss account and balance sheet. The management account monitors transactions 
within the enterprise, recording data arising from the application of the factors of 
production and the costing of individual procedures so that expenditure can be 
attributed to the correct point in the production process. These two sources of data !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 24 October and 12 December 1888, A/1/10[291], WYL523, 
WYAS (W). The sourcing and use of wagons is discussed at greater length in Chapter 6. 
22 H. F. Bulman and Sir R. A. S. Redmayne, Colliery Working and Management (London, 1921), p. 31. 
23 ‘Numerous studies and government reports show that the largest cause of business failure is the lack of 
an effective accounting system, the controls it includes, and the reports, documents and sources it 
generates’. E. L. Summers, Accounting Information Systems (Boston, 1991), pp. 40-41, quoted in T. 
Boyns and J. Wale, ‘The Development of Management Information Systems in the British Coal Industry, 
c. 1880-1947’, Business History vol. 38 no. 2 (1995), pp. 55-80; this ref. p. 58. 
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provide ‘accounting information…of direct assistance to the management in the 
formulation of policy and in the day-to-day control of a business’.24 In addition there are 
non-financial data that inform the accounting material. For a colliery, these could 
include the quantities of saleable coal raised and the seams from which it was obtained. 
The combination of financial and management accounts with relevant non-financial 
information constitute the enterprise’s management information system (MIS).25  
Each of these three elements has a distinct place in accounting historiography. 
Historians’ perception of English accounting since the Industrial Revolution has 
undergone a significant change in the last twenty years. Amongst leading historians in 
the 1960s, financial accounting in nineteenth century industrial enterprises was 
considered to be more advanced and better integrated into professional practice than 
management accounting, so that, as Pollard expressed it, ‘entrepreneurship in the 
industrial revolution did not develop to any significant extent the use of accounts in 
guiding management decisions’.26 Furthermore, it was assumed that cost accounting 
was likely to have advanced further in factory environments than in extractive 
industries, because cost inputs could be more easily allocated to the clearly delineated 
stages of a manufacturing process.27 These views were based partly on the limited 
archival evidence of costing data, much of which was informal or ephemeral in nature, 
and partly on the views expressed by contemporary writers and professional bodies. 
Accounting literature published prior to the very late nineteenth century was seen as 
being largely concerned with the outcome of interactions between the firm and its 
customers. Costing records were considered to be irreconcilable with audited financial 
accounts as they were usually collected for short-term purposes by ‘practical men’ - 
non-accountants, often engineers.28 Other historians supported Pollard’s basic premise 
on different grounds. Chandler considered that there had been little cost accounting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 T. Boyns and J. R. Edwards, 'Cost and Management Accounting in Early Victorian Britain: a 
Chandleresque Analysis?', Management Accounting Research, vol. 8 (1997), pp. 19-46; this ref. p. 22. 
The definition is taken from a publication by the Institute of Chartered Accounts of England and Wales, 
1954. Edwards and Newell suggest that the distinction between cost accounts and management accounts 
has become blurred to the point that the terms can be used interchangeably, and this will be the case here. 
J. R. Edwards and E. Newell, ‘The Development of Industrial and Management Cost Accounting before 
1850’ Business History vol. 33 no. 4 (1991), pp. 35-57; this ref. p. 39. 
25 T. Boyns, ‘Cost Accounting in the South Wales Coal Industry, c. 1870-1914’, Accounting, Business 
and Financial History vol. 3 no. 3 (December 993), pp. 327-352; this ref. p. 329; Boyns et al, 
‘Development of Management Information Systems’, p. 57. 
26 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 248. 
27 R. K. Fleischman and L. D. Parker, 'British Entrepreneurs and pre-Industrial Revolution Evidence of 
Cost Management', The Accounting Review vol.66, no. 2 (1991), pp. 361-375; this ref. p. 363. 
28 T. Boyns, and J. R. Edwards, ‘The Construction of Cost Accounting Systems in Britain to 1900: The 
Case of the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries’, Business History, Volume 39, Issue 3, (1997), pp. 1 – 29; this 
ref. pp. 1-3; Boyns, ‘Cost Accounting in the South Wales Coal Industry’, pp. 328-329; 
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prior to the invention of most elements of management accounting by the American 
railway companies of the 1850-1860s. Alternatively, Solomons suggested 1875 as the 
starting point for the use of cost accounting on the basis that prior to the ‘Great 
Depression’, profit margins were sufficiently high for most firms to be unconcerned 
with cost analysis.29  
More recent researchers have challenged these views. A 2005 review of 
accounting history noted that a major outcome of work undertaken since 1990 had been 
‘to backdate the chronology for sophisticated cost/managerial accounting’ to the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain and the early nineteenth century in the USA.30 
Similarly, Wilson observes that investigation of contemporary sources shows that 
management accounting tools were being used widely by 1850.31 The existence of 
costing systems in British industry has been detected at dates up to three centuries 
before 1900, and evidence found of the integration of cost and financial accounts into a 
single system in several UK industries, including coal and steel. Furthermore, 
management accounting has been shown to appear in professional literature from the 
1870s, a quarter of a century earlier than previously suggested.32 Similar results are 
claimed for the USA.33 These are broadenings not only of the chronology of cost 
accounting but also of its industrial application. Many of the assumptions implicit in the 
older hypotheses are therefore under challenge.  
With regard to the practical application of the data in management accounts and 
information systems, however, there is some difficulty in demonstrating their use to 
inform real-life decisions. The use of MIS data in the production of forecasts and ad hoc 
reports on specific issues can be identified quite readily, but otherwise much of their 
contribution must be discerned by inference rather than firm evidence. Even greater 
difficulty is experienced in judging whether they led to better decisions having been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Chandler, The Visible Hand, p. 109; Edwards et al, ‘The Development of Industrial and Management 
Cost Accounting’, p. 36. 
30 Fleischman and Radcliffe, ‘The Roaring Nineties’, p. 77. 
31 Wilson, British Business History, pp. 29-30. Studies showing the development of management 
accounting include: T. McLean, ‘Agent's Reputation, Accounting and Costing in Organisational Control 
Structures’, The Accounting Historian’s Journal vol. 24 no. 1 June 1997, pp. 1-22; Boyns et al, 
‘Development of Management Information Systems’; Boyns, et al, ‘The Construction of Cost Accounting 
Systems’; Edwards et al, ‘The Development of Industrial and Management Cost Accounting’; 
Fleischman, R. K., and Macve, R. H., ‘Coals from Newcastle: an Evaluation of Alternative Frameworks 
for Interpreting the Development of Cost and Management Accounting in Northeast Coal Mining during 
the British Industrial Revolution’, Accounting and Business Research vol. 32, no. 3 (2002), pp. 133-152.  
32 Boyns, et al, ‘The Construction of Cost Accounting Systems’, pp. 3, 10; Edwards et al, ‘The 
Development of Industrial and Management Cost Accounting’, p. 36. 
33 K. Hoskin and R. Macve, 'Knowing More as Knowing Less? Alternative Histories of Cost and 
Management Accounting in the US and the UK', Accounting Historian’s Journal, vol. 27 no. 1 (2000), 
pp. 91-149; this ref. p. 98. 
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made.34 In the context of this shifting ground, the extensive financial records that exist 
for Nostell and Wragby Collieries from c. 1855, and the more fragmentary evidence 
from the late eighteenth to the mid nineteenth centuries for Wragby and its predecessor, 
are reviewed for their contribution to the various debates. 
The development of accounting practice at Nostell’s collieries 
 
Both formal and ad hoc financial records of the Nostell estate colliery were kept from at 
least the late eighteenth century.35 Weekly accounts prepared by the colliery overseer 
survive from 1779, 1781 and 1805, itemising coal sold on credit and for cash, colliers’ 
wages and stock in hand. Annual calculations of the colliery’s profitability are extant 
for 1802 to 1804 and 1817 to 1833, and statements of cash received from 1806 to 1825. 
Management accounts were also compiled, shown by the statements produced in 1777 
and 1780 of working expenses and employee numbers. External cash flow, production 
cost and profit/loss information was therefore being produced on at least an occasional 
basis. Unscheduled events also triggered accounting activity, particularly in measuring 
current assets. The colliery was valued at the deaths of Sir Rowland Winn (1805) and 
John Winn (1817), including statements of creditors and total debt as well as the 
physical assets. There is little evidence on how the financial data produced before 1830 
were utilised, although the valuations would have been used in the inheritance process. 
Nonetheless they display a continuing desire for an understanding of the profit to the 
estate and of the commercial processes taking place. The recording of detailed labour 
and material expenses implies an interest in the nature of costs and their use for 
analytical or comparative purposes.36 From the late eighteenth century, therefore, the 
performance of the colliery on the Nostell estate was being periodically tracked in terms 
of both financial and management accounting data. The detailed and varied nature of 
the data suggests that they were not – as was the practice in many small collieries at the 
time - simply intended as a check on the honesty of the underground steward.37 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Hoskin et al, 'Knowing More as Knowing Less?’, p. 107; Boyns, ‘Cost Accounting in the South Wales 
Coal Industry’, p. 342; Boyns et al, ‘Development of Management Information Systems’, p. 76. 
35 ‘Formal’ in the sense that they were concerned with a specific time period and had a clear objective; for 
example, of measuring the profit and loss for a stated year. Wragby Colliery was sunk in the 1830s, and 
the mine that preceded it was known as Nostel (sic) Colliery (‘Nostell’ became the standard spelling 
during the later nineteenth century). Its exact location is unknown.  
36 All documents referred to in this and the following paragraph are from C/3/1/9/1 and C/3/1/9/3, 
WYS1352, or 1/4 and 1/7, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
37 B. F. Duckham, ‘The Emergence of the Professional Manager in the Scottish Coal Industry, 1760-
1815’, The Business History Review vol. 43 no. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 21-38; this ref. p. 32.  
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Following the sinking of Wragby Colliery in 1833-1834, there is increased 
evidence of the maintenance of both financial and management accounts, and of their 
use in management decision-making. Profit and loss continued to be calculated at least 
annually, and in some years as often as monthly, a high frequency in view of Boyns and 
Wales’s finding that even in the final quarter of the nineteenth century the directors of 
colliery companies usually received profit figures at most twice yearly.38 Charles 
Winn’s diary records regular meetings with the colliery overseer at which he received 
the surplus of sales income over wage payments for the week, or made up a deficit from 
petty cash. The frequent passing of cash surpluses to the owner was a typical 
contemporary practice among small to medium-sized collieries.39 Cost accounting 
records have also survived from the first half of the nineteenth century, showing that 
coalface and hurrying expenditure at Wragby Colliery was calculated annually.40 In 
1838 the colliery’s underground expenses were analysed on a cost centre basis, with 
cost per ton being assigned for the processes of coal winning and haulage, pit prop 
manufacture, underground maintenance and new work. Cost sheets for each of the 
individual expense lines have not survived, probably because such documents of prime 
entry were produced by a colliery official rather than the book-keepers and were more 
ephemeral than the annual summary.41 The level of detail in the costing figures matches 
similar records produced by contemporary collieries in north-east England, most of 
which had a far larger output than Wragby’s 10-12,000 tons p.a.42 On the sales side, 
separate records were kept by year, of total sales, sales by type (cash or credit), and 
debtors. Credit sales contributed about 30 per cent of income. At least 75 per cent of the 
colliery’s debtors in 1839 and 1851 owed less than £10, suggesting that Wragby sold 
mainly to domestic or small commercial customers.43 
These various data were used in managing the colliery. For example, an 1838 
estimate of the profitability of working 2! acres of coal used assumptions based on the 
previous period’s actual figures for sale price and production costs, and two instances !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Monthly profit/loss figures were produced for Wragby Colliery during the period 1835-1841 at least. 
Boyns et al, ‘Development of Management Information Systems’, p. 71. 
39 Diary entries for 1850 and 1854, A/1/8/26/28 and A/1/8/26/32, WYL1352, WYAS (W); McLean, 
‘Agent's Reputation, Accounting and Costing’, pp. 18-19. 
40 ‘Hurrying’ was haulage from the coalface to the pit bottom, often undertaken in the early nineteenth 
century by children. 
41 C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAW (W); Boyns and Edwards, ‘The Construction of Cost Accounting 
Systems in Britain to 1900’, p. 4. Documents of prime entry are those in which transactions are first 
recorded, before being entered into a double entry accounting system. Cash receipt or payment books and 
day books are prime entry documents. 
42 Fleischman et al, ‘Coals from Newcastle’, p. 136. 
43 C/3/1/9/3 and C/3/1/9/7 WYL1352, WYAS (W). Credit sales were 25-35 per cent of the total. 
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have survived of ad hoc reports that, as Fleischman puts it, ‘utilize costing data for non-
routine decision making’.44 The first of these reports was written in 1837 by Henry 
Holt, Charles Winn’s colliery viewer, and analysed the extent to which the continuation 
of pumping at a disused shaft kept Wragby free from water. It also estimated the cost of 
replacing the pump with a drainage drift. Three years later a lengthy report by Holt 
compared the costs of raising coal by a steam engine or continuing to use the existing 
horse gins. The report breaks down the cost of equipment and shaft sinking, quantifies 
the annual direct cost of workmen and materials for each option, and amortises the 
purchase price of the engine over ten years, a form of depreciation of capital 
expenditure.45 In addition to addressing the expense implications, Holt’s conclusions 
include the concept of opportunity cost: ‘Extra advantages: the fewer the shafts, the less 
the accumulation of water by the perforations – and less waste of property’.46 These 
reports support the view that financial data was used to inform management decisions. 
They also add to the evidence that in collieries like Nostell that utilized northeast 
England’s practice of employing a consultant coal viewer, the occasional visits by non-
resident management encouraged the production of summaries of a pit’s performance 
and the use of cost calculations based on data derived from experiential industry 
standards.47 Nostell’s practices contrast with Boyns’ finding in South Wales – where the 
viewer system was not generally used - that investment in new plant by colliery 
companies later in the nineteenth century ‘seems often to have been carried out…with 
little by way of hard figures as to the capital cost…or of potential savings’.48 
Before the mid-1850s regular statements of the estate owner’s investment in the 
works were produced for neither Wragby Colliery nor its predecessor. The cost of 
sinking and initial equipping of the works was calculated on completion of the work or 
at the owner’s death, but not updated at regular intervals or used to estimate the annual 
return on capital. The accounts did not identify expenditure on the long-term 
development of the colliery, probably because the sums involved were small and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Fleischman et al, 'British Entrepreneurs and pre-Industrial Revolution Evidence’, p. 369 (quotation); 
Edwards et al, ‘The Development of Industrial and Management Cost Accounting’, pp. 36, 40. 
45 Continuing the use of horse gins required the sinking of additional shafts because of the power 
limitations of the horse. 
46 n.d., c1840; ‘An estimate of the relative cost of raising coal in the Nostell Colliery by steam and horse 
power. H Holt’. C/3/1/9/1, WYS1352, WYAS (W). 
47 For example, Fleischman et al, ‘Coals from Newcastle’, p. 136; McLean, ‘Agent's Reputation, 
Accounting and Costing’, pp. 14-15; R. K. Fleischman D. and Oldroyd, 'An Imperial Connection? 
Contrasting Accounting Practices in the Coalmines of North-east England and Nova Scotia, 1825-1900', 
The Accounting Historian’s Journal, vol. 28 no. 2 (2001), pp. 31-62; this ref. p. 33. 
48 Boyns, ‘Cost Accounting in the South Wales Coal Industry’, p. 346 (quotation); Church, History of the 
British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 412. 
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continuing capital investment such as expanding the underground workings was treated 
as a working expense and charged to revenue. This was an accepted contemporary 
practice in the industry, and in Wragby’s case is perhaps unsurprising in view of the 
trivial nature of the colliery capital compared to Charles Winn’s substantial expenditure 
on agricultural improvements.49 Wragby Colliery’s low capital expenditure, its variable 
and limited contribution to the overall property income and the weekly payment of cash 
surpluses suggest that it was considered to be an integral part of daily estate business, 
rather than a separate enterprise of financial significance to the property.50 The 
customary accounting practices that were used to provide regular checks on the 
performance of agricultural elements of the property were simply replicated at the 
colliery. This aligns with the landowner’s view of mining as a normal estate activity. 
Fleischman and Macve found evidence of a lively interest in return on capital in the 
contemporary north eastern coalfield whether the colliery was the property of 
landowners or of independent capitalists, but this attitude was probably influenced by 
the substantially higher average colliery investment in that region.51  
Accounting procedures: 1854-1869 
 
A new accounting arrangement at Wragby was introduced in 1854, more systematic and 
comprehensive than that used in the 1830s and 1840s. The new system was also used 
for Nostell from its opening until 1875, although for the final six years it ran in parallel 
with a further new accounting protocol that was introduced in 1869. The 1854 system 
separated some elements of the finances of the colliery from those of the estate, and it 
originated the practice of paying 6d royalty per ton of coal raised to the Estate 
Account.52 This payment represented the income that Charles Winn would have 
received if the coal had been leased to a third-party mine operator, 6d per ton being 
typical of west Yorkshire at that period.53 Coal rent was recorded as a cost to the 
colliery and as income to the estate, so that – as already noted - a loss-making period for 
the colliery might nonetheless be profitable to the estate. The actual transfer of cash 
royalties from the colliery to the estate varied in relation to the need of the two entities !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Boyns, ‘Cost Accounting in the South Wales Coal Industry’, pp. 333-334; McLean, ‘Agent's 
Reputation, Accounting and Costing’, p. 19. 
50 The shifting of labour between colliery and agricultural purposes has already been noted. 
51 Fleischman et al, ‘Coals from Newcastle’, p. 143. 
52 The royalty/rent was calculated on the net (saleable) production minus coal used at the colliery, a 
standard arrangement for the Yorkshire coalfield. Rent was not charged on coal consumed at the colliery.  
53 Royal Commission appointed to Enquire into the Subject of Mining Royalties, First Report, 1890 
(Shannon, 1969), p. 117 (evidence of Marshall Nicholson).  
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for funds. In 1875 Rowland instructed Edmund to pay the coal royalties to the estate at 
quarterly or six-monthly intervals as convenient, but in later years the colliery retained 
the royalties as reserve funds, with occasional payments to the estate of relatively large 
sums.54  
The 1854 system addressed costs and income in an integrated manner and 
calculated receipts, outgoings and profit at two points, as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Cost and income categories, 1854-1869     
Cost at the pithead, comprising:    Price at the pithead, comprising: 
rent of coal;     sale value of coal without delivery. 
coal consumed at the pit; 
underground and top wages; 
wagon lease charges. 
 
Cost on total payments, comprising:  Price on total receipts, comprising: 
cost at the pithead, plus:    price at the pithead, plus: 
interest and bank charges;    railway charges; 




Average cost at the pithead or total payments Average price at the pithead or total receipts 
Cost divided by net tonnage of coal raised.  Price divided by tonnage of coal sold. 
 
Profit/loss 
Price on total receipts minus cost on total payments. Profit/loss was not calculated on the pithead cost and 
price. 
Source: C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W) 
 
This system differentiated between the variable cost of production, fixed 
overheads and delivery costs in a more sophisticated and consistent analysis than had 
previously been used. Each of these categories had several sub-divisions. The pithead 
was the first point at which cost and income was calculated, when the coal had reached 
the surface and was ready for sale. It included underground and surface workers’ wages 
and the rent of the coal, but excluded indirect costs, delivery and management salaries. 
The second point of calculation was on total payments and receipts. For Nostell !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Letter 5 April 1875 Rowland to Edmund Winn, C/3/1/6 [372], WYL1352, and six-monthly profit & 
loss accounts and balance sheets, 1900-1909, 2/6, WYL523, both WYAS (W). 
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Colliery, the ‘total payments’ figure added indirect costs, which included interest on the 
loans that part-funded the sinking and the bank charges for the colliery’s overdraft. 
Neither of these items figured in Wragby’s accounts. Wragby’s sinking cost had long 
been written off and there is no evidence that it had a separate bank account. Indeed, the 
weekly reconciliation of the cash balance implies that receipts were paid directly into 
general estate funds. The income on total payments was calculated by adding the 
delivery charges to the pithead price.  
Summary figures for pithead and total payments, including profit and loss, 
appeared in a formal statement at six and twelve monthly intervals, a periodicity in line 
with contemporary industry best practice.55 Average costs and prices for each heading 
were also produced. An advance on earlier practice was that the 1854 system included a 
mechanism for recognising capital expenditure, rather than treating it as a working 
expense. At Wragby, nominal deductions were made from profits to pay for equipment 
renewal or other capital expenditure. These sums were transferred to a capital account 
and written off annually. Nostell Colliery was dealt with somewhat differently. The 
initial investment cost of the colliery was represented in the capital account, which was 
not subject to write-off or depreciation.  Subsequent capital spend was added in 
cumulatively.  
The 1854 system did not include cost analysis of the individual stages involved 
in the production process, or of the consumption of materials other than the coal burnt 
to power the colliery engines, so that the expenses were difficult to break down into 
smaller components. The aggregate cost figures were, however, used on occasion to 
inform managerial decision-making. In 1868 two analyses were made of the optimum 
method of working the coal in the light of expected market price reductions.56 These 
were intended to establish the cost base required in order to make a profit rather than to 
reconcile an aspirational price point with known costs of production, and are indicative 
of the pre-eminence of market forces as a determinant of commercial policy in the 
nineteenth century coal trade.57 Whatever the practical effect on colliery policy of these 
particular analyses, the shortcomings of the 1854 accounting system in the context of 
the larger scale of the new colliery directly contributed to the system’s replacement in 
1869.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Boyns et al, ‘Development of Management Information Systems’, fn. p. 71. 
56 Cost estimates produced in February 1868, C/3/1/9/1 and C/3/1/9/8, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
57 J. F. Wilson A. and Thomson, The Making of Modern Management: British Management in Historical 
Perspective (Oxford, 2006), p. 237. 
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Accounting procedures: 1869 onwards 
 
Nostell Colliery had an output four times higher than Wragby’s, and its sales were 
shipped by rail to a wider geographical area than that served by the older pit.58 It 
required more coalface and haulage workers, as output per man could not have 
increased sufficiently to achieve a higher annual production without significant numbers 
of additional staff. More surface staff was needed to work on the screens and railway 
sidings. The reliance on the railway trade required a proactive sales function, and more 
work in, inter alia, administering the wagon fleet and settling accounts with customers 
and railway companies. The numbers of clerical and managerial staff would therefore 
have expanded, and a comparison of the working costs of the old and new pits indicates 
that the labour force at Nostell was three to four times that at Wragby.59 
The stimulus for the 1869 change in accountancy procedures was largely 
practical. There was no statutory reason for them to be changed. The 1862 Companies 
Act set out forms of accounts for limited liability corporations, but Charles Winn as sole 
proprietor had no obligation to produce accounts to meet the Act’s requirements or to 
inform partners or shareholders. Similarly, although accountancy was moving towards a 
corpus of formalised standards based on nascent professional organisations, these had 
not yet passed into widespread use in non-corporate enterprises.60 Several studies have 
suggested that modifications to an organisation’s accounting system were often 
responses to financially difficult times – which particularly encouraged an interest in 
cost analysis – and to changes in the senior personnel of an enterprise.61 These 
disruptive influences were at work at Nostell in 1868-1869. In June 1868 John Roseby 
was appointed colliery viewer in addition to his duties as engineer for the Lincolnshire 
ironstone.62 Shortly after appointment, Roseby expressed his dissatisfaction at the 
condition of the pit. He was particularly concerned about the high underground costs, 
and the difficulty of obtaining a breakdown of their constituent parts: ‘As for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 From 1870, at least 80 per cent of Nostell’s sale was by rail, and much of the remainder was consumed 
at the colliery itself. Landsale (including the domestic supply to the Winns’ residences) was a minor 
component of income, particularly after 1880.  Notebook, c. 1875, containing financial and production 
records of Wragby and Nostell Collieries, C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352; General financial statements book, 
1866-1882, 2/1, WYL523, both WYAS (W). 
59 C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
60 Wilson et al, The Making of Modern Management, pp. 239-240.  
61 For example, Hoskin et al, 'Knowing More as Knowing Less?’, p. 123; Boyns et al, ‘Development of 
Management Information Systems’, p. 72; Boyns et al, 'Cost and Management Accounting in Early 
Victorian Britain’, pp. 32, 40-41. 
62 Letters 22 June 1868 Edmund Winn to John Roseby and 25 June 1868 reply, both C/3/1/9/3, 
WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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increased expenses I must say that I am very sorry to see them but more particularly as I 
find that I cannot get a proper analysis of what the money has been expended for’. He 
considered the costs of underground haulage and of coal winning to be about 23/4d per 
ton (10-15 per cent) too high.63 Roseby’s policies brought about a sharp increase of 
production at the colliery at a time when the colliery’s financial position was 
unpromising. In early 1868 Rowland’s observed that it was ‘certainly not very 
satisfactory’, and the Winn brothers disagreed on the best means of improving 
matters.64 These various issues provided an environment conducive to a change in 
accounting procedures, and arguably the accounts system at the colliery was overhauled 
because it provided insufficient costing information for Roseby to make policy 
decisions on production levels. This implies that cost accounting information was 
actively used – at least while Roseby was assessing the condition of the colliery in 
summer 1868 - to analyse the colliery’s performance.  
The 1869 accounting system completed the separation of the colliery and estate 
businesses that had begun with the charging of rent for the coal. Nostell Colliery had its 
own bank account, and the colliery and estate cross-charged each other for the supply of 
materials and services, the transfers being recorded in each set of accounts as external 
transactions. For example, the colliery charged for its staff to service a lift at the Priory, 
and it paid cottage ground rents to the estate. The reality of the single ownership of all 
elements of the property would assert itself at need, but the resulting transactions were 
recorded formally. For example, assets were transferred between departments. The 
miners’ cottages were moved to the estate account for capital purposes between 1878 
and 1893, while the colliery administered the profit and loss account for the cottages, 
based on rental income against the cost of repairs and ground rent payable to the 
estate.65 Accumulated coal rents were retained by the colliery as a reserve fund, and 
later transferred to the Estate Account en bloc. Funds were transferred between 
departments if one was short of ready money.66 This flexibility applied to loans as well 
as short-term cash shortages. For instance, £1,000 of a loan taken for colliery purposes 
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63 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 5 July 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
64 C/3/1/9/1 and letters 30 October 1867 and 14 February 1868, Rowland to Charles Winn, A/1/8/1, both 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). Chapter 8 has further discussion of these events. 
65 The cottage capital account was transferred back to the Colliery just before a large number of new 
houses were built. 2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
66 For example, in spring 1866 Rowland offered to pay £1,000 from Appleby to the colliery.  
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was diverted to the estate to pay off an overdraft at Leatham’s Bank and not repaid for 
nearly three years.67 
The financial accounting aspects of the new procedures brought the colliery 
closer to standard professional practice and the forms of company accounts set out in 
the 1862 Companies Act and its successors.68 Both the 1854 and 1869 systems were 
founded on the cost centre principle that Edwards and Newell identify as exemplifying 
modern accounting practice.69 The handling of financial matters at Nostell was far 
removed from the ‘charge and discharge’ system of landed estate accounting in which 
an entry for the cost of feed for race-horses could be followed by one for coal-miners’ 
wages.70 The coal business was divided into four: the colliery itself, cottages, wagons 
and stores.71 The first three of these categories had profit and loss and capital accounts, 
calculated at six-monthly intervals.72 The cost centre accounts recorded the variable 
costs and income for their activities, and the overall enterprise balance was the 
aggregate of these, less indirect overheads such as management salaries, bad debts, bank 
charges and interest. The main colliery revenue account included credits from coal sales 
and other income so that a profit or loss could be calculated.73 The chief expense on the 
cottage account was the payment of ground rent to the estate, and the wagon account 
was credited with the interest on the capital that had been saved by the policy of leasing 
rather than buying wagons. The new system also incorporated balances of stock from 
the previous period, and the periodic return on capital invested was calculated. 
Some elements of the new accounting system retained a distinctly ‘home-grown’ 
feel, especially the treatment of capital.74 Although capital expenditure was recognised 
and recorded, there was no balance of assets and liabilities broadly conforming to the 
template in the Companies Act. On the asset side, the capital account itemised and 
calendarised expenditure on shafts, plant, railways and other types of fixed capital. The 
liabilities side recorded the sources from which capital had been obtained, including !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 2 December 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). Presumably the 
loan had a lower interest rate than the overdraft. 
68 Wilson et al, The Making of Modern Management, p. 238. Nostell Colliery was not incorporated until 
1918, when it became a private company.  
69 Edwards et al, ‘The Development of Industrial and Management Cost Accounting’, p. 40. 
70 Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 153. The example is taken from the Fitzwilliam estate at 
Wentworth Woodhouse. 
71 Miners were responsible for providing at their own expense certain items used underground (picks etc), 
and the Stores account was for these items which were bought in bulk by the colliery and sold on to the 
workforce at a small mark-up. The cottage account was for the housing rented to the colliery workforce.  
72 ‘General Financial Statements’ ledger, 2/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
73 The main colliery account was misleadingly entitled ‘Statement of working costs’, and the ‘stores’ 
profit/loss was included in it as a sub-account. 
74 All comments relate to ‘General Financial Statements’ ledger, 2/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
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loans, payments in kind and cash transfers from the Estate Account. No reference was 
made to coal stocks or to trade debtors and creditors. Between 1869 and 1872 a balance 
was struck for each year, which was paid off by the transfers of cash from the estate 
totalling £11,500 in 1871 and 1872, identified in Table 3.3.75 Conventional balance 
sheets only began to be produced in 1883, for six monthly periods with an annual 
summary. 
During the later nineteenth century the accountancy profession debated whether 
a colliery’s capital account should be closed once it had begun production, so that all 
subsequent capital expenditure was charged to revenue. Alternatively, fixed capital 
items could be charged to capital while labour cost incurred in the maintenance or 
improvement of the capital stock was funded out of revenue. Although Boyns suggests 
that the normal practice at collieries in the later nineteenth century was that ‘[capital] 
expenditure relating to a particular colliery, once normal production had begun, should 
be expensed’, Nostell adhered to the alternative policy.76 New items of fixed capital 
were added to the capital account, while the labour cost for the underground 
development of the colliery, which in accounting terms was maintenance of capital, was 
charged to revenue as ‘New work’.  
The capital account at Nostell accumulated year on year without depreciation, a 
common practice in collieries in the north-east of England, which retained this practice 
longer than elsewhere.77 The cumulative figure was used to calculate the Winns’ return 
by expressing the annual profit as a percentage of capital, which had the effect of 
deflating the percentage return. Depreciation was first applied at Nostell in 1901, and 
from 1903 the colliery and brickworks capital accounts were reduced each year by fixed 
sums of £3,540 and £1,142 respectively. Following a substantial write-off of wagon 
capital in 1902 - presumably to more accurately reflect the current value of the 
colliery’s wagons, some of which were over 30 years old - depreciation was applied to 
wagons at a rate of c26 per cent p.a. until 1906 after which the fixed sum of £442 was 
deducted annually.  
Capital expenditure on wagons at Nostell was treated in an inconsistent manner. 
This resulted from the colliery’s practice of obtaining wagons on lease purchase, by 
which the colliery made periodic payments – monthly, quarterly or half-yearly, 
depending on the agreement - over a seven-year term. At the termination of this period, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 See Chapter 3, p. 69. 
76 Boyns, ‘Cost Accounting in the South Wales Coal Industry’, pp. 333-334; quotation p. 334. 
77 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 513-514.  
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the wagons became the Winns’ property, although the colliery was responsible for their 
maintenance throughout the lease term.78 Under Nostell’s accounting practices, the 
periodic lease payments appeared in the separate wagon capital account, not as 
expenditure from the colliery capital account, so that in the 1871 ‘Receipts and 
expenditure on capital account’ for the colliery, wagon costs appear only as £400, 
representing a small number of wagons that the Winns had built internally or purchased 
outright.79 However, when calculating the return on capital -  ‘Summary of profit 
realised or loss on Capital invested’ – the costs of both leased and purchased wagons 
were included. From 1891, Nostell accounting policy towards wagon capital was 
revised. A substantial number of wagons were bought on lease purchase after the 
colliery deepening. 50 per cent of the annual payments for these wagons was assigned 
to the capital account, the remainder being charged to revenue. This effectively 
depreciated the wagons’ value, ten years before depreciation was introduced for other 
forms of capital.  
For the management accounts, the main innovation in 1869 was the introduction 
of a fortnightly ‘Statement of Costs’.80 This recorded a range of production data, 
including the weight of coal won from each seam, an analysis of wage expenditure for 
various functions, and the consumption of stores, timber and fuel.81 It also assigned ‘per 
ton’ figures for overheads including management, selling costs, taxes and interest 
charges, and ‘New work’.82 Supporting information was recorded, such as changes in 
wage rates and their date of effect. The cost book therefore supplied a wide range of 
information that contributed to the analysis of work processes at the colliery and, in 
conjunction with other accounting outputs, constituted the basis of a management 
information system. It certainly fulfilled a characteristic of management information 
systems observed by several accounting historians, that they often remained in place for 
long periods unless disrupted by significant changes in the organisation: the ‘Statement 
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78 Other forms of lease existed, for example the purchase lease, under which the colliery company paid an 
annual fee for the maintenance of the wagons (which was carried out by the lessor) and at the end of the 
lease period the lessee had the right to buy the wagons outright at a fixed price. Hyslop, Colliery 
Management, p. 267.  
79 The contemporary cost of an 8-ton wagon was around £70. Ibid, p. 264. 
80 From autumn 1867 into the following summer, Rowland made several comments in letters to his father 
about the poor financial performance of the colliery. 
81 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
82 A surprising omission is the absence of any overt statement of the costs of underground haulage, pit 
ponies etc. 
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of costs’ kept the same basic format, and was recorded in the same ledger, from 1869 
until nationalisation in 1947.83  
Assessment of the extent to which Nostell’s MIS was used in making 
management decisions is hampered by the methodological and evidentiary problem of 
linking the production of information to managerial action. Occasional references in 
their correspondence show Charles and Rowland Winn to be informed on colliery 
affairs in the 1830s and 1840s and concerned about its running costs.84  However, the 
infrequency of the references suggests that the colliery was an insufficiently important 
element of the property to generate much discussion and thereby evidence on the 
practical use of costing data. In the late 1860s Roseby’s belief that the inadequacy of the 
costing system was a serious hindrance to improvement of the colliery’s performance 
indicated that accounting information was acknowledged to be of significant value to 
management. However, the increase in the volume of accounting data did not also 
increase the evidence of their use in, for example, the preparation of advance budgets 
based on assumptions of production and sales. The systematic use of financial scenarios 
to inform practical decisions therefore cannot be assumed. Although Roseby saw the 
justification of the colliery’s financial performance to the Winn family as part of his 
role as viewer, this process - and management generally – was reactive and took place 
in an informal organisational environment. Understanding the detailed character of an 
organisation and the manner in which its business was conducted is important to 
interpretation of the surviving records. Boyns and Wale note in their study of 
management information systems in the coal industry that: 
The earliest example we have found of the production of financial 
accounts on a more regular basis than six months is at the Nostell 
Colliery. Half-yearly and annual accounts were produced prior to 1882, 
but from the beginning of the year fortnightly balance sheets were 
prepared. Since no minute books have survived, however, it is not clear 
how regularly these were submitted to the board.85 
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83 Boyns et al, ‘Development of Management Information Systems’, pp. 75-76. 
84 Such as Rowland’s letter to Charles Winn, 2 March 1844, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W): ‘There has 
been a very large sale of coal at the pits lately, more than they have had for a very long time. Last week 
they sold 240 tons and the week before 270. Drake the blacksmith has sent in a very large bill for work 
done at the Coal Pits and some of the charges are out of all reason, and he has charged…1/3 more iron in 
weight than he has used’. 
85 Boyns et al, ‘Development of Management Information Systems’, fn. p. 79. Judging by the surviving 
examples, the production of fortnightly accounts appears to have been a short-term practice.   
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This failure of evidence arises because until 1918 Nostell Colliery was not incorporated, 
and had no board of directors.86 Policy issues were dealt with in discussion and private 
correspondence. The absence of formal records makes the influence of accounting 
information on the formulation of policy especially difficult to trace.  
The 1869 financial accounting procedures continued largely unchanged until the 
First World War – apart from the introduction of conventional balance sheets and the 
use of depreciation - and, as noted, the main management accounting tool changed little 
until 1947. From 1882 the accounts were kept in the Winns’ Wakefield estate office, 
where book-keeping for all elements of the property was concentrated, and were in the 
care of employees of very long service: a 1907 request for a pay increase from the chief 
book-keeper showed that he had worked for the Estate for forty-three years and one of 
his colleagues for thirty-one.87 The self-sufficiency of the Estate organisation is 
underlined by the absence of evidence that the colliery accounts underwent independent 
audit. The practice of external audit had become increasingly common among 
companies incorporated under the 1862 Act and was not unusual among landed estates 
with substantial industrial or urban incomes – both the Northumberland and Bute estates 
employed independent auditors.88 The apparently inward-looking nature of accounting 
at Nostell Colliery, which hardly changed after the upheavals of the 1850s and 1860s, 
contrasts markedly with the culture of openness to technical change that was apparent in 
the late nineteenth century and which is described in Chapter 8. 
In conclusion, how does the evidence from Nostell contribute to the 
historiographical debate described earlier in this chapter? Financial and management 
accounts, although unsophisticated, had been prepared in a regular and consistent 
manner from the late eighteenth century. The production of such records at a small 
colliery like Wragby might suggest that similar records could commonly have been kept 
at enterprises of similar size. It is likely, however, that Wragby was more likely to keep 
such records as it was part of a landed estate that was accustomed to monitoring its 
financial performance. It is notable that cost accounting data appeared at least as early 
as financial accounts, and in an extractive industry that lacked the pattern of clear-cut !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Dintenfass notes that even in the inter-war years among collieries that were limited companies, it was 
difficult to find evidence of decision-making processes or details of the personalities involved. 
Dintenfass, Managing Industrial Decline, pp. 9-10. 
87 Letters, Edmund to Rowland, Winn, 11 February 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL 1352, and J. B. James to 
George Winn, 16 July 1907, 15/1, WYL523, both WYAS (W). 
88 Independent audit of limited liability companies was not made compulsory until 1947. Napier, 
‘Aristocratic Accounting’, p. 171; Spring, The English Landed Estate, p.12; Wilson et al, The Making of 
Modern Management, p. 238. 
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incremental production characteristic of manufacturing industry. They were used in ad 
hoc analyses and forecasts that were prepared by technical specialists to assist the owner 
in considering investment and production decisions. Inadequate process costing 
information was one of the triggers for the 1869 accounting process revision. These 
factors imply that financial and cost accounting data developed in parallel, and that cost 
data influenced management decision-making at a relatively early date. It also suggests 
that the relative stages of development of financial and cost accounting in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were misconstrued by the earlier interpretation 
of the evolution of accounting practice, and understated costing data’s influence on 
management. The Winn estate’s interest in understanding production costs at its colliery 
predates by nearly a century Solomons’ proposal of 1875 as the commencement of the 
investigation of costs by industrial managers.  
Accounting practices at Nostell, although not subject to statutory influence, 
became more sophisticated over the course of the nineteenth century in response to the 
level of investment in the colliery and to common practice in the coal trade. The 
introduction of the 1869 accounting system supports the suggestion that changes of 
senior management or periods of financial difficulty may trigger new accounting 
initiatives, rooted in a real concern to improve accounting practices for managerial 
purposes. However, Nostell does not support the revisionist perspective at all points. 
Boyns and Edwards suggested that the integration of management and financial 
accounts in the coal industry was ‘widespread’ by the 1870s and that this integration 
was often signalled by the use of cost centres as the basic unit of accounting. This 
finding was disputed by Hoskin and Macve, whose alternative hypothesis was that in 
the nineteenth century the integration of financial accounts, management accounts and 
organisational administration was not far advanced, and that this was indicated by a 
failure to ‘articulate and systematically implement labour standards’, the touchstone of 
‘the modern approach [to management] based in a human accounting’.89 The evidence 
of accounting integration at Nostell inclines to Hoskin and Macve’s interpretation, and 
indeed to the earlier view that cost and management accounts were entirely separate. 
Despite the use of cost centres for financial accounting purposes at Nostell the 
integration of financial and management accounts was far from complete, so that, for 
example, the costs per ton given in the ‘Statement of costs’ cannot be reconciled with 
the total figures for working costs in the profit and loss account, and the tonnages of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Boyns, et al, ‘The Construction of Cost Accounting Systems’, p. 10; Hoskin et al, 'Knowing More as 
Knowing Less?’, pp. 109-110. 
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coal used in each as the basis for calculations do not exactly agree. The likelihood is 
that each set of accounts was maintained by a different function, probably the 
engineering (‘Statement of costs’) and book-keeping (financial accounts) departments, 
and was used to inform separate decision-making processes. The new accounting 
procedures were not even in universal operation throughout the colliery, especially at 
the most senior level. The ‘pithead’ and ‘total payments’ system dating from 1854, 
although not readily comparable with the new cost centre-based method, ran in parallel 
with it until 1875, probably at the preference of a member of the Winn family. This 
underlines the informal nature of a family-owned business and the ability of senior 
individuals to override the imposition of pan-organisational practice.  
As regards the measurement and introduction of labour standards, there was 
little evidence of Chandler’s ‘visible hand’ of corporate management in directly and 
consistently moulding the setting of such standards at Nostell, where the process was 
not decided by objectivity and measurement of performance. Setting the piece rate for a 
new seam was worked out between management and workforce through a subjective 
and adversarial series of manoeuvres and compromises, which on the labour side 
included the deliberate restriction of output during trial periods, localised strikes and 
pressurising management through anonymous critical letters. Edmund considered this 
behaviour to be ‘natural’ and understandable on the part of the miners, and accepted its 
unpredictable and unstructured nature, which clearly could not be characterised as 
‘based in a human accounting’.90 However, the variety and level of detail of the 
accounts at the Nostell collieries and the range of uses to which they were put, including 
forecasting, estimating and analysis of past performance, testify to ‘the variety of 
accounting’s contractual and managerial roles’ from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, and bear out the view that ‘accounting and costing have long been of great 
importance in the British coal industry’.91 
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90 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 16 November 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
91 Hoskin et al, 'Knowing More as Knowing Less?’, p. 98; McLean, ‘Agent's Reputation, Accounting and 
Costing’, pp. 4-5. 
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Chapter 6 
The influence of transport on the market for coal 
Introduction  
 
Chapter 6 explores in detail the role that transport – and especially the railway – played 
in the British coal trade. It begins by considering the relationship between the growth of 
the railway and canal networks and the increases both in national coal consumption and 
the geographical extent of colliery markets. The influence of these changes on Rowland 
Winn’s strategy for the founding of Nostell Colliery is touched upon. The extent of 
Nostell’s own market is assessed in the context of the markets addressed by the 
Yorkshire coalfields as a whole. The focus of the chapter then turns to the operational 
management of the delivery of coal by rail, and the importance to the coalowner of 
having the means to get the product to the customer promptly and cost-effectively. The 
chapter concludes with a review of the use of the private owner wagon on British 
railways, and notes the increasing use of service levels as a differentiator in the delivery 
of coal.  
Sea-sale, landsale and new technology in transport 
 
Prior to the eighteenth century, the coal trade in England had two routes to market, each 
defined by transport. Coalfields with easy access to ports sold to ‘sea-sale’ markets, in 
which coal was shipped by sea in bulk over relatively long distances to markets in the 
British Isles and north-west Europe. The most notable sea-sale route was north east 
England’s longstanding trade to London, while the Cumberland coalfield had well-
established links with Ireland and ports on the west coast of England.1 Inland coalfields 
had ‘landsale’ markets, selling to customers accessed by land transport.2 These were 
highly localised because of the cost and difficulty of moving a heavy and bulky 
commodity by road or by early, rudimentary tramways, and a landsale colliery’s market 
rarely extended further than ten miles from the pit-head.3 Wragby was a classic example !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 30. 
2 Inland coalfields were those without easy access to the sea; that is, most of the English fields apart from 
the north-east and Cumberland. 
3 Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry, p. 359. 
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of the landsale colliery - 85 per cent of its sales were made to customers within a 6-mile 
radius, an area in which it probably enjoyed a virtual monopoly.4 As roads and road 
transport improved towards the end of the nineteenth century, it became possible for 
mines in industrial areas to support moderate production levels on a landsale trade. For 
example, in the twenty years before the First World War Hunsworth Colliery near 
Cleckheaton sold c50,000 tons annually to local textile and engineering industries, 
mostly delivered by road direct from the pithead.5 The majority of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century collieries, however, were dependent on the railways.  
The pattern of local landsale and long distance sea-sale was broken by the 
growth of the canal network, and later the railways. Cheap and efficient overland 
transport by water or rail ‘destroyed regional and local monopolies’. Collieries without 
access to coastal shipping could move coal economically to customers beyond the 
limitations of road transport, and prices were reduced in markets outside the coalfields.6 
Reliable bulk transport also enabled coalowners to obtain economies of scale in 
production without holding large stocks, which were expensive and prone to 
deterioration.7 Low-priced coal transported by canal or rail from large, distant collieries 
undercut small-scale, high-cost indigenous suppliers.8 For example, George Loch, agent 
to Sir John Ramsden’s estate at Huddersfield, commented in 1844 that local 
townspeople were ‘very desirous’ that a Manchester to Leeds railway should be built 
because it would ‘enable them to command a cheaper supply of coal than they now 
have…coal from the [Leeds] collieries could be delivered in Huddersfield at 6/6d per 
ton, the price now paid being 10/-’.9 From the 1830s, railways quickly established an 
advantage over canals through their ability to move freight ‘from a much wider variety 
of locations, faster, at more regular speeds, and with a lower outlay of man and 
horsepower’.10 At Carlton, Edmund had planned to benefit from the competition 
between canals and railways. If a railway competed with the Aire & Calder Canal 
Company in carrying coal from the south Yorkshire coalfield to the Humber, the canal 
company would have to:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Sales for 1851. C/3/1/9/7, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
5 Ledger, Cleckheaton Colliery Co Ltd, B/CC, WYAS (K). 
6 R. A. Church, ‘Ossified or Dynamic? Structure, Markets and the Competitive Process in the British 
Business System of the Nineteenth Century’, Business History (vol. 42, no. 1, 2000), pp. 1-20, p. 5 
(quotation); Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 43-45; B. Fullerton, The 
Development of British Transport Networks (Oxford, 1975), p. 21. 
7 Bill Hudson, Private Owner Wagons vol. 1 (Barnsley, 1988), unnumbered introduction. 
8 Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, p. 30. 
9 George Loch, report on the Huddersfield estate to Sir John Ramsden, 6 June 1844, Ramsden papers 
DD/RA/4, WYAS (K). 
10 Fullerton, The Development of British Transport Networks, p. 21. 
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…reduce their tolls to a minimum below what would be remunerative 
with the present mode of using horse power (and they must therefore 
propose substituting steam tug boats)…if at any time they should raise 
their tolls…[we] should always have the opportunity of sending coals 
to the same part of the country by rail’.11  
Technological competition would therefore enhance the beneficial effect of the new 
transport media on the cost and speed of moving Carlton’s coal. These effects could be 
seen nationally, as coal consumption in Britain increased rapidly in the mid-nineteenth 
century - from 23,500,000 tons in 1830 to 32,600,000 ten years later and 60,000,000 in 
1855.12  
The new forms of transport did not create a national market in which all 
coalfields, irrespective of location, could compete equally, but they did increase the 
level of competition by enabling markets in non coal-bearing areas to be supplied by a 
number of coalfields.13 For instance, in 1850 90 per cent of coal supplies reached 
London by sea, mostly from north-east England. Twenty years later, after the 
completion of the North Midland/Great Northern main line allowed the Midlands 
coalfield to compete in London against sea-sale coal, the coal market in the capital had 
doubled in size and 55 per cent was carried by rail.14 Similarly, in the last twenty years 
of the nineteenth century Yorkshire and the East Midlands benefited when connections 
to the east coast were established and new docks were built by competing railway 
companies at Hull, Grimsby and Immingham. As a result these coalfields made 
significant inroads into sea-sale markets in Britain and abroad.15  
The Winns were introduced to the importance of transport in the coal trade 
during Edmund’s attempt to promote Carlton Colliery. A report by John Walker on the 
proposal described the opportunity that canals and railways gave to the coalowner, but 
also hinted at the fragility of that opportunity, and its vulnerability to changing 
circumstances: 
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11 Letter, Edmund Winn to Lord Wharncliffe, 22 January 1856, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
12 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 12. 
13 Coalowners were assisted to maximise sales by the adoption of a similar policy on freight by the major 
railway companies, which ‘pursued traffic maximisation from the 1840s which eroded the effects of 
spatial imperfections in industrial competition’. Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, p. 30. 
14 In both 1850 and 1870 around 90 per cent of sea-borne coal was from the north-east, and no more than 
10 per cent of rail-borne. Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, pp. 168-169. 
15 Fullerton, The Development of British Transport Networks, pp. 39-40; Mitchell, Economic 
Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 23, 27; Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, 
pp. 39-40. 
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[Carlton] is well situated with reference to canal and railway…[the 
Great Northern Railway] will not give facilities for the transit upon 
their line of any coal but their own. This leaves the Midland Railway 
only as the means of gaining access to the south – at a higher rate of toll 
– which will of course have its effect upon both sales and profit…The 
canal transit places the Carlton coal at a slight disadvantage in point of 
toll as compared with the Barnsley district…and this although only 
amounting to a few pence per ton operates seriously upon profits.16 
Rowland’s promotion of new railways to support his coal and ironstone interests, and 
his refusal to commit capital to a new colliery until the construction of a railway was 
certain, indicate his grasp of Walker’s point: an inland coalowner aspiring to launch a 
colliery of any significant size had to be connected to the railway network, unless there 
was a very large local ‘captive’ market. Transport defined the markets that could be 
reached by a colliery, and influenced the physical extent of the coalfield. The expansion 
of the coalfields tracked that of both canals and railways, so that ‘even the prospect of a 
new line sometimes led to the sinking of pits in hitherto untapped parts’.17 The 
construction of the West Riding and Grimsby Joint Railway linking Wakefield and 
Doncaster – vital to Nostell’s prospects – stimulated the sinking of several other pits, at 
Fitzwilliam, Hemsworth and South Elmsall.  
The ability of Nostell Colliery to produce and sell an average of over 1,000 tons 
of coal each week – rather than the 1,000 a month that Wragby had sold - was 
dependent on the market access given by the railway network. In 1869 over 90 per cent 
of Nostell’s sales were transported by rail, rising to 95 per cent after 1887. However, 
landsale had some qualitative advantages over railway-sale coal. Landsale coal volume 
was more consistent year on year and varied less in response to economic cycles than 
did the railway market, so that the proportion of landsale rose in periods of low overall 
sales. Jonathan Hyslop, a contemporary colliery manager writing in the 1870s, tempered 
his opinion that ‘it is seldom that [landsale] is sufficient for even one pit, and a wider 
connection is necessary’ with the qualification that it ‘had the advantage of being a 
ready-money branch of the business with little trouble, no extra allowances for weight, 
no discounts, and generally higher prices’.18 The tendency to higher prices can be seen !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Letter, John Walker to Rowland Winn, 5 September 1854, C3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
17 Buxton, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 67-68 (quotation p. 68); Fullerton, 
The Development of British Transport Networks, p. 4. 
18 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 148. 
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in Figure 6.1, but railway transport generated far higher sale volumes, especially for a 
rural colliery. Reliance on a local market would have restricted Nostell’s potential to 
little more than Wragby’s 10-15,000 tons per annum. 
 
Figure 6.1: Landsale as a proportion of all sales at Nostell Colliery by value and 
weight, 1869-1914 
  
Note: Landsales by weight are not available for 1869-1882.  
Source: Ledgers 1869-1888, 4/1, WYL523, 1889-1903, C/3/3/2/2 and 1903-1914, C/3/3/2/4, WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
The geographical extent of the Yorkshire coalfield’s market 
 
Consideration of the geographical extent of Nostell’s market will begin with that of the 
Yorkshire coalfield as a whole. Mitchell estimates that around 80 per cent of Yorkshire 
coal production in the 1860s was consumed in its home county or in Lancashire, buoyed 
by an expanding manufacturing base. Coastwise and export shipments were 
‘negligible’, and only about 5 per cent went south by rail.19 However, in the ensuing 
forty years, the coalfield’s market became more geographically diverse, as can be seen 
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Table 6.1: Estimated consumption of coal produced by Yorkshire collieries, 1869-
1913 
Year 1869 1887 1903 1913 
 Tons (m) Per cent 
annual 
total 
Tons (m) Per cent 
annual 
total 
Tons (m) Per cent 
annual 
total 
Tons (m) Per cent 
annual 
total 
Export 0.4 3.66 1.9 9.4 3.1 10.9 6.8 15.6 
Coastal 0.1 0.9 0.4 2.0 1.1 3.9 2.4 5.5 
Ironworks 1.4 12.8 3.4 16.8 4.4 15.4 6.1 14.0 
Local genl. 
mfg. 
5.3 48.6 6.9 34.2 7.3 25.6 10.9 25.0 
Local house 2.2 20.2 3.0 14.8 3.7 13.0 4.3 9.8 
Mfg./house 
railed south 
0.5 4.6 2.0 9.9 4.0 14.0 5.4 12.4 
Railways 0.4 3.7 0.9 4.5 1.4 4.9 2.2 5.0 
Steamships 0 0 0.5 2.5 1.9 6.7 3.2 7.3 
Collieries 0.6 5.5 1.2 5.9 1.6 5.6 2.4 5.5 
Total 10.9 100.0 20.2 100.0 28.5 100.0 43.7 100.0 
Notes: 1. ‘Local general manufacturing’ in this context includes gas and electricity, and consumption of 
Yorkshire coal by Lancashire manufacturers. 
2. Much of the ironworks consumption was located in the Leeds and Sheffield areas. 
Source: All information from Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 16.  
 
Coal consumption by general manufacturing businesses in Yorkshire doubled 
between 1869 and 1913, but the proportion of coal produced in the county and sold 
locally or in Lancashire declined to under 50 per cent by the First World War, the 
reduction being especially pronounced in the 1880s and 1890s. This was the outcome of 
structural changes in the regional economy. Yorkshire’s flax and linen industries died 
out in the third quarter of the century and the growth of the woollen industry slowed in 
the 1890s. West Yorkshire coalowners looked to alternative markets to absorb the 
production increase of the later 1870s that resulted from the investment attracted by the 
high prices of 1872-1875. Much of this new capacity was located – as was Nostell - in 
the eastern extension of the field and relatively close to the Humber ports, so that sales 
were sought in the export, coastal and steamship bunker trades.20 All these markets 
showed stronger growth in the early twentieth century than that for coal sent south by 
rail, which declined as a proportion of total sales between 1903 and 1913. The 
proportion of exports accelerated from 1890, although the west Yorkshire coalfield was 
below that of the county as a whole - returns from West Yorkshire Coalowners’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 23-26; H. S. Jevons, The British 
Coal Trade (London, 1915), p. 67. 
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Association members in 1913 showed that 14 per cent of their output was exported, 
mostly from Hull, Goole and Grimsby and destined for the Baltic area or South 
America. This was because many of the Association’s members were located in the 
western part of the coalfield, distant from east coast ports but close to plentiful local 
industry.21 
The geographical extent of Nostell Colliery’s market  
 
Although a lack of surviving records makes the recreation of the extent of 
Nostell’s market more difficult for the 1860s and 1870s than for the years between the 
late 1880s and the First World War, a number of conclusions can be drawn for the 
earlier period. The regional markets served by Nostell can be characterised through the 
usages to which its coal was put – the main categories being domestic, manufacturing, 
coking, gas or steam – and these were dependent on the nature of the coal produced.22 
Virtually all Nostell’s output prior to 1886 came from the Shafton seam. The best 
quality coal from the seam could be sold for gas generation, and included some cannel 
that attracted a high price for this purpose.23 However, the bulk of production was sold 
for manufacturing purposes – that is, to fire stationary engines used by industry – and as 
steam coal for railway engines.24  
Table 6.1 suggests that a new colliery of Nostell’s size, opening in the West 
Riding in the mid-1860s, would find most of its sales within Yorkshire or contiguous 
industrial areas, while less than 10 per cent of the county’s production went to export or 
southern markets. It is therefore surprising that in its early days Nostell looked to sell 
coal in London and Europe. In 1867 Rowland signed a five-year contract with the 
London Gas Co., the coal to be railed to Grimsby for onward shipment by coaster – an 
immediate payback by Rowland’s railways.25 Later that year the Winns sent 
consignments from Grimsby to London for sale on arrival through the coal exchange, 
and John Roseby attempted to sell direct to the French gas industry.26 The likely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Dintenfass, Managing Industrial Decline, p. 56. 
22 See Chapter 7 pp. 132-138 for a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of these markets. 
23 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 31. 
24 Coal from the Shafton seam was ‘often bought by the railway companies for use by slow traffic’. The 
Times, 1 December 1913, p. 26.  
25 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 29 June 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
26 Edmund followed on by rail to sell the coal, probably through London Coal Exchange. Belton hinted to 
Rowland that Roseby’s French trip was simply a ‘jolly’ at the Winns’ expense. Letters, Rowland to 
Charles Winn, 30 October 1867, A/1/8/1, and Thomas Belton to Edmund Winn, 4 September 1867, 
C/3/1/9/3, both WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
! 112!
explanation of these metropolitan and export aspirations is the personal involvement of 
Rowland and Edmund in marketing the coal. As commercially ambitious members of 
the landowning class, the Winns’ education, social milieu and political aspirations made 
them more oriented to London than the average Yorkshire coalowner. Their thoughts 
turned to the convenient forum of the London Coal Exchange to gain an entrée to the 
capital’s domestic and industrial market.  
The nature of Nostell’s coal was also an influence. Cannel and other good 
quality gas coals were common around Halifax, Dewsbury and Bradford, and the 
collieries in those areas had the advantage of proximity to the West Riding 
conurbation.27 The London gas market was large, and the Winns appeared to have taken 
the opportunity to place the colliery on a good financial footing by securing a five-year 
London Gas Co. contract and an agreement to supply locomotive coal to the GNR. 
Rowland had clearly identified the ‘corporate’ market as a particular sales target - in 
October 1867 he referred to ‘obtaining a gas contract or two’ - but his expectations were 
not fulfilled because of commercial problems that are discussed in Chapter 8.28 Despite 
this, and the failure of the French gas venture to make any further impression on the 
colliery’s records, Nostell certainly established a presence in the capital, as a price for 
Nostell gas coal was quoted on the London Coal Exchange in the late 1860s.29 The coal 
sent to southern markets was transported by rail and sea, in addition to rail-borne 
deliveries to the Yorkshire manufacturing customers who constituted a large part of 
Nostell’s market. After the early 1870s boom, during which Edmund noted that the 
difficulty lay in bringing sufficient coal to the surface rather than in selling it, a lengthy 
slump set in during which production fell sharply and landsale again became a 
significant proportion of the colliery’s sales.30  
The coals from the Winter and the Beamshaw seams that were worked by the 
colliery after the deepening of the shafts had a strong influence on Nostell’s 
geographical markets from 1888 onwards. They were particularly suited to domestic 
usage as well as the gas market that the Shafton addressed. By linking customer names 
in sales records with data relating to the coal carriage costs paid to railway companies, a 
reconstruction of the geographical extent of Nostell’s market is possible for the period 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 A. Greenwell and J. V. Elsden, Analyses of British Coals and Coke, and the Characteristics of the 
Chief Coal Seams worked in the British Isles (London, 1907), pp. xxviii-xxx. 
28 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 30 October 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
29 The Times, 6 August 1867, p. 11. 
30 See Fig. 6.1, p. 109. Production fell from 53,000 to 38,000 tons between 1876 and 1878. 2/1, WYL523, 
WYAS (W). Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 15 August 1872, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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from 1888 to 1914.31 In the ten years after 1888 the main railways used by Nostell for 
coal carriage were the Great Northern, North Eastern and Lancashire and Yorkshire, the 
extent of whose networks suggest that Nostell coal was being sold in the industrial 
north, the east of England south of Doncaster, and London. From the late 1890s 
onwards, Nostell increased its use of the Lancashire and Yorkshire, while the London 
and North Western, Great Central, and Hull and Barnsley Railways also became more 
prominent. The Great Central was an alternative to the Great Northern for the London 
trade, potentially giving access en route to the east Midlands, although the main 
destination for Nostell coal on GCR lines was probably the newly constructed dock at 
Immingham. Nostell’s inland market therefore lay in four main districts - the West 
Riding, Lancashire, East Anglia and London - and coal sent by sea went via the east 
cost ports around the Humber.  
Coal merchants were supplied in all four of these districts. These merchants 
mainly supplied the domestic market, but some of the larger firms – especially in 
London – also sold to industrial users. The northern merchants were substantial regional 
operators with a number of branches or sub-retailers, and were concentrated in the 
industrial West Riding and the Pennine towns of Lancashire. Geo. Moxon and Son was 
a typical customer, based in Huddersfield but with a branch network extending to east 
Lancashire. Larger clients were W. Fletcher and Son, headquartered in Leeds but with 
connections throughout England, and G. Hinchliffe & Co., also northern-based with 
depots in east coast ports and London. After 1900, Nostell built up a trade with Co-
operative Retail Societies in the West Riding and Lancashire, probably the source of the 
increased use of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and London and North Western railways 
for carriage. Rail access to London from Nostell was possible through the Great 
Northern, Great Central or Midland, but the Winns did little business with the latter 
company - the colliery was directly connected to a Great Northern/Great Central joint 
line, and the Midland’s service level was inferior.32 Destinations in the east of England 
were reached via the Great Northern. Some of Nostell’s output went south by sea, as 
indicated by correspondence regarding a delivery of coal to Hull Docks to be shipped to 
Myers, Rose & Co. in London.33 The colliery’s southern customers were large 
merchants who sold to industrial consumers and smaller retailers, and had regional 
branch networks. These dealers included Thomas Moy & Co., which had a substantial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 C/3/3/2/2, C/3/3/2/3and C/3/3/2/4, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
32 See below, p. 124. 
33 Letters, George Winn to Myers, Rose & Co., 10 June 1906, and George Winn to J. A. F. Aspinall, 
general manager L&YR, 30 October 1906, both C3/6/4/[1857], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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business throughout East Anglia and owned depots in the capital. Nostell’s London 
trade included William Cory & Son, Myers, Rose & Co. and Rickett, Cockerell & Co.  
Cory’s were one of the first merchants to practice backward vertical integration by 
moving into colliery ownership. Rickett’s claimed to be the largest distributor of 
household coal in London and the Home Counties.34 This was an impressive customer 
list for a colliery of modest size, and the cachet of dealing with a prominent 
Conservative politician and – from 1885 - peer may have influenced some purchase 
decisions. After Rowland’s ennoblement the colliery letterhead specified that any reply 
should be addressed to ‘Lord St Oswald’, and many correspondents did exactly that.35  
Nostell’s market for manufacturing coal was largely in the Leeds, Wakefield and 
Dewsbury areas, with a few customers in east Lancashire. Much of the colliery’s 
landsale trade was for small orders of this grade of coal, emphasising the local nature of 
the demand. Larger clients included wagon builders, ironworks and brick-makers, but 
there is no evidence of sales to the textile industry.36 Carriage for these customers was 
by the Great Northern or the Lancashire and Yorkshire. Sales of gas coal from Nostell 
were split between Yorkshire and London. Several West Riding gasworks were 
customers, as was the Beckton Gas, Light and Coke Co. in east London. Nostell’s steam 
coal market was local to the West Riding, mostly to GNR locomotive depots. Finally, 
the colliery was indirectly involved in the export market through its trade with shipping 
companies, two of the most prominent of which were Pyman & Bell of Hartlepool and 
J. T. Crampton of Portsmouth. Nostell supplied coal – probably domestic or 
manufacturing grade - f.o.b. to east coast ports, in Pyman & Bell’s case at Hull although 
Nostell coal was also shipped from Grimsby/Immingham. Pyman & Bell sold pit-prop 
timber to Nostell, and the coal was a return cargo for this trade, bound for ports around 
the Baltic Sea.  
The effect of the railway can be appreciated by comparing the geographical 
extent of markets for Nostell’s coal in 1851 and in the 1890s. At the earlier date, a high 
proportion of Wragby’s customers were located within six miles of the colliery and little 
coal travelled more than ten miles.37 Forty years later, Nostell Colliery’s market !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Information on coal merchants from Hudson, Private Owner Wagons vols. 1-4, and K. Turton, Private 
Owner Wagons: Fifth-Tenth Collections (Witney, 2006-2011). 
35 Perhaps disappointingly to the originators, the replies came from George Winn, who was merely an 
Honourable. 
36 For example, engine and foundry coal sold to the Horbury Junction Iron Co., the Yorkshire Wagon Co. 
(both Wakefield), Headfield Brick Co. (Dewsbury), and the Monk Bridge Iron Co. (Leeds). C/3/3/2/3 
[175], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
37 C/3/1/9/7, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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extended to approximately fifty miles by rail within the Yorkshire/Lancashire industrial 
region, and up to 150 miles to the south and east of England either by rail throughout or 
transhipped from rail to coaster at a Humber port. The colliery had few inland 
customers in coalfields outside the West Riding and east Lancashire, however, as the 
transport cost made its coal uncompetitive with more local suppliers - for example, 
there is no evidence that Nostell coal sold in the Midlands markets accessible from the 
Great Central’s route to London via Nottingham and Leicester. New lines could open up 
new markets, as when the East Anglian market became accessible to Yorkshire 
collieries in the 1880s by the construction of a line south-east from Lincoln into 
Norfolk. Just as collieries opened close to the route of new railways, so coal sales 
followed new lines into non coal-producing areas.38  
The railway companies’ own commercial policies had a direct influence on 
geographical coal markets. One of John Walker’s reservations about the proposed 
colliery at Carlton was that the Great Northern Railway, whose lines ran close to the 
site, did not carry coal other than that sold under the company’s name at its stations.39 
Because of this, the Midland – whose rates were higher – was the only railway that the 
colliery could use. However, the GNR abandoned its ‘entrepreneurial role in the coal 
trade’ after an 1859 court ruling that it could not be involved in the sale of coal, and 
thereafter it carried coal simply as freight.40 In 1871-1872 the company aggressively 
sought coal business by cutting its charges for taking coal from Yorkshire to London to 
a point below the Midland’s charges from Nottinghamshire. As a result of this ‘rate 
war’, the volume of coal sent south by rail increased to nearly 10 per cent of 
Yorkshire’s output: a trade report for the West Riding in spring 1872 commented that 
‘within the last two years the quantity has been doubled to the metropolis from our 
district’.41 No doubt Nostell benefited from this boom. However, it subsided rapidly 
when the Great Northern built lines into the north Derbyshire coalfield, which was 
nearer to London than Yorkshire and could compete with the Midland without price-
cutting. Yorkshire collieries then began a lengthy period during which they developed 
markets in other parts of southern England accessible by rail, particularly East Anglia, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 25. 
39 See the letter from John Walker to Rowland Winn dated 5 September 1854, p. 108 above. 
40 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 45 (quotation); P. Bagwell, The Railway 
Clearing House in the British Economy 1842-1922 (London, 1968), pp. 83-84. 
41 Iron & Coal Trades Review, 6 March 1872 (vol. 6, no. 210), p. 92. 
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and re-established Yorkshire’s place in the London market as changes in transport rates 
permitted.42  
Nostell’s trade with the eastern counties and with several prominent London 
merchants showed that it participated in the consolidation of the Yorkshire coalfield’s 
markets. It also shared in the renaissance of the coastal trade in coal. Although by 1870 
the railway had outstripped coastal shipping as the prime carrier of coal to London from 
all coalfields, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century improvements took place in 
the loading capacity, speed and fuel consumption of maritime transport.43 Railway 
companies invested in upgraded facilities at ports on their networks, including those 
closest to Nostell on the Humber estuary. By the 1890s, coastal shipment was once 
again competitive with rail transport for Yorkshire coal heading south, so that in 1900 
one million tons of coal from the county was carried to London by sea. This figure 
continued to grow up to the First World War, and this included a proportion of Nostell’s 
sales.44 The various modes of transport developed their own specialities. Coastal 
shipping was more suitable for bulk deliveries for industrial use and for bunkering, 
especially after 1890. The railways could better manage the highly distributed delivery 
of coal, often in small lots, for domestic use or for inland industrial consumers, and 
canals remained cost-effective for bulk deliveries if the colliery and customer were 
located close to the waterway.45 Much of Nostell’s market consisted of relatively small 
consignments of the type typically carried by rail - the colliery was not on a canal and 
there is no evidence that it used inland waterways. 
Managing ‘the means for transit to the ordinary market’:46 railways and wagons 
 
The effective use of the railway network could materially affect a colliery’s 
profitability, as Jonathan Hyslop made clear in his 1875 guide to colliery management. 
He recommended that a colliery should market to customers the shortest rail distance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 25. 
43 Fullerton, The Development of British Transport Networks, p. 41. 
44 Although shipment to London by coasting vessel held an apparent cost advantage over rail as charges 
were 3-5/- per ton in 1900, compared to rail’s 7-7/9d, this was reduced by other transit costs associated 
with water transport. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 16; Church, 
History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 20-21. 
45 V. Van Vleck, ‘Delivering Coal by Road and Rail in Britain: The Efficiency of the ‘Silly Little 
Bobtailed’ Coal Wagon’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 57 no. 1 (1997), pp. 139-160; this ref. 
pp. 145-146; P. J. Cain, ‘The British Railways Rates Problem, 1894-1913’, Business History 20 (1), 1978, 
pp. 87-99; this ref. p. 92. 
46 John Walker’s description of the role of the railways and canals. Letter, John Walker to Rowland Winn, 
5 September 1854, C3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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away. This would minimise railway charges, deploy the colliery’s stock more efficiently 
and reduce wagon wear and tear per delivery. If possible a single railway company 
should be used for the journey. By doing so, delays caused by failures of co-operation 
between rival railways would be eliminated, and the colliery’s competitiveness 
enhanced because of the lower carriage charges given by railway companies to 
‘exclusive’ customers. Hyslop suggested that coalowners should give preference to 
journeys that avoided re-marshalling at an intermediate point and did not require transit 
through railway bottlenecks, particularly large cities.47 This avoided delays that were 
disruptive to both supplier and customer, and consumed management time in disputes 
about demurrage costs.  From the perspective of Hyslop’s recommendations, Nostell 
made good use of its railway connections. The great majority of Nostell’s coal carriage 
costs were payable to a small number of railway companies with direct or near access to 
the colliery. Because carriage costs payable to companies that transported loads for sub-
sections of a journey were re-distributed through the Railway Clearing House, this did 
not necessarily imply that Nostell’s market did not extend beyond its ‘home’ lines. 
However, there is no evidence from charges for maintenance of stock developing faults 
in transit that Nostell’s wagons were commonly taken by a second company to reach 
their destination. Coastal traffic and customers in Yorkshire, Lancashire and London 
were easily accessible through a single railway and, apart from sorting at the beginning 
and end of a journey for train formation and customer delivery, would not have required 
re-marshalling en route. Beyond the geographical access given by the railways, 
however, lay a set of issues relating to the management and financing of coal 
movement. The prominence that Hyslop gave to this subject in his guide suggested that 
the coalowner needed to invest wisely in transport capital and manage it efficiently in 
order to derive maximum benefit from the marketing opportunities that railways 
presented.  
A coalowner could only gain the advantages of railway transport if he had at his 
disposal wagons in which his coal could be moved. For the coal trade, wagon shortage 
was a recurrent problem at busy times. The early 1870s ‘coal famine’ was partially 
attributed by contemporaries to a shortage of rolling stock, and in 1893 William 
Spencer, the viewer at Nostell, commented to George Winn that ‘in [Leicestershire] we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Bagwell, Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, pp. 81-83; Hyslop, Colliery Management, 
pp. 292-293. Hyslop may have been influenced by the failure of the Railway Clearing House to 
standardise transit and demurrage rates for coal.  
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are busy, but a good deal strapped for wagons’.48 It was assumed in the late nineteenth 
century coal trade that at least as many wagons of ten-ton capacity were required by a 
colliery as it raised tons of coal per day.49 In Nostell’s case, between 1866 and 1886 this 
was 150-200, rising to 7-800 after the shaft deepening.50 The coalowner then had to 
decide how to obtain the wagons. One option was to hire them from a railway company. 
In theory this enabled the coalowner to pay only for the wagons he actually required, 
but in practice it made him dependent on the railway for the means to complete his sale 
transaction. In effect, he was competing against the railway company’s other priorities 
for its limited resources. It was a problem that affected the Winns, as in 1887 Edmund 
wrote to his brother that ‘there may be some difficulty in getting Great Northern and 
Great Eastern Railway wagons [to fulfil an order from East Anglia], as there is always 
considerable demand for them about this time for potatoes and corn’.51 Alternatively, 
the coalowner could rely on the customer to supply wagons, but some customers might 
not own any, or have insufficient to carry all their requirements. This exposed the 
coalowner to the danger of losing business to a rival who had taken the third option, of 
buying and running his own rolling stock, and who therefore controlled the means of 
fulfilling the sale.  
The decision between the methods of sourcing wagons can be analysed through 
their relative transaction costs. By relying on a railway company or customer to supply 
them, a coalowner was dependent on geographically and organisationally diverse third 
parties, each with their own priorities. He also forfeited an opportunity for profit from 
the wagon hire charge made to customers for delivery, and lost a convenient means of 
storing unsold coal.52 Transaction cost theory argues that a firm will internalise a 
process if it reduces the spatial distribution and variety of the transactions involved, and 
that internalisation is especially likely if it improves the co-ordination of buyer and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 264; letter, William Spencer to George Winn, 20 November 1893, 
11/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). In addition to his work as a consulting engineer, Spencer was a principal in 
several colliery companies in the east Midlands. 
49 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 133. 
50 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 19 December 1888, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
51 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 8 November 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
52 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 265. Storing unsold coal in wagons was a common practice but could 
lead to overcrowding in colliery sidings, and to cost if wagons were stabled on railway company sidings. 
Over-use of wagons for storage might also require sourcing additional stock. For example, in 1907 
George Winn requested the loan of wagons from the Great Northern Railway in order to deliver a 
locomotive coal order to the company because the domestic trade was very slow and much of Nostell’s 
stock was full of ‘wait order’ house coal. Letter, George Winn to J. W. Morton, GNR, 14 November 
1907, C3/6/4/[1857], WYAS (W). 
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seller so that they interact in the most practicable way.53 This suggests that many 
coalowners would buy their own rolling stock, to simplify the delivery process and 
reduce the complexity of customer transactions. The Winns certainly took this approach 
and their experience of the pitfalls of hiring railway company wagons made them aware 
of the danger of curtailing sales by a shortage of wagons. When production was 
ramping up at Nostell in the late 1880s, Edmund recommended to Rowland that they 
buy more rolling stock: ‘If Shaw [Nostell’s sales agent] can sell the coal we must not let 
want of wagons stop him’.54  
The Winns had invested in wagons before Nostell Colliery came into 
production. ‘Wagon hire’ appears as a charge to Wragby Colliery’s debit account in 
1864, and the regularity and rate of the payments suggest that they were for the lease 
purchase of rolling stock.55 Although Nostell built some wagons itself, most of its stock 
was obtained by seven-year lease purchase on the terms described in Chapter 4.56 By the 
late 1870s a fleet of some 250 wagons had been built up, at a capital cost of £17,500.57 
The deepening of the shafts began a period of renewed investment in wagons as the 
colliery output rose. Beginning in May 1888, the Winns bought 515 wagons on seven-
year lease purchase agreements, payments for the final one hundred beginning in 
October 1894.58 At their peak in the first half of 1895, lease payments exceeded £2,500 
per half-year and the total capital spend on wagons was nearly £37,000 – over three 
times the cost of sinking the new shafts. In the early twentieth century the Winns 
changed their approach to outright purchase and bought 100 new vehicles in 1901-1902, 
probably to replace life-expired stock from the 1870s.59 From then until the First World 
War the colliery acquired no new stock.60  
By investing in their own rolling stock, the Winns were typical of most 
coalowners. Railway companies encouraged the collieries to run their own wagons, and 
although for their part the coalowners preferred their customers to provide rolling stock, 
the majority accepted that ‘the increased capital cost and inconvenience [of buying !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, New Series vol. 4 no. 16 (November 1937), pp. 
386-405; this ref. p. 397; P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1992), pp. 29-30. 
54 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, n.d., probably 1888, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
55 C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
56 Chapter 4, pp. 99-100.  
57 The suppliers included the Bristol & South Wales Wagon Co. (Bristol), the North Central Railway 
Wagon Co. (Rotherham) and the Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. (Wakefield). All these companies were 
founded c1860 to supply the market for private owner wagons. 4/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
58 Obtained from the Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. 
59 C/3/3/2/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
60 2/7, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
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wagons] was more than offset by the uncertainty of the ability of railway companies to 
supply enough wagons when trade conditions required’.61 Of the mineral wagons 
running on British railways in 1918, 62.5 per cent were owned by collieries, 24 per cent 
by distributors, 8 per cent by end users and only 5 per cent by the railway companies.62 
The ownership of sufficient rolling stock was an important competitive advantage in a 
strongly cyclical market like coal. It was essential to exploit the financial opportunity of 
an upturn when prices and profits were high, which were also times when demand for 
wagons might exceed supply and collieries without their own supply might have 
difficulty making deliveries.63 
The purchase and maintenance of a fleet of wagons, and their storage when not 
in use, added a substantial overhead to a colliery’s costs.64 Nostell’s investment in 
wagons constituted around 25 per cent of its total capital throughout the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.65 As noted in Chapter 5, this was an unusually high proportion 
of colliery assets in comparison to the industry norm of around 10 per cent, but the cost 
of the stock itself was not the only expenditure resulting from the decision to run ‘in-
house’ wagons.66 Land and siding space was needed to accommodate the stock at the 
colliery when it was not out on delivery. At Nostell in 1888 Edmund calculated that the 
colliery needed another 4-500 wagons to cope with the increased output, and that one 
hundred such trucks took up 500 yards of siding capacity.67 The cost of the land was 
mitigated for the Winns because the colliery was built on their own property, but in 
many cases the coalowner had to buy or lease it at commercial rates. In slack periods 
much of this capital would be underemployed, an issue that made some coalowners 
reluctant to buy their own wagons. For instance, the directors of the Nottinghamshire 
coalowners Barber, Walker & Co. cited the cost of idle stock when rejecting the advice 
of their managing director to buy their own wagons in the late 1860s. A few years later, 
the Grassmoor Colliery in Derbyshire reaped ‘huge profits’ as its owner had bought a 
fleet of wagons shortly before the 1870s boom and therefore could fulfil deliveries 
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61 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 83-84; 
62 Van Vleck, ‘Delivering Coal by Road and Rail in Britain’, p. 140. During the 1920s, ownership of coal 
wagons by the railways increased considerably. 
63 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 82. 
64 Ibid, p. 82. 
65 C/3/3/2/1, WYL1352, and 4/1, WYL523, both WYAS (W).  
66 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 112-113. 
67 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 25 January 1887 and 19 December 1888, C3/1/9/[846] and 
A/1/10/[291], both WYL1352, WYAS (W). In later years, the normal wagon size at Nostell was 
increased to 10 tons. 
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while other collieries, including its near neighbour Barber, Walker, were hamstrung by 
shortage of stock.68  
Maintenance of a high level of wagon usage, with prompt dispatch, speedy 
return and minimum damage to coal or rolling stock, was a key element in determining 
the return on a colliery’s investment in wagons and in achieving economies of scale. 
Successful management of the issues referred to by Hyslop – the swift turn-round of 
wagons on each delivery trip, and minimisation of time spent sitting in sidings en route 
to or from the customer – helped to reduce the coalowner’s costs and was an important 
aspect of the commercial management of a colliery. There is evidence that managerial 
time was spent on this issue at Nostell, and that decisions were informed by the 
colliery’s management information system. In 1888 Edmund stated that the number of 
wagons required to meet the higher level of production from the new seams was based 
on the assumption that each wagon would make one return trip to a customer per 
fortnight.69 This was a ‘best case’ scenario, because the wagon ledger indicated that the 
actual average was one trip per month, with the expectation that as production rose so 
would wagon usage. However, even a fortnightly trip was less than the frequency 
required for the wagons to break even: 
For an eight-ton wagon it takes...a journey a week when the rate is 6d 
per ton, to cover rent [lease payments] and repairs and they never make 
anything like that…I should think barely a journey a month on the 
average.70 
Nostell’s wagons were accounted for in a separate profit centre, so that some 
insight is possible into the efficiency with which they were being used. Coal prices were 
customarily quoted as ‘delivered’ to the customer’s premises or as loaded into the 
customer’s wagons at the colliery sidings. The credit side consisted of the wagon hire 
charges paid by customers ordering ‘delivered’ coal, and was therefore dependent on 
the number of revenue-earning journeys undertaken by each vehicle. Debit items 
included railway mileage charges and the cost of maintenance and repair of the wagons.  
The latter was unpredictable, as it was largely a function of the miles run by the wagons !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 C. P. Griffin, ‘Robert Harrison and the Barber, Walker Co.: a Study in Colliery Management, 1850-
1890’, Transactions of the Thoroton Society vol. 82 (1978), pp. 51-62; this ref. p. 53; Church, History of 
the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 82.  
69 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 19 December 1888, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
70 This calculation used the colliery’s management information system, in this case the wagon ledger that 
recorded stock usage. Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 24 October 1888, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W).  
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and the care with which they were treated, especially while loading and unloading.71 
Two significant debit items were omitted from the Nostell wagon account. There was 
no overhead for the clerical and managerial effort related to wagon ownership. More 
significantly, and as discussed in Chapter 5, until 1890 the wagon account did not 
include a charge for lease payments. After that year, 50 per cent of the lease payments 
were charged to the wagon account, and the balance to capital. This made a substantial 
difference to the profitability of the wagon business, which after 1890 was at best 
marginal. Figure 6.2 shows the annual profit and loss of the wagon account for 1870 to 
1914. In slightly over half the years the wagons were modestly profitable, but 
cumulatively over the period made a small loss.  
 
Figure 6.2: Annual profit and loss on wagons at Nostell Colliery, 1870-1914 
 
Source: C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352; 2/1, 2/3, 2/4, 2/6 and 2/7, WYL523, both WYAS(W). 
 
Deficits were particular heavy in periods of low sales or of high expenditure on lease 
payments such as the mid 1880s and 1895-1905. If lease payments had been attributed 
to the account for the period before 1890, the losses on the wagon business would 
certainly have been higher. From a purely financial perspective, therefore, the Winns’ 
investment in a wagon fleet was unprofitable, but it improved the colliery’s market 
competitiveness. 
Striking a balance between cost containment and servicing the market was not 
the only difficulty in managing rail deliveries. The coal trade was one of the largest 
owners of private goods stock in the late Victorian and Edwardian eras, and the 
prevalence of privately-owned (PO) mineral wagons has been cited by a number of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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historians as a major cause of ‘unexploited economies of scale’ by the railway system.72 
PO wagons carried only the goods supplied or purchased by their owners, to whom they 
returned ‘home’ empty and required careful shunting to ensure that they were routed 
correctly.73 Private owners like Nostell had no interest in return loads in their wagons, 
and merely required that they were returned quickly and safely.74 In addition, many PO 
wagons, including much of Nostell’s stock, were small and constructed to non-standard 
specifications. Although the smallest conventional wagon capacity for coal was 
generally established by the late 1880s as ten tons, the Winns purchased 115 eight-ton 
wagons in 1889.75 Furthermore, the wagons were not built to a consistent standard. 
They were registered to carry eight tons on the public railway but purportedly were 
manufactured to the ten-ton Railway Clearing House specification. As a result, the 
Great Northern Railway’s inspectors frequently stopped Nostell’s wagons for 
overloading, causing delay and expense to all parties. When George Winn requested 
that the wagons be re-registered as ten tons, it transpired that some elements of their 
technical specification were inadequate for the higher weight.76  
This incident suggests sharp practice on Nostell’s part, to get eight-ton railway 
rates for a ten-ton load. Notwithstanding that possibility, low-capacity wagons were 
suited to its trade, which included a high proportion of small deliveries to multiple 
destinations. Nostell’s sales ledgers from the 1880s to 1914 record an extensive 
customer base with few accounts exceeding annual sales of £1,500, and colliery 
correspondence from the late 1880s refers to the receipt of daily orders for fifteen or 
twenty wagons of coal for a variety of destinations in London and the West Riding:  as 
an apologist for the PO wagon expresses it, ‘precisely the domain of the “bobtailed” 
wagon’.77 This pattern of distribution corresponded to the numerous depots provided by 
the railways to reduce coal merchants’ cartage distances – a significant issue when road 
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72 Originally by Veblen in Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (1915), supported inter alia by 
Kindleberger, Obsolescence and Technical Change, and David, The Landscape and the Machine. Van 
Vleck, ‘Delivering Coal by Road and Rail in Britain’, pp. 140-141. 
73 P. Scott, ‘The Efficiency of Britain’s ‘Silly Little Bobtailed’ Coal Wagons: A Comment on Van 
Vleck’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 59 no. 4 (1999), pp. 1072-1080; this ref. p. 1074; Van 
Vleck, ‘Delivering Coal by Road and Rail in Britain’p. 141. 
74 V. Van Vleck, ‘In Defense (Again) of “Silly Little Bobtailed” Coal Wagons: Reply to Peter Scott’, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 59 no. 4 (1999), pp. 1081-1084; this ref. pp. 1082-1083. 
75 The wagons were bought from Yorkshire Wagon Co. of Wakefield, one of the largest wagon 
manufacturers. Charles Roberts & Co. one of the largest British wagon manufacturers and a near 
neighbour of the Yorkshire Wagon Co., ceased building coal wagons of under ten tons loading during the 
1890s. Bill Hudson, Private Owner Wagons vol. 2 (Barnsley, 1988), p. 1. 
76 Notably the axle bearings. Letters, George Winn to H. N. Gresley, 27 July and 6 August 1908, 
C3/6/4/[1857] 1906, WYL 1352, WYAS (W).  
77 Van Vleck, ‘In Defense (Again) of ‘Silly Little Bobtailed’ Coal Wagons’, p. 1082. 
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motive power was primarily equine. The railway companies continued to use their 
networks of local depots even after the advent of the motor lorry made them 
unnecessary.78 In view of the high proportion of the colliery’s capital invested in small 
wagons, to replace them by higher-capacity rolling stock and concomitant handling 
facilities would have required major investment both by the coalowners, railway 
companies and port proprietors.79 It would also have needed a high level of co-
ordination and co-operation by diverse competing companies. For example, in 1907 the 
Mersey Dock and Harbour Board wrote to the West Yorkshire Coalowners’ Association 
to enquire if its members would adopt larger wagons if the port of Liverpool could 
accommodate them. The Association replied that several of its members had a 
proportion of higher-capacity stock but had not adopted them fully because the port of 
Goole could not handle other than standard wagons.80 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century railway freight rates became largely 
standardised, particularly after the 1894 Railway and Canal Traffic Act, which ‘severely 
limited the railways’ powers to raise charges’.81 As a result, competition between 
railway companies became centred on service levels, such as the frequency of trains, 
free warehousing and the inclusion in freight rates of collection and delivery at either 
end of the rail journey.82 George Winn’s concerns with Nostell’s wagons during the 
period up to the First World War centred on the speed of their delivery and return, and 
with the correct execution of delivery instructions by the railways – complaints from 
customers were often directed to the supplier of the coal, rather than the railway that 
carried it. A few examples will illustrate the importance of service. In 1906, George 
claimed that the late arrival at Hull docks of coal for Myers Rose & Co. in London had 
delayed a ship’s departure, and that the railway was responsible for demurrage costs. In 
the same year, he gave detailed instructions to the Great Northern Railway as to the 
correct order in which wagons of manufacturing coal and slack delivered at the 
company’s Bradford depot should be positioned over the drops for unloading.83 Poor 
service could lead to the exclusion of a railway from a colliery’s business. In 1912 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Bagwell, Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, p. 85. 
79 T. Nicholas, ‘Enterprise and Management’, in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain: vol. II Economic Maturity, 1860-1939 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 227-
252; this ref. p. 235. 
80 Minutes, 5 March 1907, West Yorkshire Coalowners’ Association, MS/148/3, Special Collections, 
Leeds University Brotherton Library. 
81 Scott, ‘The Efficiency of Britain’s ‘Silly Little Bobtailed’ Coal Wagons: A Comment’, p. 1077. 
82 Bagwell, Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, pp. 88-89; Cain, ‘The British Railways 
Rates Problem’, pp. 87, 93-94.  
83 Letter, George Winn to J W Morton, Great Northern Railway, 9 November 1906, C3/6/4/[1857], 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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George complained to the Midland Railway about delays in returning wagons from its 
Kensington depot, stating in his letter that ‘our customers will not now order coal from 
your company’s depots’ and always used the Great Northern or Great Central.84 
The service demands of customers in London and Bradford were symptomatic 
of a coal market that was becoming more sophisticated in its expectations of the 
supplier.  The supplier himself needed to come to terms with the nature and demands of 
the railway market, and the effect that it could have on an enterprise’s competitiveness. 
A balance was necessary between having the ability to deliver the product, and 
burdening a company with under-used capital. The coalowner had to be aware of the 
market opportunities that could open up or be closed by new railways or changes in 
carriage rates. Wagon usage and costs benefited from close and continuing attention. 
The railway market required coalowners not merely to get the coal to the surface, but to 
be equally attentive to the process of delivery. However, at the same time as the market 
acquired enhanced expectations of the delivery of coal, it became equally discriminating 
about the nature of the coal that it bought. Chapter 7 will therefore turn to the 
segmentation of the coal market in the later nineteenth century and Nostell’s efforts to 






84 That is, would not order wagon-loads for delivery to MR goods stations in the south. Letter, George 
Winn to J. Rawson, MR, 3 January 1912, C3/6/4/[1857], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Chapter 7 
‘The capacity to sell’:1 marketing Nostell’s coal 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 examines Nostell Colliery’s marketing policy. The later nineteenth 
century coal market was segmented by the various purposes for which coal was used. 
This segmentation had developed as consumers became more aware of the suitability of 
individual types of coal for specific uses, and the benefits achievable from using the 
most appropriate product. The first part of the chapter gives an overview of this 
segmentation, which had a range of implications for coalowners. In order to succeed in 
a highly competitive market, colliery companies needed to produce coal that was 
tailored to users’ requirements and maintained a consistent quality. They had some 
ability to vary the markets into which they sold. Modifying the nature of the coal that 
they supplied could be achieved by preparation – cleaning and grading the coal or 
mixing it with coal from other seams - or by changing the seam that was mined. In 
either case the intention was to market a coal that supplied particular benefits to the end 
user. 
The second section of the chapter analyses the five main market segments in 
detail, including the extent to which each was important to Nostell’s sales. The final 
three sections consider how and to what extent a coalowner could use means other than 
coal quality to differentiate his products and gain competitive advantage. The elements 
of the marketing mix that come under examination are pricing, product nomenclature 
and the channels through which the coal was sold to the end user.  
Much of this chapter is based on the two main studies of coal marketing, selling 
and pricing in the Victorian and Edwardian eras: Church’s The History of the British 
Coal Industry, vol. 3: 1830-1913 Victorian Pre-eminence and Mitchell’s Economic 
Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914. Some of Dintenfass’s writing is 
also relevant, although his main focus is the inter-war period.2 There is limited !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 William Armstrong, Co. Durham coal viewer, discussing the importance of effective selling, quoted in 
Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 71. 
2 Dintenfass, ‘Entrepreneurial Failure Reconsidered’; Managing Industrial Decline: Entrepreneurship in 
the British Coal Industry between the Wars (Columbus, 1992); ‘Family, Training and Career in the 
British Coal Industry in the Era of Decline’, Business and Economic History, vol. 22, no. 1 (Autumn 
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academic and contemporary literature addressing in detail the selling and marketing of 
coal in the nineteenth century. There was an extensive contemporary ‘how-to’ literature 
on colliery management but these books were mostly directed at readers studying for 
the statutory examinations for colliery officials, and concentrate heavily on technical 
and safety matters.3 Very few books dealt with commercial subjects: commerce was not 
on the examination syllabus, and to give away ‘trade secrets’ might benefit a writer’s 
business rivals. The two exceptions to this are Hyslop’s Colliery Management (1875; 
written by a practicing colliery manager) and Jevons’ The Coal Trade (1915; written by 
an academic), both of which discuss sales channels, market segmentation and 
commercial strategies. Chapter 7 leans heavily on these sources for a contemporary 
perspective. 
‘The great variety of coal will no doubt strike you with astonishment’:4 
segmentation of the later nineteenth century coal market 
 
If the geographical markets into which a colliery could sell were dependent on 
transport, the user markets available to it were a function of the nature of its coal, and 
the manner in which the coal was prepared for sale. In 1867, Rowland wrote to his 
father about a sales contract he had signed under which the customer would take 
Nostell’s coal unsorted and ungraded: in Rowland’s words, ‘slack, smudge and 
everything, just as it comes out of the pit’.5 Contrastingly, H. S. Jevons compared the 
coal market in 1914 to that for office paper, in which a clearly differentiated set of 
products was sold, each with a distinct purpose: 
When you order a ream of paper you specify the size, the thickness, the 
texture, the colour, whether ruled or unruled; and it is really, for most 
purposes, just as necessary to specify carefully the kind of coal 
required.6 
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1993), pp. 273-284; and ‘Industrial Identities and Civic Imperatives: The Life Tales of British Coal 
Masters and the Problem of Economic Decline’, Business and Economic History, vol. 25, no. 1 (Autumn 
1996), pp. 275-282. 
3 There was a large market in self-teaching books designed to prepare candidates for the examinations for 
the various levels of colliery officials’ certificates introduced in the 1872 Coal Mines Act and subsequent 
legislation. 
4 William Laird, The Export Coal Trade of Liverpool: a Letter to William Littledale Esq. (Liverpool, 
1850), p. 33. 
5 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 29 June 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). ‘Slack’ was small 
coal and ‘smudge’ was very fine slack.  
6 Jevons, British Coal Trade, p. 31. 
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These two comments highlight the development of a segmented coal market in Britain, 
a process that had begun well before the 1860s but which picked up speed from mid-
century. The market for ungraded coal clearly survived into the 1860s, as evidenced by 
the contract that Rowland had obtained, but it was increasingly superseded by a demand 
from domestic and industrial consumers for products of consistent size and combustion 
characteristics. Users developed a better understanding of the suitability of different 
types and sizes of coal for a range of purposes. Commercial users could consult a 
variety of comparative analyses of the properties of different coals. An early example 
was the Admiralty’s 1845 ‘Report on the coals best suited to the steam navy’, which 
measured the heat and smoke generation, combustion characteristics and residue levels 
of coal from various collieries and seams.7 Coal and coke comparisons were widely 
published in trade journals and buyers’ guides, such as a serial feature in the Colliery 
Guardian in 1885-1886 on chemical analyses of coal from different seams. Books such 
as Greenwell and Elsden’s Analyses of British Coals and Coke: A Guide to the 
Purchaser of Coal were published in several editions.  
During the third quarter of the nineteenth century five main market segments 
became established: domestic, steam-raising, manufacturing, coking and gas.8 Within 
each category there was a number of sub-divisions. These related to the size of the coal, 
its quality in matching the purpose for which it was used, and the originating colliery’s 
ability to supply a product of consistent size and quality. The market segments are 
described in greater detail later in this chapter, but some examples of the characteristics 
that made coal preferred for particular uses will clarify the nature of the categories. Coal 
used to generate gas ideally required high levels of volatility and bitumen. A good class 
coking coal had to cake when fired in an oven, to optimise the size of the final product. 
The best steam coal – used mainly in ships and railway engines - burned hot and freely 
with little smoke. The domestic market preferred coal that was easily lit, burned with a 
luminous flame and left the minimum ash.9 Manufacturing coal was used to fire 
industrial steam engines, and was often a lower grade residuum of the other coal types – 
effectively a by-product.10 Few of these characteristics were exclusive to a category, but 
a coal that possessed a particular attribute could attract a higher price in an appropriate 
market segment. 
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7 Laird, The Export Coal Trade of Liverpool, p. 23. 
8 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 266. 
9 Jevons, British Coal Trade, pp. 37-39. 
10 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 35, 267-268. 
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In addition to the physical properties of the product, market segments favoured 
coals from certain sources on the basis of customer experience. This was especially 
important in the domestic market, especially in London, which developed a matrix of 
prices in which the district, seam or colliery was an indicator of price and quality. For 
example, the Wallsend district of Northumberland was celebrated as a source of high-
class household coal.11 The coal’s provenance was less important to industrial markets 
but there were some preferences for the output of certain coalfields and seams. For 
instance, south Durham was able to charge a slight premium for gas coal because of the 
reputation of its products for this purpose.12 
Small coal became an increasingly valuable product in the later nineteenth 
century. Up to mid-century ‘round’ (large) coal dominated the market, and small coal 
and slack were virtually unsellable. They were left as infill in the goaf13, burnt on the 
surface as waste, or at best used to raise steam at the colliery. Attitudes began to change 
after 1850. Competitive pressure in finished goods markets encouraged manufacturers 
to reduce costs. Fuel economies were achieved by adapting industrial equipment to burn 
smaller and less calorific grades of coal more efficiently.14 This trend was reinforced by 
the periodic shortages and price inflations that affected the coal market. In the early 
1870s the Iron and Coal Trades Review commented that ‘consumers of furnace and 
engine fuel have been compelled by absolute necessity to economise…owing to the 
difficulty in obtaining supplies’.15 Small coal constituted an increasing proportion of the 
total market and higher demand led to higher prices. Mitchell found that between 1870 
and 1913 the increase in demand for small coal was paralleled by a rise in its price 
relative to other coals. In the Yorkshire coalfield over this period, the price of best 
house coal increased by 80 per cent but that of screened small coal for manufacturing 
purposes went up by 140 per cent.16 
The sorting of coal into different grades was a long established practice but 
developed most rapidly in the last quarter of the century: ‘genuine improvements in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, p. 18; Pearsall’s Monthly and Annual Importation and Delivery of 
Coal, 1832-1833 and 1834 (London, 1835) lists over 200 varieties of ‘coal’, ‘small coal’ and ‘Wallsend’ 
that were sold in the London coal market in the early 1830s. 100 came from Northumberland, 22 from 
Co. Durham, 35 from Yorkshire and 50 from other coalfields including Tees-side, Cumberland, Scotland 
and Wales,  
12 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 266-267; Kirby, British Coal-Mining 
Industry, p. 11. 
13 The area in the workings from which coal had been removed. 
14 R. A. Church, The Great Victorian Boom 1850-1873 (London, 1975), pp. 49-50.  
15 Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 87-88; Iron and Coal Trades 
Review 28 February 1872 (vol. 6 no. 209), p. 172 (quotation). 
16 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 268-271.  
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quality and more elaborate differentiation of the inferior types of coal proceeded apace 
after the boom of the early 1870s’.17 The trend had considerable implications for 
coalowners. By cleaning and grading coal, coalowners could find ‘more (and more 
remunerative) markets’, trading on consumers’ desire for a product that was consistent 
in quality and tailored to its intended use.18 The capital cost of screens and cleaning 
plant was usually more than offset by the higher prices obtainable for prepared coal.19 In 
its early days, Nostell Colliery lacked the equipment to grade or clean coal in the 
manner demanded by the railway market, a probable hangover from Wragby’s sales to 
local domestic and small business customers who took coal ‘through and through’ as it 
came out of the pit.20 When he was appointed viewer in 1868, John Roseby reported to 
Edmund that: 
The expenses for screening I know will be always high as the coal must 
be properly screened or it will not sell. And the pieces of small dirt 
must be properly taken out both in the [large] screened coal and also in 
the small and nuts.21 
These problems were caused by the dirt partings in the Shafton seam which 
reduced its thickness and added to the difficulty and cost of producing a ‘pure’ product. 
Roseby highlighted the value of properly sorted coal and justified the capital cost of the 
equipment by the higher prices that could be obtained and the reduction in labour costs 
achievable by substituting mechanical screening for hand sorting: 
I would advise an independent screening for nuts and slack the cost of 
which will be about £400 or less. With this you will be enabled to make 
a considerable saving in labour…I am fully aware of the unpleasant 
feeling to spend money in new work when the Colliery is not making it 
but in this instance it would pay for itself in a few months.22 
Edmund accepted Roseby’s recommendation for the installation of new screens and 
became convinced of the necessity for cleaning and grading coal in order to obtain the 
highest price. For example, after the deepening of the shafts, Edmund was much 
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17 Ibid, p. 270. 
18 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 268. 
19 Jevons, British Coal Trade, pp. 219-220. 
20 ‘Through and through’ was a nineteenth century term for unsorted coal. 
21 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 5 July 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
22 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 5 July 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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concerned about the need to remove a layer of white ash from coal cut from the 
Beamshaw seam before it was shipped to the customer.23  
The physical characteristics of coal often defined the purposes for which it could 
be sold, so that a colliery might be restricted to certain market segments. Because 
Nostell did not produce coal that was prone to caking, it sold little to the coke market. 
By changing the seam that it mined, a colliery could also change the market it sold into, 
and many collieries – as did Nostell – had access to coal seams of varying 
characteristics at different depths. This could place older-established collieries in a 
difficult position when their better seams became exhausted. They had of necessity to 
tap coal that was of inferior quality or more difficult to work. Costs rose relative to price 
because in order to maximise sales and prices, they had to spend more in improving a 
second-class product.24 However, when Nostell changed the seams from which it 
produced coal in the mid-1880s, the shortage of capital that had restricted it to the 
shallow but inferior Shafton seam worked in its favour – the new seams were better and 
more productive than the old. When the deepening of Nostell’s shafts neared 
completion in 1886, Edmund wrote that a seam cut by the shaft-sinkers was ‘first class 
house coal - if it works at all easily [it] will be a profitable one’.25 The bed was the 
Winter seam, described by the British Geological Survey as ‘an extremely good house 
coal’, and in The Times as one of the three best house coals in the west Yorkshire 
coalfield.26 The Beamshaw seam, occurring a few yards below the Winter, was 
primarily sold to the gas market but also produced a good second-class house coal. The 
Beamshaw and Winter coals were bituminous like the Shafton, but were more 
consistent in quality and easier to work. The new seams allowed the Winns to continue 
to supply the gas market, which was large and reliable in its demand, and also to enter 
the domestic market on a large scale. This was a crucial development for Nostell’s 
future because of house coal’s high prices. Collieries mining bituminous coal 
commonly specialised in the gas and domestic markets - the Forest of Dean coalfield, 
for example, did so - and these two sectors came to dominate Nostell’s sales.27 
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23 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 27 August 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). See below, 
p. 148. 
24 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 95-96. 
25 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 January 1886, A/1/10[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
26 W. N. Edwards et al, Geology of the Country Around Wakefield (London, 1940), p. 77; The Times, 1 
December 1913, p. 26. 
27 Forest of Dean Colliery Association, Fine Forest of Dean Coal (Cinderford, c. 1930), passim. 
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‘Good enough house coal to sell easily’:28 Nostell Colliery’s markets by segment  
 
Nostell’s ability to sell coal from the same seam to both the house and gas markets 
confirms the permeability of the boundaries between the five market segments. A glut 
or shortage in one market could affect supplies in another. A House of Commons Select 
Committee investigating the high domestic coal prices of 1871 decided that they were 
influenced by strong demand for coal in the iron trades.29 Edmund Winn noted a similar 
effect fifteen years later, when steam coal prices were depressed by over-supply in the 
domestic and metallurgical markets: 
This is always the worst time of year to sell steam coal; it is not the 
shipping season and there is an extra quantity of Hards thrown on the 
market in consequence of the demand for house coal, and this year 
there will be extra difficulty from the depression in the iron trade.30 
The propensity to cross-over between sectors does not diminish the usefulness 
of the five segments as a tool with which to analyse the marketing of Nostell’s coal. 
However, as with the analysis of Nostell’s geographical markets, the usage markets into 
which it sold in the 1860s and 1870s can only be assessed in general terms. Like most 
contemporary collieries it sold several grades and sizes of coal, but their volumes 
cannot be established from the colliery’s records because the surviving data define sales 
only as either ‘coal’ or ‘slack’. It is certain that in the 1860s the market for gas coal was 
important to Nostell, as it was the highest-priced sector into which the Shafton coal 
could be sold – as shown by the Winns’ efforts to sell gas coal in London and in 
France.31 The gas market had a number of advantages for coalowners. Demand for gas 
was relatively stable over economic cycles, and consumption rose as the urban 
population increased and new applications in heating and cooking supplemented 
demand for lighting purposes. Until the early years of the twentieth century gas 
maintained a substantial advantage over competing products, and its range of uses 
expanded. As a result, the demand for gas coal was relatively price-inelastic and did not 
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28 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 2 March 1886, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
29 Buxton, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 89. 
30 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 12 January 1886, A/1/10 [291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
31 Letters, Rowland Winn to Charles Winn, 29 June and 30 October 1867, A/1/8/1, and Thomas Belton to 
Edmund Winn 4 September 1867, C/3/1/9/3, both WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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display the marked seasonality of other market segments.32 Total sales grew from 
around 1,000,000 tons in the 1840s to over 15,000,000 in 1903.33 
The specialised nature of the gas industry also gave coalowners a market for 
premium-priced products, particularly cannel. Nostell produced cannel from the Shafton 
seam until the seam’s abandonment in 1885, and it was in high demand – in 1867 the 
colliery received complaints from a cannel customer who could not be supplied because 
of production problems.34 The Winns marketed cannel even though it occurred in tiny 
quantities, because it enhanced the colliery’s reputation for producing high quality coal 
and sold at a substantial premium. For example, in 1869 490 tons of cannel were sold at 
8/- per ton, when the average pithead price for all coal was 5/-. By the early 1880s the 
differential was even wider, cannel being sold at well over twice the price of ‘best’ 
coal.35 
Gas customers ordered in large quantities and were early adopters of the practice 
of placing contracts direct with a colliery for the supply of coal for multiple years, 
usually to a maximum of three.36 Rowland exceeded this with the five-year contract 
through which he hoped to sell a large proportion of Nostell’s annual output in a single 
transaction.37 After the deepening of the shafts, the gas market continued to be 
important to Nostell. From 1888 to the turn of the century gas coal was the colliery’s 
leading product by weight and value, constituting over 50 per cent of sales by value in 
1890, decreasing to 25 per cent by 1900 (Figure 7.1).38 The colliery’s main gas product 
at this period was a coal from the Beamshaw seam described by George Winn to a 
customer as ‘an average gas coal’.39 This apparently slighting reference was probably 
intended to differentiate it from high-grade cannel. After 1900 slack from the Winter 
seam comprised an increasing proportion of Nostell’s sales of gas coal, the large coal 
from the Winter being supplied to the domestic market. The gas industry was adapting 
to the use of smaller, cheaper coal as it began to feel competitive pressure from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 37-38; Church, History of the British 
Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 17, 23-24. In a 60-page ‘advertorial’ special edition of The Times on power 
(‘The Fuel Number’) in December 1913, electricity was treated as a by-product of coal, gas and oil, rather 
than as a power source in its own right. 
33 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 12; Jevons, British Coal Trade, p. 41. 
34 Letter, Thomas Belton to Edmund Winn, 11 July 1867, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
35 1/4 and 2/3, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
36 Jevons, British Coal Trade, p. 291. 
37 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 29 June 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
38 C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
39 Letter, George Winn to J. T Crampton & Co., 30 May 1907, C3/6/4/[1857], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
Beamshaw was the west Yorkshire name for the Stanley Main seam. At Nostell it was also referred to as 
the Priory seam, and coal sold by Nostell from the Stanley Main/Beamshaw/Priory seam were marketed 
under the name ‘Priory’.  
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electricity.40 The increased proportion of lower-priced small coal in Nostell’s gas sales 
accounts for its drop below the mean price for all sales after 1904-1905 shown in Figure 
7.1.  
Figure 7.1: Annual gas coal sales at Nostell Colliery as proportions of all sales by 
weight and value, 1890-1913 
 
Source: All information from C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
The manufacturing coal market for powering steam engines in industry also 
made extensive use of small coal and was important to Nostell sales. Yorkshire’s 
manufacturing industry consumed at least 25 per cent of the county’s output by weight 
up to 1914, with an additional percentage sold to more distant customers.41 In the 1860s 
and 1870s, manufacturing coal was probably Nostell’s main market. After the shaft 
deepening it lost this prime position, and its proportion by value fell because of its low 










40 Jevons, British Coal Trade, pp. 55-56. 
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Figure 7.2: Annual manufacturing coal sales at Nostell Colliery as proportions of 
all sales by weight and value, 1890-1913 
 
Source: All information from C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
Demand in the manufacturing market was fairly inelastic because fuel was 
generally a minor component of total production cost, although sales were liable to the 
same cyclical fluctuations as the industries it served. As manufacturing coal 
increasingly became a by-product of more expensive grades, the market could be 
affected by certain special circumstances. In the first stages of a boom, for example, 
increased demand from industry might lead to price inflation because the supply of 
manufacturing coal would not rise until higher domestic demand stimulated house coal 
production.42 This could trigger price inflation such as that of winter 1871-1872, when 
the price of manufacturing grade nuts and slack in the West Riding rose by nearly 40 
per cent in four months.43 A similar effect can be seen in Figure 7.2 in the price of 
Nostell’s manufacturing coal in 1900, during a major strike in the Yorkshire coalfield. 
In times of normal demand, manufacturing coal had limited seasonal price 
variation. However, when demand for household coal was high the price of 
manufacturing coal could be influenced by the cross-over of better class coal to the 
more remunerative domestic market. George Winn commented to one of Nostell’s 
larger manufacturing customers, the Horbury Junction Iron Co., that: 
After having met you as regards price, we scarcely think it fair that 
you…expect such a large quantity should be delivered in the winter 
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42 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 35, 266-268. 
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months [when domestic demand and prices were high], when we could 
do so much better.44 
For the Yorkshire coalfield as a whole, the industrial base of the West Riding formed a 
solid block of demand throughout the nineteenth century.45 In Nostell’s case, 
manufacturing coal remained a consistent, if lower-priced, component of total sales, 
maintaining a level of 20-25 per cent of all sales by weight from 1895 to the First World 
War.  
The related but discrete entities of manufacturing and steam coal emerged from 
the undifferentiated demand for engine coal in the mid-nineteenth century, and 
exemplified the refinement of markets through technological change and the increasing 
sophistication of consumers.46 The steam coal market originated from the introduction 
of iron steamships and the substitution, in the interests of economy and greater 
availability, of coal for coke in railway engines.47 As well as producing a hot and 
smoke-free flame, the best steam coal was consistent in size and had a propensity to 
produce detached cinders, as these characteristics reduced stoking costs.48 Steam coal 
was expensive to work because of the need to supply a physically uniform product but – 
despite a rise in price as it became established as a distinct product and its consumption 
increased – its price was lower than domestic coal. Consumers bought in bulk and were 
usually good credit risks, which compensated for the lower price, and the market was 
attractive to collieries with large reserves and high productive capacity.49 Steam coal 
prices tended to rise in the summer, which was the main shipping season. The coal was 
generally differentiated only into ‘best’ and ‘seconds’, reducing grading and storage 
costs for producers. Steam coal was a relatively minor component of Nostell’s sale 
because the steam market preferred a less bituminous product.50 Nostell’s modest output 
also prevented it from competing effectively in a market oriented to high volume 
producers. After the shaft deepening, steam accounted for about 10 per cent of sales in 
the 1880s, declining somewhat after 1900. The GNR was its sole railway customer. 
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44 Letter, George Winn to the Horbury Junction Iron Co., 16 November 1907, C/3/6/4[1857], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
45 See Table 6.1, p. 110. 
46 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 267. 
47 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 30 and 33. 
48 Jevons, British Coal Trade, pp. 37-39. 
49 Hyslop, Colliery Management, pp. 290-291; Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal 
Industry, pp. 33 and 267; Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 48. 
50 Jevons, British Coal Trade, p. 37. 
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Figure 7.3: Annual steam coal sales at Nostell Colliery as proportions of all sales 
by weight and value, 1890-1913 
  
Source: All information from C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
House coal was the fourth market sector into which Nostell sold its coal, and 
became the most important from the late 1890s through to 1914. The domestic market 
was the most complex sector in terms of the range of products and supply channels 
available to the consumer, and attracted the highest prices in the British market 
throughout the nineteenth century.51 Household coals were clearly differentiated by 
name, and consumers often had strong preferences for particular producers or seams. It 
is not possible to estimate Nostell’s house coal sales before the deepening of the 
colliery. However, it is unlikely that the highly-priced domestic market constituted a 
significant proportion of sales at that time, because Nostell’s coal sold for a markedly 
lower average pithead price than either all UK collieries in 1875-1881 or Yorkshire 
collieries in 1882-1885 (Table 7.1).  
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Table 7.1: Average pithead prices per ton at Nostell Colliery, 1875-1885, compared 
with all UK collieries 1875-1881, and Yorkshire collieries, 1882-1885  
 
Year Nostell All UK Yorkshire 
1875 7/10d 8/9d  
1876 7/1d 7/6d  
1877 6/2d 6/9d  
1878  5/4d 6/-  
1879 4/8d 5/6d  
1880  4/8d 5/3d  
1881 4/8d 5/-  
1882 4/9d  6/6d 
1883 5/1d  5/7d 
1884 5/1d  5/4d 
1885 4/9d  5/- 
Sources: 1. UK and Yorkshire averages from Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 53, 
58-59.  2. Nostell information from 5/8, WYL523, WYAS(W). 
 
This situation changed after the colliery began producing coal from the Winter 
seam in the late 1880s.  Edmund – admittedly not a disinterested witness – described the 
Winter coal as ‘burning splendidly with very little dust’; ideal for a house coal.52 The 
domestic market was seasonal, prices and sales invariably rising in winter. Demand 
tended to vary in relation to the weather, as Edmund noted just before Christmas 1891: 
‘This weather will help our coal trade, we have not had less than 10 and 12º [of frost] 
the last three days’.53  
As well as for its high prices, the domestic market was attractive to coalowners 
because it was less liable to cyclical fluctuations than sectors dependent on 
manufacturing and trade, and demand was reasonably price-inelastic. Although 
consumers were not entirely unresponsive to price rises, heating the home was a high 
priority for all but the poorest households. However, although the UK market for 
domestic coal grew throughout the Victorian and Edwardian eras, it declined as a 
proportion of all sales from the mid-century onwards because of rapidly increasing 
demand in other sectors.54 In the Yorkshire coalfield, local domestic consumption as a 
proportion of all uses fell by half between 1869 and the First World War.55  
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52 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 27 November 1890, A/1/10[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
53 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 22 December 1891, A/1/10[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). Writing 
from London, he went on to say that ‘the yellow fog is fearfully thick and pretty nearly as bad in the 
house as out’, a side-effect of the rising coal sales.  
54 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 12, 33. 
55 See Table 6.1, p. 110. 
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Domestic coal rose as a proportion of Nostell’s total sales by weight from 16 per 
cent in 1890 to 25 per cent in 1900 and 33 per cent by 1913. This exceeded the 
equivalent proportion for the Yorkshire coalfield as a whole, which ran at 20-25 per 
cent from 1887 to 1913. There was a matching rise in the proportion of Nostell’s 
income derived from the domestic market, which surpassed 40 per cent throughout the 
ten years prior to the First World War. Figure 7.4 illustrates the increasing importance 
of domestic coal sales at Nostell.  
Figure 7.4: Annual domestic coal sales at Nostell Colliery as proportions of all sales 
by weight and value, 1890-1913 
 
Note: All information from C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
Figure 7.5 shows that the Beamshaw seam dominated production at Nostell 
between 1888 and 1905, although the superior quality of the Winter seam was 
recognised at an early stage. Winter coal was added to sample wagonloads from the 
Beamshaw seam that were sent to merchants in 1887, in order to raise their quality.56 
There is no documentary evidence to explain the initial concentration on production 
from the Beamshaw, but one could speculate that it was because its coal could easily be 
sold into the gas and manufacturing markets in which Nostell was already established.57 
There may have been technical reasons for working the Beamshaw seam first. These 
probably related to drainage because it was at greater depth than the Winter. The Winter 
seam, however, was the focus of the Winns’ introduction of mechanical coalcutting, 
when it was first tried at Nostell in 1888.58  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 27 August 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
57 The explanation could be purely technical - collieries generally worked seams in their descending 
order, to reduce problems of drainage. The Barnsley seam was at 485 yards’ depth at Nostell, 
approximately 80 yards beneath the Winter and Beamshaw/Stanley Main. 
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Source: All information from West Yorkshire Coalowners’ Association, ‘Annual Output of Members’ 
Collieries, 1889-1931’, MS 148/13-14, Leeds University Brotherton Library Special Collections. 
 
As the proportion of domestic coal in Nostell’s total output rose, the colliery’s 
average pithead price began to exceed that for the Yorkshire coalfield as a whole and 
remained above it to 1912, as can be seen from Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Annual average pithead prices for Nostell Colliery and the Yorkshire 
coalfield, 1890-1912 
 
Year Average pithead price per 
ton 
 Nostell Yorkshire 
1890 7/6d 8/9d 
1892 7/10d 7/9d 
1894 7/3d 7/4d 
1896 5/11d 6/5d 
1898 6/4d 7/- 
1900 9/7d 10/1d 
1902 8/3d 8/1d 
1904 7/8d 7/1d 
1906 7/4d 6/9d 
1908 9/4d 8/5d 
1910 8/8d 7/8d 
1912 9/11d 8/4d 
1913 10/8d 9/5d 
Sources: Yorkshire averages from Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 58-59. 2. 
























The rising market for small coal, which became an increasingly significant 
component of the colliery’s total sales, also influenced the increase in average sale 
price. Coal sales at Nostell increased from 75,000 to 200,000 tons p.a. between 1888 
and 1913, and small coal provided around half that increase. The average price of small 
coal rose sharply relative to other types of coal. The average pithead price per ton of 
Nostell’s most expensive coal doubled in the twenty-five years before the First World 
War, while the mean price of small coal rose fourfold. Coalowners could take advantage 
of economies of scale by marketing small coal: ‘the importance of utilising to the 
greatest advantage the whole of the coal output from mines’.59 
 
Figure 7.6: Annual small coal sales at Nostell Colliery as proportions of all sales by 
weight and value, 1888-1913 
 
Source: All information from C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
 
After 1888, the better coal and larger quantities being raised from the Beamshaw 
and Winter seams encouraged the management at the colliery to exploit the 
opportunities available in a segmented market for differentiating coals for specific 
groups of users. Table 7.3 shows the types of coal sold by Nostell from 1885 to 1913, 
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Table 7.3: Coal types sold by Nostell Colliery and their average prices, 1885-1913 
 
 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1913 
Gas/Best £0.29 
(100) 




























   












































































Notes: 1. The figure in brackets is that coal’s price as a percentage of the highest-priced coal in that year; 
2. Prices are pit-head, per ton; 3. The spike in prices in 1900 resulted from a strike that particularly 
affected Engine (manufacturing) coal demand because it took place between April and October.  
Source: C/3/3/2/1, C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS(W). 
 
In 1885 Nostell marketed four types of coal, mostly to industrial markets, 
differentiated by generic identifiers: ‘gas, ‘engine’ or ‘slack’. As the output of the new 
seams ramped up, a different approach was taken. The colliery’s grading and cleaning 
capability was improved in the redevelopment so that the output could be exploited to 
its full extent.60 The coals were given names that were designed to indicate origin, size 
and quality, a practice that is considered in more detail later in this chapter. In addition 
to the two premium coals (‘Wragby Best’ house coal and ‘Priory Wallsend’ gas/house 
coal), a generic name was retained only for  ‘Engine’ coal, a low-priced manufacturing 
variety. Small coal was initially sold in two grades - nuts and slack - but later in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 The colliery’s screens were renewed in 1888. C/3/3/2/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
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1890s the range was widened. The new size of cobbles was introduced and the nuts 
grade was sub-divided into three to reflect the respective quality. Slack was also sub-
divided by size, into rough, medium and pea.61 By 1901 Nostell’s product range had 
more than doubled since the redevelopment of the colliery. The management showed an 
awareness of the needs and expectations of customers, and a willingness to invest in an 
enhanced capability for sorting, storing and shipping coal. They were rewarded by the 
marked improvement of the colliery’s financial performance from the early 1890s 
onwards. The colliery evolved from producing a commodity differentiated only in the 
broadest terms to marketing a range of individual products that corresponded to the 
customer’s needs and expectations. As well as the development of clear market 
segmentation, the later nineteenth century coal market also saw changes in pricing, sales 
channels and the contractual arrangements through which coal was sold. The remainder 
of the chapter will consider Nostell’s response to the evolution of the commercial 
environment in which it operated, beginning with pricing. 
‘These days of keen competition’:62 setting a price for Nostell’s coal 
 
The heterogeneity of the later nineteenth century coal market, well characterised 
by Jevons, implied that there was no easily defined single price for coal. As we have 
seen, the segmentation of the coal market after 1850 corresponded to the specific needs 
of the user, and coal prices constituted a complex matrix that reflected these five usage 
segments and the different grades within each category. The pricing of coal from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the First Word War was a function of a largely perfect 
market, although in earlier years it had been strongly influenced by legislative 
regulation. The statutory price controls and duties that had applied in the London 
market and some provincial locations had been repealed by 1830, and from the 1850s 
coal industry legislation refocused on safety and social improvement.63 Successive 
national governments took a laissez-faire stance in economic matters, and the most 
important example of the organised control of prices by coalowners came to an end 
when north east England’s Limitation of the Vend broke down in the mid-1840s.64 The 
nature of the coal industry was an influence on the owners’ inability to combine after 
the 1850s. As the industry grew, so did organisational fragmentation and competition - !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 C/3/3/2/1, C/3/3/2/2 and C/3/3/2/4, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
62 William Armstrong, 1863, quoted in Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 72. 
63 Buxton, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 131-132. 
64 ibid, p. 40. 
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in 1900, there were over 3,000 collieries in Britain, owned by nearly 1,800 separate 
firms.65 Coalowner organisations had difficulty in controlling prices,66 for reasons made 
clear by a contemporary report:  
There was great competition in the sale of coal; and although there 
existed agreements among the masters not to undersell each other, yet 
this was done, first, in an underhand manner, by giving extra weight 
and allowing discount, and afterwards by openly lowering the price.67 
The trajectory of coalowner organisations in Yorkshire in the nineteenth century 
is worth brief review. Outside north east England, early nineteenth century coalowners 
in west Yorkshire had been among the most active in price collusion. However, the 
West Riding coalowners’ organisations that existed sporadically in later years had 
mostly been intended as mutual support against organised labour, notably during strikes 
in 1853 and 1858.68 Rowland Winn was sceptical of owners’ organisations, stating in 
1885 his desire to avoid involvement in ‘any combination of colliery owners – from 
which I am convinced there is nothing in the long run to be gained’.69 The Winns were 
equally unenthusiastic about trades unions. Edmund deprecated the activities of Ben 
Pickard, the first secretary of the Yorkshire Miners’ Association, and remarked of a 
decision by the London Gas, Light & Coke Co. to employ only union members that ‘I 
can hardly believe they would put themselves so completely in the power of their own 
workmen’.70 Rowland’s attitude to combinations of suppliers or workers was consistent 
with his preference – made clear from the Carlton project onwards – for avoiding 
arrangements that might enable external interests to influence the running of his 
property. Nostell Colliery was a passive follower of trends in wages and prices, reacting 
to market-wide changes but staying clear of organised attempts to influence the level 
and timing of those changes. 
When a new employers’ organisation, the West Yorkshire Coalowners’ 
Association (WYCOA), was founded in 1890, it concentrated on resolving wage !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Crouzet, Victorian Economy, p. 270. 
66 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 668.  
67 National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1860). Quoted in F. Machin, The Yorkshire 
Miners vol. 1 (Barnsley 1958), p. 82. 
68 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 652 and 655. 
69 Letters, Rowland Winn to William Spencer, 21 March 1885, C/3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, and 
Ben Day to George Winn, 26 June 1890, WYL523, both WYAS (W); West Yorkshire Coalowners’ 
Association minute books, 1890-1914, MS 148/1-3, Leeds University Brotherton Library Special 
Collections. 
70 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 27 May 1885, 10 July 1886 and 8 February 1891, A/1/10/[870] and 
A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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disputes and providing financial assistance to members resisting labour demands, 
although it also had some success in regulating the normal seasonal price changes.71 
George Winn, who had taken over as Nostell’s general manager shortly beforehand, 
recognised the value of the organisation’s stance on labour relations, and Nostell joined 
shortly after its establishment. George was not active in the WYCOA – he never held a 
post within it, and attended meetings infrequently after 1892 – but Nostell used its 
arbitration and strike indemnity services several times during the 1890s and early 1900s. 
During a 1900 strike, for example, the colliery received over £8,000 in indemnity 
payments.72  
The market itself became the determinant of coal prices. Mitchell argues that 
from 1850 coal prices were the set by ‘the largely unfettered forces of competition in a 
nearly perfect market’.73  The two major influences on price – particularly after the 
railway network in the coalfields was largely completed in the 1860s - were the 
inevitable variations in quality between coal produced by individual coalfields and 
collieries, and the relative locations of a market and its supplying coalfields. Location 
was important in two respects: firstly, the distance of travel was a prime influence on 
the cost of transport and, secondly, the number of suppliers with easy access to a 
particular market determined the level of competition within it. A market that was easily 
accessible from a number of coalfields was likely to be highly price-competitive. More 
isolated markets had less competition and higher prices. Coal of the same type and 
quality, originating from a single colliery, could therefore have different prices in the 
various markets in which it was sold.74 With a few exceptions in remote areas that were 
insulated by high incoming transport costs,75 virtually all coalowners had the theoretical 
ability to set prices at whatever level they pleased, but were actually ‘price-takers in a 
highly competitive market’ in which ‘the scope for departing from market prices 
was…extremely limited’.76  
This situation had been pre-figured by John Walker in his report on Carlton in 
1854. In a telling phrase, Walker expressed concern that the proposed colliery would be 
‘controlled by the circumstances’ of the market because of its high rental and a small !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 An indemnity scheme gave financial support to coalowners during strikes about issues that were 
considered points of principle for the employers. The focus of the Association’s activities can readily be 
seen from its minute books, held in the Brotherton Library, University of Leeds. 
72 West Yorkshire Coalowners’ Association minute books, 1890-1914 passim, MS 148/1-3, Leeds 
University Brotherton Library Special Collections. 
73 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 264. 
74 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 263-264.  
75 This occasionally extended to an entire coalfield, for example the high-cost field in north Somerset.  
76 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 70. 
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but competitively significant disadvantage in transport costs relative to other local 
collieries. This would make it difficult to price the coal at a level that would ‘realise the 
large annual vend’ that would be needed to ‘cover the minimum and reserved rents’.77 A 
similar situation applied at Nostell. As a supplier to the railway market, Nostell had 
little control over prices and its high cost base in the pre-1888 period meant that it could 
only be profitable during periods of price inflation. In the late 1870s and early 1880s, 
the Winns’ discussions of the colliery were suffused by the sense that they operated in a 
pricing environment in which there was little room for manoeuvre by the individual 
producer. This manifested itself in a fatalistic attitude to market forces and concerns 
about costs. Edmund implemented a ‘cutting policy’ on costs in 1867 and 1868, and in 
1876 Rowland observed to a fellow landowner that ‘I believe that the number of pits 
that are being opened out will keep the price down…and that we shall not see a general 
increase in letting values [of coal-bearing land] in our lifetime’.78 In the following year 
he considered the possibility of leaving the coal trade.79 This extreme step was not 
taken, but discussions recurred about closing the colliery and the necessity of a rise in 
coal prices to restore Nostell’s profitability, without any suggestion that alternative 
action on pricing was possible.80 Indeed, Rowland welcomed a potential coalfield strike, 
as it would lead to a rise in prices and reduce variable costs.81  
In the early 1880s, after a succession of unprofitable years, Edmund pressed his 
brother to decide on the colliery’s future. He stated bluntly that it was impossible to 
increase the output or reduce the production cost of the Shafton coal to the point that it 
could be profitable at the price levels of the late 1870s and early 1880s.82 There was no 
opportunity for supplying more highly priced markets other than through the tiny output 
of cannel. He successfully proposed to Rowland that the shafts should be deepened to 
reach better coal, albeit at the cost of further investment. When this process had been 
completed and production began from the lower seams in 1886, Nostell launched new 
coal into the market for the second time in twenty years. Early indications were good. 
The Beamshaw seam was, in Edmund’s opinion, ‘good enough house coal to sell easily 
and I shall be surprised if we have not a market at a good fair price for all we can !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Letter, John Walker to Rowland Winn, 5 September 1854, C3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
78 Letting values related to expectations about the market price of coal. Rowland was correct, as a 
sustained rise in the pithead price of coal did not begin until about five years after his death. Letter, 
Rowland Winn to H. S. L. Wilson, 8 August 1876, C/3/1/6/[372], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
79 Letter, Rowland Winn to H. S. L. Wilson, 24 April 1877, C/3/1/6/[372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
80 Letters Edmund to Rowland Winn, 19 January and 5 February 1882, A/1/10/[291], and 5 December 
1883 and 11 March 1885, A/1/10/[870], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
81 Letter Rowland Winn to William Spencer, 21 March 1885, C/3/1/6/[372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
82 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 19 January 1882, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
! 147!
raise’.83 The brothers’ correspondence described the process by which a ‘good fair 
price’ was set. In effect, it was an auction, bearing out a contemporary’s remark that 
‘the selling price is to a very great extent beyond [the coalowner’s] control’.84 An 
internal trial was made against a recognised good domestic coal to estimate the coal’s 
likely appeal to the market.85 Sample wagon-loads were then sent to merchants who 
were invited to offer a price for bulk supplies. Edmund wrote to Rowland to express his 
satisfaction at the outcome: 
The merchants at Bradford like the look of the sample wagons…and 
offer a price that leaves 8/9d at the pit, we shall make this 9/- and 
upwards before long I have little doubt.86 
Mitchell’s view that transport and coal quality were the main determinants of 
price variation are borne out by the manner in which Edmund proposed to ‘tweak’ the 
offered price a little higher. Nostell had good access to the national railway network so 
that its transport costs were already competitive with those of neighbouring collieries. 
Edmund therefore concentrated on ensuring that the quality of the samples would not 
only engage the interest of the coal merchants in the initial auction, but also be 
consistently achievable when in full production: 
It is a new coal going to the market; buyers will crab it as much as 
possible to lower the price and the salesman will try to get the sample 
as good as possible to help himself in selling it. It is Spencer’s business 
to see that a sample is made that will sell.87 
He recommended that an entry into the important southern markets should not be 
attempted until the best attainable quality could be achieved consistently: 
I should not be in any hurry to send samples into the London or Eastern 
Counties’ markets until I saw what sort of sample of coal comes out of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 2 March 1886, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
84 E. E. Melly, who was manager of Griff Colliery, Warwickshire, from the early 1880s until 1913, 
quoted in Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 70. 
85 ‘I have got a wagon of good Barnsley Hards to the Colliery so that it may be compared with the wagon 
Hay had got out of the seam at Nostell’. Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 February 1886, 
A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
86 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 March 1886, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
87 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 25 November 1886, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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the long wall workings, I expect it will be better (more large) than out 
of the narrow work.88 
Edmund was concerned about a layer of white ash in the Beamshaw seam that did not 
adversely affect its combustion characteristics but which for cosmetic reasons would 
make it harder to sell as a household product: 
…the white ash will prove the main difficulty with the coal in preparing 
it for the London market. It must be kept out. If it is confined to the 
lower part of the bed there ought not to be much difficulty…but if we 
find it varies in different parts of the workings it will increase the 
difficulty very greatly.89 
Edmund’s comments contrast with twenty years earlier, when he had to be encouraged 
by Roseby to invest in grading and cleaning equipment for the Shafton coal. Dintenfass 
noted that ‘the trade in coal came more and more to involve ‘manufactured’ 
commodities rather than ‘extracted’ ones’.90 In the original samples sent to merchants, 
and almost certainly as a matter of course during bulk supply, a significant proportion 
of Nostell’s output from the late 1880s onwards was, in some degree, manufactured: 
graded, cleaned, and largely from the Beamshaw seam but including a proportion from 
the superior Winter seam.91  
The strategy for the redeveloped colliery was to ‘sell the largest possible 
proportion of the coal [at] the price of first class coal’, and the Winter seam made this 
possible.92 Johnson Shaw, Nostell’s sales agent, told Edmund in 1887 that: 
‘…he will not have difficulty in disposing of as much coal as is likely 
to be raised for some time to come, say four or five hundred tons a day. 
If he can do that and keep up the price…I think the Colliery ought to 
pay well enough’.93  
Once Nostell had secured and maintained a profitable presence in the market 
through the quality and consistency of its products, there were other ways in which the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 20 September 1886, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). HM 
Inspectorate would not allow the deployment of the full workforce until both shafts were completed, 
giving two escape routes from the workings. Longwall methods would be used from that point. Until 
then, coal was extracted by pillar and stall (‘narrow work’) using a limited workforce.  
89 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 27 August 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
90 Dintenfass, ‘Entrepreneurial Failure Reconsidered’, p. 20. 
91 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 27 August 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
92 Letter Edmund to Rowland Winn, 25 November 1886, A/1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
93 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 2 September 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Winns could establish their colliery in the minds of the consumer. One means of 
achieving this was the use of distinctive names, and the influence of this practice on the 
marketing of Nostell’s coal will be considered in the following section. 
What’s in a name?: from Stanley Main to Beamshaw 
 
It was difficult for a coalowner to physically differentiate his merchandise from that of 
his competitors, as coal was delivered in bulk and was not easily packaged or visually 
distinguishable one type from another.94 Many collieries attempted to differentiate their 
products by naming them in ways that would help to establish a ‘brand’, and indicate to 
the customer the quality and origin of the coal. In industrial markets the name usually 
identified only the district or coalfield but more detailed nomenclature was common in 
the household trade, in which the reputation of individual collieries or seams had 
considerable commercial value. The London domestic market had a long-established 
practice of naming coals after the originating colliery or coalowner, usually with a 
suffix that related to the region or seam from which it came – for example Killingworth 
Wallsend or Toft Main Splint.95 By the time of the redevelopment of Nostell in the mid-
1880s, the Winns were well aware of the power of coal names. When the new sinking 
cut a seam at around the depth at which the Barnsley measures were expected to be 
found, Edmund was anxious to establish its identity – an uncertain process, as the depth 
and nature of individual beds could vary considerably within a coalfield. He was 
concerned that the seam they had reached was the Stanley Main, generally considered a 
second-class coal,96 and warned his brother that ‘it will be as well not to say anything 
about what it may turn out to be, I think it would injure the sale. There is much 
prejudice’.97 The seam was in fact the Winter, with the Stanley Main – locally known as 
the Beamshaw - a few yards below it, and the Winns decided to work these coals rather 
than incur further expenditure in reaching the Barnsley seam.98 The Stanley Main 
produced better coal at Nostell than it did elsewhere, but was always referred to by the 
Winns as the ‘Beamshaw’, and the marketing title given to coal cut from it was ‘Priory’. 
No coal from Nostell was sold under the name ‘Stanley Main’.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Although privately-owned wagons always displayed the name of the colliery or owner, and acted as 
mobile advertisements. 
95 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, pp. 266-267; Church, History of the 
British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 49. 
96 Greenwell et al, Analyses of British Coals and Coke, p. xliv. 
97 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 17 December 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
98 Wilcockson, Sections of Strata of the Coal Measures, pp. 252-253. 
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The desire for association with perceived high quality was strong, so that 
collieries whose sale was mostly from second-class seams would produce small 
amounts of high quality coal – even at a loss - in order to enhance their market 
standing.99 Coalowners also appropriated coal identities to which they had little right. 
Wallsend coals and those from the Silkstone seam of Yorkshire and Derbyshire were 
traditionally among the highest quality products in the London market. The terms 
became used as generic indicators of quality for coal, so that ‘some collieries in south 
Yorkshire and even North Staffordshire use [Wallsend] for their best qualities’.100 The 
Winns themselves indulged in this sleight of hand and gave the name ‘Priory Wallsend’ 
to a gas/house coal produced from the Beamshaw seam. ‘Premium’ coal names were 
also used as comparative indicators, as when the Clay Cross Co. advertised its best 
quality coal as ‘equal to Wallsend’.101 A contemporary acknowledgement of the power 
and value of nomenclature was made when Lord Londonderry used legal action to stop 
the use of the name ‘Londonderry Wallsend’ for coal that had not been produced from 
his estate.102  
As prepared coal became increasingly important in the market, specific 
indicators of a coal’s quality or size – such as ‘best’, ‘seconds’, ‘kitchen’, ‘nuts’ or 
‘cobbles’ – were added to the nomenclature. Examples were Russell Hetton Nuts and 
Ellison Main Bean, while the Clay Cross Company advertised its Brights, Seconds and 
Kitchen coals as a domestic range, in descending order of quality.103 After the 
redevelopment of the colliery, Nostell marketed a portfolio of coals prepared by 
cleaning, screening and – in some cases – mixing of different seams, that were targeted 
at various market segments but with a bias to the domestic (see Table 7.3). A naming 
policy was introduced that was appropriate to this sector. Nostell’s premium product, a 
good domestic coal from the Winter seam, was christened ‘Wragby Best’. The 
gas/second class house coal from the Beamshaw/Stanley Main was called ‘Priory 
Wallsend’. The names combined indicators of geographical origin – albeit perhaps best 
understood by inhabitants of the Wakefield/Doncaster area – and quality. ‘Engine’ coal 
retained its generic name as appropriate to the market at which it was targeted. 
‘Wragby’ was retained for the top grade of nuts, echoing the name of the premium 
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100 The Times, 1 December 1913, p. 26. 
101 The Times, 5 January 1870, p. 11. 
102 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 48-49. 
103 Pearsall’s Monthly and Annual Importation and Delivery of Coal, unpaginated; The Times, 7 January 
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domestic coal, and the other nut grades were called ‘House’ and ‘Steam’ to indicate 
their quality and appropriate use. Slack was divided into the industry-standard sizes of 
rough, medium and pea. This range of named coals brought Nostell into the mainstream 
of contemporary coal marketing.  
The use of names to establish a brand in the market encouraged some 
coalowners to attempt to enhance their market position through advertising, on their 
own behalf or acting through their membership of a regional association. Collieries with 
a network of retail depots advertised their outlets’ location and prices in local 
newspapers, stressing the economies achievable by buying direct from the mining 
company, with a guarantee of single-source unadulterated coal. The Amalgamated 
Collieries Co.’s press advertisements, for instance, claimed that buying from their 
depots would ‘save the middleman’s profit’.104 Those collieries whose main markets 
were industrial or wholesale advertised in trade journals. Whether the advertisements 
addressed the domestic or business user, the coal names were prominent and there were 
emphases on quality and the advantages of buying direct from the producer – for larger 
advertisements, a list of customer endorsements might be included.105 Conversely, 
merchants’ advertisements stressed the choice available through buying from a 
middleman who carefully selected the best products on the market. The ‘advertorial’ 
was used at local and national level. For example, the Heckmondwike Colliery Co. 
benefited from an article in the Spen Valley Advertiser & Times urging its readers to 
buy local coal rather than ‘imported’, ‘foreign’ varieties from Barnsley. A forty-page 
supplement in The Times on coal, gas and oil included full-page advertisements by large 
collieries, and the coalowners’ associations of various coalfields provided much of the 
copy.106 Nostell did not have its own retail outlets except for the landsale at the pit-head, 
and appears not to have placed advertisements. However, it did benefit from WYCOA’s 
efforts on behalf of its members, and particularly through the comment in The Times’ 
1913 fuel supplement that the Winter seam was an outstanding house coal. This 
discussion of the use of advertising has brought to the foreground the retail and 
wholesale channels by which the coal reached the market. As with coal names, the use 
of the most appropriate channel gave the enterprising coalowner an opportunity to 
differentiate his products, and the focus of this chapter will therefore switch to the issue 
of sales channels. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 The Times, 6 January 1885, p. 15. 
105 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 49. 
106 Advertiser & Times, 19 December 1907, p. 2; The Times, 1 December, 1913. 
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‘In all selling, great caution is required…’:107 collieries, merchants and retailers 
 
The sales channels through which coal reached the customer were in a state of flux 
during the middle years of the nineteenth century. The arrangement that had been 
commonplace in the north-east’s trade with London - of a shipper taking title to a 
consignment of coal from the colliery at a discounted price to cover his risk, and then 
selling on to a merchant at the destination port - had largely been discontinued by the 
1860s. It had been replaced by a system under which railway and sea-sale collieries sold 
to merchants, the transport costs being borne by the purchaser. The merchant sold to 
retailers or end-users. Merchants bought coal from different collieries as the opportunity 
arose, although they often dealt regularly with the same producers and customers over a 
long period. For purely local sales, the collieries retailed direct to end-users.108  
Mitchell noted that ‘the separation of producing and merchanting was virtually 
complete until the early 1870s’, but from then onwards these functions began to come 
together. Selling directly to the end user without the use of middlemen, gave coalowners 
several benefits. They could retain more of the price margin for themselves, and they 
had greater control of the marketing of their coal. This gave them the opportunity for a 
degree of price flexibility, particularly when improvements in the speed and capacity of 
coal-handling technology enabled further cost to be removed from the supply chain by 
combining production and delivery. Church estimated this as a reduction in the cost of 
distribution from two-thirds of the retail price in 1830 to 30 per cent to 50 per cent fifty 
years later.109  
Coalowners gained these advantages at the expense of increasing the complexity 
of their businesses. By taking out middlemen, collieries had to maintain their own retail 
outlets for domestic and small business customers, and employ salaried salesmen to sell 
to larger business customers. They could establish a chain of outlets independently or 
buy an existing retailer, and deliver coal direct from the pit in colliery wagons.110 
Railway companies that rented storage and siding space at their stations encouraged the 
development of colliery-owned retailers. For example, in 1908 the London and North 
Western Railway alone had 155 such coal-yards in the London area.111 Through the last !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Hyslop, Colliery Management, p. 299. 
108 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 71-72; Jevons, British Coal Trade, pp. 293 and 
305. 
109 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 63-64, 72-75. 
110 Depots at railway stations were used extensively by both collieries and coal merchants. Church, 
History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 73. 
111 Bagwell, Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, p. 85. 
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quarter of the nineteenth century coalowners from a variety of coalfields, including 
Derbyshire/Nottinghamshire (Clay Cross Co., Staveley Iron & Coal Co. and the Pinxton 
Colliery Owners), the north-east (Tyne Main Coal Co. and the Marquis of Londonderry) 
and south Yorkshire (J. & J. Charlesworth and the Silkstone & Elsecar Colliery Co.) 
opened depots at railway stations across the country, and particularly in London.112 
Hyslop remarked in Colliery Management that the profits from retail ‘were in many 
cases very considerable’, but also drew attention to the cost and difficulty of managing a 
distributed retail network, and particularly of ensuring the honesty and 
conscientiousness of salaried agents.113  
Perhaps influenced by these considerations, there is no evidence that the Winns 
sold through wholly-owned outlets.  In 1907, in fact, George Winn wrote to the Great 
Northern Railway requesting that it install a weighing machine at its station in Sandal (a 
suburb of Wakefield close to Nostell) to encourage coal merchants to begin trading 
from it, implying that the colliery had no ‘in-house’ outlets even in its home locality.114 
The great majority of Nostell household coal sales were made through merchants. It is 
possible that the Winns, as landowners, were inclined to commercial development only 
of their own property, so that a network of branches held no attraction for them. 
Alternatively, the Winns could have simply be conforming to local practices, as a 
review of the coal market written immediately before the First World War noted that 
‘very little direct trade is done with the consumer’ in west Yorkshire, most house coal 
from the area being distributed through merchants and factors.115 By using merchants, 
the number of transactions to be managed was reduced, and the cost and risk of running 
a distributed retail business entirely removed.116 This was in any case an overhead that 
might have been difficult for a medium-sized colliery like Nostell to sustain, especially 
given the limited size of its management team. The colliery certainly developed 
longstanding relationships with some large merchants, though there was little likelihood 
of amalgamation with them given Nostell’s status as the personal property of a 
landowner and an integral element of a landed estate. Nostell’s commercial options 
were therefore constrained by the nature of its ownership. 
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112 A review of advertisements of the London Daily News and The Times from 1860 to 1892 suggests that 
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Although it eschewed an entry into domestic retail, from its earliest days Nostell 
sold direct to industrial users. Direct selling usually increased the coalowner’s share of 
the profit, and enabled the colliery to get a better understanding of its customers. The 
ability to deal face-to-face with its end-users was helped by the ubiquity of the railway 
network, which Rowland had used so effectively when setting up the first ironstone 
leases. In addition, many provincial centres in the later nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries followed London’s example in founding coal exchanges, and these provided 
focal points for colliery salesmen. Both wholesale merchants and large end-users 
participated in the exchanges, so that a colliery salesman could reach the two types of 
bulk-buyer in a single forum. Collieries in south Yorkshire and the 
Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire coalfields were among the leaders in appointing salaried 
salesmen to sell to large customers, and also developed close – preferably exclusive - 
ties with local agents and merchants.117  
At first, Rowland and Edmund undertook much of the direct selling at Nostell. 
Rowland secured contracts with gas and railway companies, while Edmund went to 
London to sell shiploads of coal through the exchange.118 The use of direct sales was 
encouraged by the increasing popularity in the 1860s and 1870s of bulk purchasing on 
contract by wholesale merchants and large industrial customers, especially consumers 
of gas, steam and manufacturing coal, two of Nostell’s main markets. Under these 
arrangements the coalowner undertook to supply an agreed weight of coal, often of a 
closely specified quality, over a set period and typically on a monthly basis. The 
contracts enabled the buyer to guarantee receipt of an essential fuel or raw material to a 
known price and timetable. They were usually put out to tender directly to the collieries, 
reducing opportunities for middlemen.119 They had benefits for the coalowner, because 
as Jevons pointed out, collieries ‘cannot be worked advantageously on day-to-day sales, 
which would probably mean irregular working as coal cannot be stored without great 
expense’.120 Hence Rowland’s satisfaction at obtaining a gas contract in 1867 that he 
hoped ‘will at once put the colliery on its legs and keep them going as hard as they can 
go’.121  
Jevons, writing in the Edwardian era, estimated that in coalfields supplying the 
steam market or selling manufacturing coal to large industrial customers, extended term !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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contract sales accounted for up to 75 per cent of all sales by weight. In Yorkshire and 
the Midlands coalfields, in which domestic and small industrial consumers made up a 
greater proportion of the market, contract sales constituted about 50 per cent of sales. 
Jevons described most contracts as being for terms of three to twelve months, and 
exceptionally up to three years.122 The Times, in its 1913 coal trade review, 
characterised the London trade as being dominated by yearly contracts, the price either 
being annualised or with a contractual variation between summer and winter.123 George 
Winn’s correspondence with colliery customers from 1900 onwards corroborates Jevons 
and The Times. Contracts were employed by many of Nostell’s larger customers, and 
the proportion of coal sold in this way was around 50 per cent of the total by weight. 
Most of Nostell’s contracts lasted for a six monthly ‘season’ - that is, covering the 
period of summer or winter prices – or at most to a year.124 The average length of 
contracts decreased over the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the commercial 
risks involved became clearer to the market, so that Rowland’s five-year agreement 
with the gas company in 1867 was unlikely to be replicated forty years later. The length 
of contracts was partially a response to the cyclical nature of the coal market. The term 
tended to reduce with increased commercial uncertainty as both buyer and seller feared 
being caught out by a significant price change, although the contracts themselves 
contributed to smoothing the amplitudes of the market cycles in the sectors in which 
they were most commonly used.125   
During the period of generally rising prices after 1900, there is evidence from 
Nostell that extended contracts enabled coalowners to influence the prices paid by large 
consumers based on the volume and schedule of deliveries. Throughout the period 
1900-1914 George Winn consistently offered price reductions to the customer only in 
exchange for a minimum volume or a longer-term commitment. If this approach failed, 
however, the ultimate weakness of George’s position was shown by his recourse to the 
superiority of the service that Nostell offered or reference to a reduction that had been 
given to the customer for a previous contract. On one recorded occasion only, George 
would not negotiate with one of Nostell’s largest customers, when during a period of 
high demand and prices in 1907 he refused a reduction ‘simply because our neighbours 
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are offering their coal a little cheaper’.126 In general, Nostell was forced to abide by the 
prices - and their seasonal shifts - generally prevailing for west Yorkshire collieries, 
with only minor negotiation on the conditions under which the coal was sold. 
The responsibility for selling to large customers, whether end-users or 
merchants, lay within the Nostell Colliery organisation, apart from a brief period when 
Edward Myers was appointed as the London agent in the late 1860s. From 1866 to the 
early 1880s Thomas Belton combined the roles as administrator of coal sales and house 
steward at the Priory. This was a relic of the traditional approach to estate management 
in which industrial, agricultural and domestic facets of the estate were combined. 
Belton’s role as overseer had to be supplemented by proactive salesmen, a role that was 
initially taken by Rowland and Edmund. From 1875, when the easy sales and high 
prices of the boom were slacking off and the Winns had withdrawn from sales, Belton 
was assisted by directly-employed salesmen working on a commission-only basis. In 
1879 two full-time salesmen were appointed on salary, commission and expenses. The 
earnings of one of them – Johnson Shaw - identify him as a successful operator and 
from 1884 he was the colliery’s main salesman, and one of its three salaried employees. 
The other two were the viewer and the colliery manager, an indication of the importance 
of sales. Shaw was heavily involved in the launch of the new coal in 1886-1888, 
negotiating a price for the sample wagonloads of domestic coal and sending orders back 
to Nostell from customers in the West Riding/Lancashire industrial district and the 
London area.127 He regularly attended the London exchange and the Yorkshire Coal 
Exchange in Leeds, of which he was a founder and committee-member.128 A 
representative of Nostell was therefore prominent in a regional network designed to 
promote coal sales, in addition to the colliery’s membership of WYCOA, the producers’ 
organisation. Shaw was one of the Winns’ most loyal employees and continued as 
colliery sales agent into the 1920s.129 
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126 Letter, George Winn to Geo. Hinchliffe & Co., 23 July 1907, C3/6/4/[1857], WYL1352, WYAS (W); 
other letters in this reference 1906-1914 passim, including to the Horbury Junction Iron Co., J. T. 
Crampton & Co., and Pyman, Bell & Co.. Prices rose sharply in 1907-1908, falling again late in the latter 
year. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 278. 
127 4/1, WYL523; The Times, 1 December 1913, p. 26; letters Edmund to Rowland Winn 1886-1887 
passim, A/1/10[291] and C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352; all WYAS (W). 
128 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 79. On Mondays the London Coal Exchange 
was attended by ‘a large number of owners and representatives from the Midlands and Yorkshire’; The 
Times, 1 December 1913, p. 26; Yorkshire Coal Exchange Ltd, Leeds, Committees minute book no. 1, 
National Coal Mining Museum of England library. 
129 Shaw worked for the Winns for at least 48 years, appearing in the 1927 Colliery Year Book and Coal 
Trades Directory as sales agent at Nostell. 
! 157!
Markets and marketing at Nostell Colliery 
 
The Winns’ approach to marketing became more complex and sophisticated in 
the twenty-five years from 1866. Although overall price-setting remained largely 
market-led with limited input from individual suppliers, the Winns were increasingly 
aware of the value of meeting market needs. Nostell’s product marketing progressed 
substantially from 1868, when Roseby urged Edmund to install adequate screens, to the 
decision to deepen the shafts in the early 1880s, which was informed by a greater 
understanding of market realities – such as the advantages of high volume - than had 
been in evidence fifteen years previously. It culminated in the expanding range of 
named, graded products in the 1890s. Selling became professionalised and firmly 
established in the colliery hierarchy, undertaken full-time by a salaried employee rather 
than as an occasional task for the Winns. The colliery’s sales staff became established 
members of the formal coal markets in Yorkshire and London. By the early 1890s coal 
marketing at Nostell had evolved from weakness to strength. !!
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Chapter 8 
‘One head man on the spot’: management of Nostell Colliery 
Introduction  
 
Chapter 8 sets Nostell Colliery within the context of the evolution of management in the 
nineteenth century coal mining industry. The chapter will investigate the links between 
the management of collieries and of landed estates, in a period during which the Winns’ 
colliery evolved from an adjunct of the estate into a stand-alone operation. Finally, 
during the second half of the nineteenth century the greater size and complexity of the 
average colliery, the intense competition in the industry, and increasing statutory 
intervention all contributed to a higher degree of professionalization and specialisation 
in the operational management of colliery companies. The chapter will explore these 
changes and analyse their effect on the management of collieries on the Nostell estate. 
The historiography of management in the coal industry 
 
In a bibliography of industrial history published in 1935, H. L. Beales remarked that ‘it 
is noteworthy that the history of mining trade unionism is more accessible than the 
history of mining enterprise’.1 Thirty years later, in The Genesis of Modern 
Management, Pollard separated entrepreneurialism from management in the industrial 
history of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and reached the more wide-
ranging conclusion that ‘the story of modern industrial management’ was ‘one of the 
most glaring gaps’ in the history of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath. Pollard 
also identified coal mining as being among the earliest endeavours that required active 
management of varied and extensive resources, noting that as early as the seventeenth 
century substantial capital investment could be required to establish a coal mine of 
significant size.2  As he and other writers have observed, the running of a large colliery 
involved supervision of a sizeable labour force undertaking a production process in an 
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1 Beales, ‘Studies in Bibliography’, p. 102. 
2 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 1, 61-62. 
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environment that made managerial oversight particularly difficult.3 By its nature, 
mining also carried a high level of physical risk to its workers, and of capital risk to its 
owners. Colliery managers and owners also had to contend with competitive pressures, 
technological change and, from the mid nineteenth century, intervention by government 
in the interests of social improvement. Because of the structure of the industry and the 
environment in which it operated, coal mining was likely to be an innovator in 
management. 
Historians have continued to pay limited attention to managerial processes in the 
coal industry, despite its central position in the development of British industrial 
management practice. Neville and Benson noted in their 1975 bibliography of labour in 
the coal industry that ‘the absence of any interpretation of the “management revolution” 
in the context of the British coal industry as a whole during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries remains a glaring gap in the existing state of our knowledge’.4 This omission 
has been addressed to some degree in the multi-volume History of the British Coal 
Industry and in a number of individual studies, and colliery management has received 
attention through analyses of productivity levels and mechanisation.5 However, even in 
2008 Perchard remarks on the ‘scant attention paid to managerial employees in the 
historiography of the British coal industry.  In most cases, managers in the industry 
have been assumed to be either adjuncts to their employers or local autocrats.  There 
have only been a handful of studies examining managers in the industry’.6 
Perchard’s reference to ‘local autocrats’ suggests a similarity between the power 
held by management over a colliery, its workforce and the local community, and that 
wielded by a landowner over his property. In Genesis of Modern Management, Pollard !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For example, B. F. Duckham, A History of the Scottish Coal Industry vol. 1, 1700-1815 (Newton Abbot, 
1970), p. 113; M. W. Flinn, The History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 2: 1700-1830 The Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford 1984), p. 52; McLean, ‘Agent's Reputation, Accounting and Costing’, pp. 1-3. 
4 R. G. Neville and J. Benson, ‘Labour in the coalfields (II). A select bibliography’, Bulletin of the Society 
for the Study of Labour History 31 (1975), p.49. 
5 The Flinn, Church and Supple volumes of The History of the British Coal Industry include surveys of 
managerial practice. Individual studies of management in the coal industry include Mee, Aristocratic 
Enterprise, on the Fitzwilliam estates and the Biram family; T. J. Raybould, Economic Emergence of the 
Black Country (Newton Abbot, 1973), on the Earl Dudley’s estates; E. Richards, ‘The Industrial Face of a 
Great Estate: Trentham and Lilleshall, 1780-1860, Economic History Review vol. 27 no. 3 (August 1974), 
pp. 414-430; the surveys of mining by landowners and studies of individual estates in Ward et al, Land 
and Industry: The Landed Estate and the Industrial Revolution; Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business; 
Dintenfass, Managing Industrial Decline, which deals extensively in matters of management; Duckham, 
‘The Emergence of the Professional Manager in the Scottish Coal Industry’; Medlicott, ‘The 
Development of Coal Mining on the Norfolk and Rockingham-Fitzwilliam Estates’; Griffin, ‘Robert 
Harrison and the Barber, Walker Co’. There has also been discussion of managerial attitudes in the 
debates on mechanisation and production levels conducted by Greasley, A. J. Taylor, Buxton, Kirby and 
others. 
6 Quotation from Perchard, The ‘Black Jock’ Manager?. 
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specifically identified the development of management practice in the coal and 
industries as founded on that of landed estates. He noted the similarities in job titles and 
responsibilities of managers of large collieries and ironworks, and of the estates on 
which they were based – for example, the use of the titles ‘agent’ and ‘steward’, and a 
tendency to sub-divide responsibilities by geography rather than function.7 The coal 
industry frequently appears in studies of the management and development of landed 
property, and a significant proportion – possibly a majority - of studies of managerial 
practice in the coal industry relate to mining on landed estates.8 As noted in Chapter 7, 
contemporary nineteenth century literature dealing with management at collieries was 
heavily skewed to engineering and safety, rather than man-management or managerial 
structures and strategy.9 
Managerial oversight of estate collieries developed from the arrangements made 
for running the agricultural and domestic facets of landed property. From the early 
eighteenth century onwards, many landowners employed professional agents. These 
agents had a wide remit, with responsibility for all elements of the property.10 Where 
mineral mining was a significant element of the estate’s activities, a sub-agent with 
relevant technical and legal expertise was employed to handle this specialised business, 
reporting to the main agent.11 North east England was the driving force of the coal 
industry in the eighteenth century, largely because of the activities of a number of the 
region’s landowners, and the functions of the commercially-oriented mineral agent and 
the technical mining engineer coalesced into the colliery viewer, competent in 
engineering, marketing and labour relations.12 Viewers could be resident or consultant, 
and on estates to which mineral income was especially important – such as Earl 
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7 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 23, 29. 
8 Examples of references to coal in the context of wider studies of estate management include Spring, 
‘The English Landed Estate in the Age of Coal and Iron’; Thompson, English Landed Society, and 
Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture; Richards, The Leviathan of Wealth; Sturgess, 
‘Landowners, Mining and Urban Development’. 
9 Jonathan Hyslop’s book Colliery Management is an exception, as it is in its discussion of marketing. 
The concluding chapter ‘General Economy’ includes general guidelines for the management of a mine, 
on principles informed by religious conviction. 
10 E. Richards, ‘The Land Agent’, in G. E. Mingay (ed.), The Victorian Countryside vol. 2 (London, 
1981), pp. 439-456; this ref. pp. 339-340. 
11 Flinn, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 2, p. 52. 
12 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 409-410; McLean, ‘Agent's Reputation, 
Accounting and Costing’, pp. 3-4. 
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Fitzwilliam in Yorkshire and the Marquis of Londonderry in County Durham – the coal 
viewer’s responsibilities might include more general elements of estate administration.13 
The link between the management of estates and of collieries weakened when 
landowners moved from colliery ownership to leasing their coal seams. This trend 
accelerated after the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and by the time of Nostell 
Colliery’s opening in the 1860s, management in the coal industry was increasingly 
professionalised and specialised.14 The impetus for this came from a range of sources. 
The emergence of competitive regional and national markets in place of local 
monopolies stimulated marketing, selling and logistics skills in the industry. Investors 
supplying the rising levels of capital required for a colliery hedged against the risks of 
their investment by employing management that was technically and commercially 
competent. As shallow seams became exhausted, the increasing depth from which coal 
was being mined required the application of specialised technical knowledge to ensure 
that the coal was obtained economically and safely. Intense price competition promoted 
efficiency in working methods. Prior to the 1840s, legislators had adopted a policy of 
‘conscientious non-interference’ in the running of collieries. After the report of the 
Children’s Employment Commission in 1842 and a series of major colliery explosions, 
an increasing body of legislation was directed to improving safety in mines and 
ensuring that colliery managers employed best contemporary practice. A safer work 
environment, a stable workforce and increased profitability were seen as interlinked, 
and a government inspectorate was established in the 1850s to oversee compliance with 
legislation. 
The desire for improved safety was a particular motivation for the foundation of 
professional bodies. Once again, the north east of England took the initiative. The North 
of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers, founded in 1851, was the 
precedent for the formation of similar bodies in other coalfields. These institutions 
codified and disseminated approved professional standards, often citing safety as a 
means to profitability.15 For example, when the Midland Institute of Mining Engineers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 A. Orde (ed.), Publications of the Surtees Society vol. 217: Letters of John Buddle to Lord 
Londonderry, 1820-1843 (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. xviii-x; G. Mee, Aristocratic Enterprise (Glasgow, 
1975), pp. 97-99. 
14 The following three paragraphs are based on O. O. G. M. MacDonagh, 'Coal Mines Regulation: The 
First Decade’, pp. 75-78; Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 420-425; D. Morrah, ‘A 
Historical Outline of Coalmine Legislation’ in Mining Association of Great Britain, Historical Review of 
Mining (London c. 1929), pp. 301-320; and Sinclair, Coal Mining Law, pp. 84-85. 
15 Griffin, ‘Robert Harrison and the Barber, Walker Co’, pp. 59-60; Church, History of the British Coal 
Industry, vol. 3, p. 426. 
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was formed in Wakefield in 1868-1869, one of its major objectives was the formulation 
of safe practices for working the gassy Barnsley seam, which had experienced a series 
of lethal explosions.16 The strengthening of the Mines Inspectors’ statutory powers and 
the imposition of a compulsory (if broad-brush) safety code in 1860 indicated 
government’s intention to encourage the use of contemporary best practice. The north 
eastern coalfield’s system of employing an expert viewer to periodically review a 
colliery’s progress and advise its resident management was particularly favoured, the 
viewer acting as the conduit through which technical knowledge was disseminated to an 
industry that consisted of a multiplicity of separate sites, often in isolated locations. 
Many of these developments required collieries to formalise their managerial 
responsibilities and documentation practices. For example, plans of the workings had to 
be kept current and deposited with the Home Office when the mine was abandoned.  
Regular inspections of shafts and underground workings were required. From 1872, 
colliery managers had to hold a certificate of competency awarded by examination, and 
qualifications were introduced for other levels of management. Legislation assigned 
safety responsibilities to defined roles held by named individuals and established a 
reporting framework through which the responsibilities were to be discharged. It also 
established the mine manager as a compulsory appointment, defined by his safety 
responsibilities and with a technical background.  The workforce was represented in 
safety inspections, and the checkweighman became an elected official who could not be 
replaced by management. However, the legislation did not specify a functional 
management structure for collieries; nor did it outline a form of management that would 
enable the whole business of the colliery company to be run. There was a similar trend 
towards increased formality in organisational and accounting issues, among the small 
but rising number of colliery companies which were limited liability corporations under 
the 1862 Companies Act. These were statutorily required to make public certain 
financial and company governance information, while the companies that continued as 
partnerships had the stimulus to record financial performance and managerial 
responsibility, in order to protect the interests of the partners.17  
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16 J. Blunt, A History of the Midland Institute of Mining Engineers (n.p., 1988), pp. 11-12. 
17 P. L. Payne, ‘Family Business in Britain: An Historical and Analytical Survey’, in A. Okochi and S. 
Yasuoka (eds), Family Business in the Era of Industrial Growth: Its Ownership and Management 
(Tokyo, 1984), pp. 69-104; this ref. p. 70; Wilson et al, The Making of Modern Management, pp. 239-
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The trend to professional specialised colliery management embedded in a 
framework of statutory regulations will be examined through the evolution of 
managerial practice at Nostell Colliery. However, the study of the form and quality of 
management is subject to evidence-related difficulties, as Wale identifies in a review of 
the literature relating to the performance of entrepreneurs in the British coal industry 
between 1900 and 1946. Business records rarely state the objectives or assumptions 
underlying a managerial decision or policy as these lay in ‘the shared and tacit 
knowledge of the participants’.18 It is often difficult to identify the range of alternative 
courses of action available to a particular group of decision-makers, or to assign reasons 
for which a decision was made. The study of management at Nostell before the First 
World War is subject to these problems. The colliery’s mode of ownership ensured that 
there were no board meetings, and the interaction between individual managers was 
informal. No meeting minutes survive, or any official record of decision-making. The 
main evidence lies in letters between Charles, Rowland, Edmund and George Winn, in 
which matters relating to coal are interspersed among many other subjects. The family 
correspondence is supplemented by a smaller number of letters from Thomas Belton 
and John Roseby. These letters possess the virtues of honesty and contextual richness 
and are not simply a formal record of decisions without underlying reasons, but they 
express an individual’s perspective and often tell only a part of the story.  Wale’s article 
concludes that courses of events and the reasons for management action must often be 
inferred from the full range of records. For this thesis, the robustness of the argument 
has been supplemented by additional data from the extensive collection of production 
and financial records, and from George Winn’s correspondence with suppliers, 
customers and other external agencies.  
The evolution of management at Wragby and Nostell Collieries 
 
This survey of the development of colliery management at Nostell will begin with 
Wragby. Wragby Colliery employed a workforce of no more than thirty men, who 
raised 200 to 300 tons of coal per week under the supervision of an underground 
foreman.19 Although the Wragby workforce was primarily employed in the pit, it was 
put to other tasks on the property at need. In 1841, for example, the viewer noted that no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 J. M. Wale, ‘Entrepreneurship in an Industry Subject to External Shocks: British ‘Coalowners’, 1900-
1946’, Management Decision vol. 39 no. 9 (2001), pp. 729-738; this ref. p. 737. 
19 C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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coal had been raised between 21 August and 18 September because the colliers were 
harvesting.20 Twelve years later, the men involved in drilling test bores for additional 
coal seams under the estate were reassigned to haymaking because the colliery ‘cannot 
spare the colliers as there is a large sale of coal going on at present’, implying that under 
normal circumstances the pitmen would have been redeployed into the fields.21  
The colliery’s managerial staff was also integrated with the wider estate. 
Thomas Belton, the house steward, oversaw sales administration. The estate rent 
collector and surveyor, Henry Holt, a civil engineer, provided technical advice, periodic 
performance reviews and ad hoc reports on the colliery.22 Although, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, accounts of a relatively sophisticated nature were kept for the mine at 
Wragby, financial management was founded on traditional estate habits, such as Charles 
Winn’s weekly meeting with the colliery overseer to balance the cash in hand.23 Beyond 
this routine transaction, the Winns were little involved in daily colliery management. 
They saw their role was primarily to make financial decisions regarding capital 
expenditure and major changes in procedure, or to express suitable sentiments at 
particularly successful or unprofitable years. For example, in 1837 Holt wrote a report 
for Charles Winn on whether to continue pumping from an old shaft. Two years later 
Rowland remarked on a period of particularly high output and sales, and in 1857 father 
and elder son worried over the cost of test bores and the price of a new stationary engine 
boiler.24 The colliery rarely figured in Charles’ diaries or in his correspondence with his 
sons. There is no evidence that the Winns were directly involved with Wragby’s 
customers and suppliers in the way that they were to be with those at Nostell Colliery. 
Wragby was not a separate, full-time operation, and the Winns resembled other 
landowners in ‘regard[ing] pits as merely extensions of their agricultural estates’.25 
Management was in the hands of individuals whose main duties lay in the agricultural 
and domestic aspects of the estate, and the only dedicated managerial resource was the 
underground supervisor. The colliery provided fuel for the Priory, in good years a 
modest but valuable addition to the owner’s personal income, and seasonal 
supplementary manpower in the fields.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 C/3/3/3/4 [1027], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
21 Letter Rowland to Charles Winn, 19 July 1853, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
22 Holt was a civil engineer by profession. A/1/8/1, A/1/7[787] and C/3/1/9/1, all WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
23 See Chapter 5, p. 91. 
24 C/3/1/9/1, Letters, Rowland to Charles Winn, 2 March 1842, 27 June and 4 July 1857, A/1/8/1, all 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
25 A. R. Griffin, Mining in the East Midlands, 1550-1947 (London, 1971), p. 23. 
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When in the early 1860s the Winns decided to replace Wragby with Nostell 
Colliery, it would have been a natural point for the family to move to the status of coal 
rentier rather than entrepreneur. The ironstone was so successful that in 1865 Rowland 
reassured his father that ‘after this year there will be no more difficulty on the money 
score’.26 Not all members of the family were in favour of a venture into the volatile coal 
market. In the late 1850s, Charles had eagerly discussed the founding of a colliery, and 
greeted the ironstone discovery with enthusiasm, but from the financially secure 
perspective of 1865 he complained that the new sinking would be a ‘nuisance in the 
parish and I fear entail an extent of mischief for which no amount of gain can 
compensate’. He ‘most sincerely regret[ted] that I was ever induced to open a new 
colliery at all’ – displaying what his sons may have found to be an exasperatingly short 
memory.27 However, Charles’ comments represented less an evaporation of Wiener’s 
‘Industrial Spirit’ or alarm at the uncertainties of the coal trade, but rather the irritation 
of an elderly man who foresaw the disruption of a settled manner of life.28  
Despite Charles’s reservations, the sinking at Nostell proceeded. A major part of 
the new colliery’s value to the Winns was to provide a job for Edmund, who had 
expressed a preference for ‘regular employment’ at Carlton, and had gained 
management experience as agent to the Nostell estate from the late 1850s. As director of 
the new colliery, he had sole responsibility for running a separate enterprise. His salary 
was generous in view of his limited experience of the coal trade and the pit’s moderate 
output. At £400 p.a. it was equivalent to that of a resident manager taking charge of all 
operations at a larger colliery than Nostell.29 From 1868, however, Edmund combined 
his colliery role with that of Treasurer of the West Riding Quarter Sessions. 
Other aspects of the new colliery at Nostell, apart from providing an income for 
a younger son, were influenced by landowner values. Professional agents were expected 
to be hard-working all-rounders: ‘Few things are more conspicuous than the incessant 
industry of the leading land agents in the nineteenth century…versatility, no less than 
activity, was held a desirable quality’.30 A high premium was placed on honesty, so that 
an employee of proven probity could shoulder a workload whose weight compromised 
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26 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 5 June 1865, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
27 Letter, Charles to Edmund Winn, 28 August 1865, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
28 Charles was 70 at the time of the letter. 
29 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 15 June 1868, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W); Hyslop, Colliery 
Management, p. 518; Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 463. 
30 Spring, The English Landed Estate, pp. 105-106. 
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his expertise, efficiency and, indeed, his health.31 These characteristics can be seen on 
the Winns’ estates. Reliable personnel from Wragby Colliery and the ironstone 
operation were transferred across to Nostell Colliery. They retained their functional 
responsibilities, even though the nature and size of the new colliery significantly 
changed the nature of those functions. Thomas Belton ran the commercial and sales side 
as he had for Wragby, although it was greatly expanded in extent and complexity as a 
result of increased production and the preponderance of railway sale rather than 
landsale. He also retained his duties as house steward. Hunter was the underground 
steward at Wragby and continued in this role at Nostell, for an enterprise three times the 
size.  
The most surprising appointment was that of John Roseby, who was made 
colliery engineer in 1868 in addition to his ironstone responsibilities. In 1859 Rowland 
described Roseby as ‘first rate and most indefatigable and clever’ and attributed much 
of the early success in marketing the ironstone to his efforts.32 Over the next few years 
his shortcomings became manifest. He was unreliable in keeping appointments, and 
admitted to Edmund that ‘I have sometimes caused you and Mr Rowland Winn 
inconvenience’ by this habit.33 Mrs Roseby told Rowland in 1863 that her husband was 
‘speculating in so many things in different parts of the country, that he had not time to 
attend to half…[and she] appeared to despair of finding any means of checking him in 
his relentless proceedings’.34 He was bankrupted several times by his speculations 
outside the Winn property - in 1864 and 1868, and probably in 1882 at the time of his 
death.35 It was not unusual for resident mining engineers to be consultants at other 
collieries; for example, Robert Harrison, managing director of the east Midland 
coalowners Barber, Walker & Co., took consultancy commissions on the grounds that 
they kept him informed of good practice among the competition.36 Roseby, however, 
was involved in two heavily promoted iron-smelting companies of doubtful provenance, 
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31 Mee, Aristocratic Enterprise, pp. 94-95; Medlicott, ‘The Development of Coal Mining on the Norfolk 
and Rockingham-Fitzwilliam Estates’, pp. 115-116. 
32 Letter Charles to Rowland Winn, 4 November 1859, WYL1352, A1/8/1, WYAS (W). Rowland later 
became less complimentary about Roseby. 
33 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 22 October 1867, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). In the late 
1850s Rowland kept a notebook recording these instances - ‘Notes on the behaviour of J. Roseby’, 
C/3/1/6/[1467], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
34 C/3/1/6/[1467], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
35 Hull Packet and East Riding Times, 16 October 1868 and 15 October 1869. 
36 Griffin, ‘Robert Harrison and the Barber, Walker Co’, p. 52. 
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and with a colliery in Staffordshire with a poor safety record.37 Despite these issues, 
Roseby had not been detected in any dishonesty affecting the Winns, and Rowland was 
swayed by the traits of paternalism and loyalty to employees of long standing that were 
commonplace among the landed class – and no doubt also by the convenience of simply 
adding to an existing employee’s workload.38  
All Nostell Colliery managers apart from Hunter devoted only part of their time 
to the colliery, and in some degree their competence and professionalism were 
questionable. Edmund lacked knowledge of either the commercial aspects of the coal 
trade or the technical side of mining. A main aim of the campaign for the compulsory 
certification of colliery managers was to preclude the unqualified or the pluralist being 
made responsible for the safety of a colliery.39 This objective was snobbishly expressed 
as preventing ‘a shopkeeper or joiner, or half-educated young ‘gentleman’, a nephew of 
the owner’ from attaining such a position.40 While Edmund’s credentials as a 
‘gentleman’ were excellent, he had no formal or experiential training as a colliery 
manager or mine engineer. Other aspects of his appointment also compromised his 
status. Charles had considered but rejected the possibility of giving Edmund part-
ownership of the colliery. This kept the estate and its economic activities under a single 
owner and avoided any possible inheritance problems.41 Although Edmund had 
achieved at Nostell the managerial role that he had envisaged for himself at Carlton, he 
lacked the authority of ownership. This was a significant weakening of his position in a 
setting imbued with the proprietorial ethos of a landed estate, in which the owner was 
the ultimate decision-maker for his property. At Carlton Edmund would have had the 
status of an independent owner and manager, but as general manager for Nostell 
Colliery he was the employee of his father and, later, his brother. Landowners reserved 
the right to ignore the advice given by their employees, or to reverse or modify their 
decisions.42 Quite soon after Nostell’s opening, it became clear that as heir-apparent to 
the estate Rowland intervened in the colliery as he felt necessary, and that his 
interventions might undermine Edmund’s standing as much as that of any other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Derby Mercury 22 November 1871; Birmingham Daily Post, 27 July 1872, 21 February and 4 
September 1873. 
38 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 12 May 1879, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, WYAS (W); 
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39 Certification was introduced in the 1872 Coal Mines Regulation Act. 
40 Colliery Guardian, 14 December 1867. 
41 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 July 1887, C/3/1/9/[287], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
42 Thompson, English Landed Society, pp. 151-152. 
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employee. Rowland’s attitude also presented an opportunity for aggrieved or ambitious 
members of staff to appeal directly to the estate owner, especially if, like Belton and 
Roseby, they had easy access to him in the course of their other duties. The informal 
and autocratic practices of the landed estate undermined the management chain of an 
industrial organisation. 
Other weaknesses existed in the management team. Roseby’s main experience 
was in the mining and marketing of ironstone. Belton’s mix of domestic and 
commercial responsibilities had forerunners on other estates, for example Joshua Biram, 
who had fulfilled similar roles for Earl Fitzwilliam at Wentworth Woodhouse in the 
1820s.43 By the 1860s it was unsuited to contemporary market conditions.44 Feuds arose 
because of incursions into each other’s jurisdictions, a situation exacerbated by the 
informal nature of the colliery’s managerial processes and poor definition of individual 
responsibilities. Salary levels were only belatedly adjusted to match new 
responsibilities.  These various issues manifested themselves in the management history 
of Nostell Colliery between 1867 and the mid 1870s, although as the problems were 
worked through the beginnings can also be seen of a greater degree of managerial 
specialisation and professionalism. The link with the wider estate was loosening. It was 
first entirely severed for manual workers, as there is no evidence that Nostell’s colliers 
doubled as harvest-time field labour as Wragby’s had. Their skills were more valuable 
when applied permanently to mining, The new colliery’s greater size and scope 
developed its own momentum, requiring expertise and commitment of time that 
precluded split responsibilities. 
‘Certainly not very satisfactory’:45 management at Nostell Colliery in 1867-1868 
 
Soon after the colliery’s opening, the management structure began to show signs of 
strain. In mid-1867, Belton claimed that Hunter’s shortcomings were causing a fall in 
production, and that Roseby was interfering in sales matters while neglecting his real 
responsibility for the efficiency of production: 
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43 Mee, Aristocratic Enterprise, pp. 96-97. 
44 Belton began his career at Nostell as a gardener and was appointed house steward in 1856. The 
Gardener’s Magazine vol. 9 (1833), p. 734, noted that at a West Riding Horticultural Society show in 
September 1833, ‘Mr Thomas Belton, gardener to C. Winn, Esq., Nostell Priory, exhibited a specimen of 
a rare fungus, Agaricus Nobilis’.  
45 Letter, Edmund Winn to John Roseby, 22 June 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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Coal from the new pit is coming out slowly, and will until a proper 
person be appointed to deal with men rationally…Mr Roseby is in 
France testing the coal…if the result is satisfactory with gas works 
here, [and] we cannot supply anything approaching the quantity that 
would be required, why then seek another market and keep the pit 
standing?46 
Roseby responded to this criticism by resigning, his letter to Edmund trading on the 
loyalty that he felt he was owed from the success of the Lincolnshire ironstone: ‘I have 
done my duty as far as any human being can do for you both at Nostell and at 
Appleby’.47 The dispute arose from an inadequate definition of responsibilities. 
Although Roseby was primarily an engineer, he displayed the characteristic wide-
ranging managerialism of viewers originating from north-east England, whose 
perception of their role could extend to marketing, labour relations and transport.48  He 
had been heavily involved in arranging the ironstone leases and had received a 
percentage of the income they generated. In the absence of any instruction to the 
contrary, he attempted to sell Nostell’s coal because he considered it his legitimate 
responsibility, and perhaps also in the expectation of commission on the sales.49 Roseby 
was persuaded to stay on, but the dispute resurfaced a few months later when he 
claimed that Belton was withholding information from him, and that he was excluded 
from decision-making at the colliery. He again wrote to Edmund in highly emotional 
terms:  
What I have done to merit such treatment from you or Mr Belton I 
cannot consider. I can however only come to the conclusion that all 
confidence is lost in me and for what cause I know not unless it is that I 
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46 Both emphases in the originals. Roseby was trying to sell coal to the French gas industry. Letters, 
Thomas Belton to Edmund Winn, 11 July and 14 September 1867, C/3/1/9/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
47Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 31 July 1867, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W).   
48 John Buddle, the doyen of north-eastern colliery viewers in the first half of the nineteenth century, set 
the boundaries of a viewer’s responsibilities. Depending on his agreement with the owner of a colliery – 
and while trying to avoid obvious conflicts of interest – in some cases he might advise only on 
underground matters, while in others he controlled the colliery finances and was involved in resolving 
labour disputes or major transport construction projects like the Marquis of Londonderry’s Seaham 
Harbour. Roseby joined the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers, the 
wellspring of the north-east’s mine engineering/viewing professionalism, in February 1867. Orde (ed.), 
Letters of John Buddle to Lord Londonderry, p. 94; Fleischman and Oldroyd, 'An Imperial Connection?’, 
p. 34; McLean, ‘Agent's Reputation, Accounting and Costing’, pp. 2-3. 
49Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 23 January 1860, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W).   
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have made myself disagreeable in interfering in things which I had 
nothing to do with.50  
Roseby’s ‘interfering’ related to his attempts to reverse Edmund’s production 
policy. The colliery lost money in late 1866 and through 1867, and in response Edmund 
cut production and costs, a course of action that Roseby strongly opposed: ‘From my 
experience in these matters I know that nothing like a full profit can be got without 
keeping the pit in full work’.51 Wale observes that ‘in coalmining at any time or place 
there is a requirement for output maximization…owing to the high overhead costs 
involved in operating a mine’, so that Roseby was almost certainly correct in his 
opinion.52 Contemporary colliery managers put this theory into practice. Robert 
Harrison at Barber, Walker & Co., for instance, kept up the highest possible output and 
invested in improved facilities during poorer times, to take full advantage of the 
upswing of a highly cyclical industry.53 Roseby expressed his concerns to Charles, and 
the elder Winns undermined Edmund’s authority by accepting his subordinate’s point of 
view without consulting Edmund himself. Rowland wrote to his father that: 
Roseby says he had a talk to you about the colliery…and advised 
against cutting it at present at all events. I think he is right. I do not and 
never did at all take the view of it that Edmund did.54 
Rowland intervened in colliery affairs despite his stated determination to allow 
Edmund a free rein: ‘I had rather not interfere in the colliery account if I can help it’.55 
His interventions were not always more successful or well informed than Edmund’s 
policies. The contracts Rowland arranged with the London Gas Co. and the Great 
Northern Railway in 1867 failed to produce the sales that he predicted would ‘put the 
Colliery on its legs and keep them going as hard as they can’.56 In retrospect, he 
believed that this was because the individual gas works or railway depot managers had 
not been offered commission on coal supplied to their site.57 These incidents suggest a 
marked degree of managerial naivety in the colliery’s early years. The management !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 22 October 1867, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
51 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 31 July 1867, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). The force of 
Roseby’s argument was redoubled because cutting production also reduced Charles Winn’s royalty 
income.  
52 Wale, ‘Entrepreneurship in an Industry Subject to External Shocks’, p. 733. 
53 Griffin, ‘Robert Harrison and the Barber, Walker Co.’, p. 54. 
54 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 2 December 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
55 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 27 May 1866, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
56 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 29 June 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
57 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 30 October 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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structure was ill defined, resulting in the bickering between Roseby and Belton, 
probably because there was no internal precedent in the estate on which it could be 
based. Belton had to deal with a higher level of sales, and Roseby was an ‘incomer’ 
filling a role that had not previously been required. Furthermore, the Winns had a 
limited knowledge of the commercial customs of the coal markets and, in Edmund’s 
case, of the intersection between mining engineering and economics.  
The colliery’s financial performance reflected these managerial deficiencies and 
was exacerbated by a sharp fall in UK market prices in the first six months of 1868.58 
Edmund suggested that the colliery should be leased out, and Rowland observed that his 
brother ‘seems to have lost confidence and fears money being wasted…I think he is not 
well altogether and somewhat nervous’. Rowland was confident that good engineering 
and commercial management would bring the colliery into profit. He reported these 
discussions to Charles, making clear that the colliery was being run for Edmund’s 
benefit:  
I do not see any reason myself to doubt the Colliery being worked to 
profit…depending on the chance of accidents, and of not getting 
accounts paid as regularly as they ought to be. Edmund has talked a 
great deal about letting the Colliery…if he is not disposed to go on with 
working [it], certainly I should not be so…I have plenty of work 
without it.59 
Throughout 1867 and 1868, Rowland’s attitude to the colliery’s profitability reflected 
the priority of its existence as a job for Edmund, and he was sanguine about its losses: 
‘the Colliery is certainly not very satisfactory, but I do not yet despair of making it 
do’.60  
In mid-1868, two changes occurred that had considerable implications for the 
management of the colliery. Although Edmund’s salary as general manager was 
generous, it did not meet the expectations of a scion of a financially resurgent 
landowning family. Given the uncertainty both of the colliery’s prospects and of 
Edmund’s continuing interest in running it, an additional source of income for him was 
sought. It was found in a stronghold of landowner influence, the county Quarter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 53. The pithead price at Nostell fell from 6/5d in 
July to December in 1867 to 4/11d in January to June 1868. C/3/1/9/1, WYAS (W). 
59 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 30 October 1867, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
60 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 14 February 1868, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Sessions.61 In mid-1868 Edmund was appointed treasurer of the West Riding, backed by 
a bond guaranteed in part by Rowland.62 The post was essentially a sinecure, as the 
salary attached to it was intended in part to pay clerks who did the work.63 The balance 
of this salary, his colliery pay and some family money gave Edmund £1,200 a year, 
funding a lifestyle suitable to his status, so that he could leave the Priory and ‘be set up 
in a house for himself’.64 In contributing to this independence, the colliery had fulfilled 
its main function.  
It is unlikely that Edmund’s treasury duties were onerous, but they were a 
distraction from the colliery. He was relieved of responsibility for production strategy at 
Nostell in June 1868 when Roseby was formally appointed colliery viewer at a monthly 
salary of 8 guineas.65 Roseby’s appointment letter was the first clear job description for 
a Nostell Colliery official: 
You [must] devote at least one day (Tuesday) in each week at the 
colliery…you undertake to superintend the works above and below 
ground and are responsible for the correctness of the wages bill. Your 
duties will be entirely independent of the commercial part of the 
undertaking and I do not wish you to interfere with the sale of the coal 
in any way whatever…you must not be dependent on this house [i.e. 
Nostell Priory] for meals etc.’66 
These terms addressed several issues. The offer letter was sent by Edmund and 
established him as Roseby’s immediate superior. It gave Roseby sole responsibility for 
the technical, production-related aspects of the colliery, so that they were in the hands 
of a qualified mining engineer. Edmund was moved into general management in which 
he concentrated on ‘looking after, managing and keeping the accounts of the colliery’, 
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61 In 1861 John Stuart Mill described the Quarter Sessions as ‘the most aristocratic institution remaining 
in England’. Quoted in Burn, Age of Equipoise, p. 313.  
62 QD1/513. WR Quarter Sessions, records of the Clerk of the Peace, WYAS. Appointees had to post a 
bond as surety against financial malpractice. 
63 Edmund was given an allowance by the estate to fund the clerks. They were housed in a building 
owned by the Winn family, for which the West Riding paid rent. Rowland referred to Edmund receiving 
‘£500 a year from the net proceeds of his office’. 
64 Letter, Rowland to Charles Winn, 15 June 1868, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
65 This implied that until June 1868 Roseby had filled the colliery engineer role as a casual extension of 
his ironstone duties, without any addition to his pay. It is possible that Roseby’s aggrieved reaction to 
criticism of his activities at the colliery over the previous two years was prompted by resentment of this 
situation. 
66 Letter, Edmund Winn to John Roseby, 22 June 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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as Rowland rather vaguely described it a few years later.67 This role was commensurate 
with his standing as a family member, but limited his technical input. The potential for 
friction between Roseby and Belton was reduced by the former’s specific exclusion 
from sales and commercial matters, creating two functionally defined departments, each 
with its own manager. The appointment tried to remedy Roseby’s unreliability by 
specifying regular hours of attendance, and to deflate his social pretensions by 
instructing him to cease using the Priory’s hospitality. The latter requirement reduced 
the likelihood of contact with Charles Winn, who was normally resident at Nostell. 
Edmund’s authority was therefore less likely to be subverted and a more coherent and 
focused management structure emerged.  
The Colliery is ‘put on its legs’, 1869-1876 
 
Shortly after accepting the post of engineer in 1868, Roseby sent Edmund a report on 
the colliery’s technical shortcomings. These included the production of wet coal 
through failure to drain the workings adequately, an excessive proportion of broken coal 
resulting from poor coal-getting and haulage practice, high working and haulage costs, 
and inadequate screens. Roseby implied his desire to rebuild his relationship with 
Belton by discussing with him potential markets for the wet coal. He concluded by 
emphasising his commitment and softening the implied criticism of Edmund: ‘I can 
only sum up by saying that the thing is not to my satisfaction and will alter it’.68 Under 
Roseby’s guidance the colliery’s finances markedly improved. In the first six months of 
1869 output increased by 50 per cent, underground costs fell from 7/1d to 5/9d per ton 
and, despite a continuing low pithead price, losses fell to £200 compared to £1,200 in 
the previous half-year. In the full year, the Winns made a profit of £556 (including coal 
royalties) against a loss of £2,150 in 1868, and thenceforward the colliery maintained a 
surplus up to 1871. The 1872 Coal Mines Regulation Act required that a manager be 
registered with the Home Office and John Roseby was given this status. He combined 
the roles of viewer and manager, and supervised the underground foreman. The 
colliery’s output was only a little over 1,000 tons per week, so that a full-time surface 
manager plus a separate consultant viewer would have been excessive. Having lost the 
battle with Belton over his involvement in sales, Roseby expanded his engineering !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 5 April 1876, C3/1/6/[1872-1876 373], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
68 Letter, John Roseby to Edmund Winn, 5 July 1868, C/3/1/9/3, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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remit so that up to 1873 he personally prepared the colliery’s annual accounts and 
passed them to Charles Winn with a commentary on the year’s performance.69  
In the early 1870s boom, the colliery generated £27,000 in profits and coal rent. 
The management structure defined in 1868 – under which Edmund put into operation 
Roseby’s recommendations - worked satisfactorily in favourable conditions, and 
attention was concentrated on maximising profit. As Edmund put it, ‘the Colliery is 
doing well…if I can manage to get the quantity of coal brought to bank increased it will 
be doing very well’.70 The colliery was used as a cash cow, paying for the completion of 
the outstanding parts of the Priory and the refurbishment of its older section, plus a 
substantial pay rise for Edmund. Rowland instructed Edmund that: 
I want you to pay the royalty of 6d per ton to the Estate account 
quarterly or half-yearly as you prefer, and also as much of the nett 
profits as is possible, reserving only in the Colliery account as much as 
is required for carrying on the concern…I desire also that you should 
pay yourself at the rate of £1,000 a year.71 
Between 1866 and 1876 there was a distinct shift in the nature of the 
management of the colliery. It had been founded with the main purpose of employing 
Edmund. At its opening in 1866, the management was entirely based on existing Winn 
employees and traditional reporting lines, and little allowance had been made for the 
differences between the old and new collieries. The subsequent evolution of the form 
and reporting structure of the colliery management was influenced by the characteristics 
of the industry in which it operated rather than that of the landed estate. Rowland – who 
by the mid-1860s was an experienced and successful businessman – realised that 
management had to be modified to cope with the intense competition in the coal trade, 
and to reduce the average overhead. Technical expertise was strengthened, and a 
functionally oriented organisation introduced with clearer individual responsibilities. 
Demarcation lines between commercial and technical matters were established, and in 
the technical area at least there was a degree of professionalization. Rowland’s grasp of 
practicalities is indicated in his references in late 1867 to the inadvisability of cutting 
costs and production, and to the necessity of collecting accounts efficiently and 
avoiding accidents. A balance of family duty and commercial practicality was achieved !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 After Charles’ death, Roseby ceased to produce this commentary. 
70 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 15 August 1872, A/1/8/1, WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
71 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 5 April 1876, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 373], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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by the retention of Edmund as general manager – a vantage point from which he could 
learn more about the industry - while responsibility for production and technical affairs 
was settled on a professional engineer. This structure coped with the strong sales and 
high prices of the early and mid-1870s, but came under pressure in the downturn that 
followed. 
Decline and Roseby’s departure, 1877-1883 
 
After the extraordinary profits of the boom, the colliery’s financial performance 
declined in the latter part of the decade. The national coal price trend was strongly 
downwards, and between 1876 and 1880 the average pithead price at Nostell fell by a 
third. It then held steady at around the 1880 level until the middle of the decade. The 
average cost of production per ton at Nostell, however, remained practically constant - 
indeed increased by 10 per cent in 1877 - and the Winns’ early 1870s gains were eroded 
by losses totalling nearly £6,000 between 1877 and 1879 as the colliery struggled to 
compete.72 Between 1872 and 1882 the output of the Yorkshire coalfield grew by one 
third, while Nostell’s production and sales fell by nearly 30 per cent between 1876 and 
1878, and only regained their 1872 level in 1880.73 Despite this recovery, the 1880s 
began with a sequence of poor results, as can be seen in Table 8.1: 
 



















(loss) to the 
Winns 
1877 41,947 5/9d 2/10d 6/2d  (£2,943) (£2,089) 
1878 38,833 5/11d  2/1d 5/4d (£2,962) (£2,177) 
1879 49,343 5/8!d 2/0!d 4/10d (£2,654) (£1,566) 
1880 58,245 4/11d 1/8!d 4/8d (£2,995) (£1,683) 
1881 57,014 4/9!d 1/7!d 4/8!d (£2,096) (£849) 
1882 55,000 4/11d 1/8d  4/7!d (£2,877) (£1,739) 
1883 50,494 4/10d 1/3d 5/1d (£1,638) (£492) 
1884 47,796 5/5d 1/5d 5/0!d (£2,160) (£1,118) 
1885 37,714 5/11d 1/4d 4/9d (£3,673) (£2,939) 
Sources: All information from 2/3 and 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
Note: In 1885 output was restricted by the work to deepen the shafts. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 All Nostell statistics from 2/1, 2/3 and 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W). National pithead prices from 
Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 54. 
73 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 50. 
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Although deficits were mitigated by the rise in production and therefore royalty 
payments in 1880-1883, a further £5,000 was lost on the coal business. In April 1877 
Rowland wrote to a neighbouring landowner that ‘at present prices it is doubtful if we 
shall not have to close the Nostell Colliery until better times’.74 Two years later, 
Rowland expressed concern to Edmund that ‘the Colliery is paying nothing and the iron 
greatly reduced’, and that expenditure had to be reduced.75 As losses mounted in the 
early 1880s, the brothers debated the colliery’s future. 
Duckham observed that the amount of attention paid by a landowner to mining 
or other industrial activity on his estate was a direct function of the proportion of his 
income that it provided.76 This could vary over the passage of time as new industrial 
opportunities emerged or income fell from agriculture. At Nostell, for example, coal 
figured in the Winns’ correspondence during the cash crisis of the late 1850s when it 
offered the best solution to their problems, and in 1866-1868 when the colliery was 
getting started; and again in the good years of the mid 1870s. By the later 1870s, 
Rowland’s political duties as a Conservative whip in the House of Commons - chief 
whip from 1880 – required his frequent absence in London or involvement in party 
affairs.77 In 1879 he complained that since he had taken office he worked fourteen hours 
a day, four days a week, in the House of Commons.78 He had also inherited the full 
estate on Charles’ death in 1873. The colliery was a minor part of the property with no 
distinguishing features other than a tendency to losses, and Rowland was little involved 
in it. However, the ethos of the landed estate required that he continued to be the 
colliery’s principal decision-maker and Edmund occasionally encouraged his brother to 
become more familiar with the way in which it was run. For example in 1884 he 
suggested to Rowland that: ‘The next time you are down I wish you would come to the 
office and spend a few hours there and see how these accounts [of transactions between 
the colliery and the ironstone businesses] are kept’.79  
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74Letter, Rowland Winn to H. S. L. Wilson, 24 April 1877, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, WYAS 
(W).  
75 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 12 May 1879, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
76 Duckham, ‘The Emergence of the Professional Manager in the Scottish Coal Industry’, p. 24. 
77 E. J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party: Conservative Leadership and 
Organization after the Second Reform Bill (Oxford, 1968), p. 56. 
78 Henthorn, Letters and Papers concerning the Establishment of the Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby 
Railway, p. xiv, fn4. 
79 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 5 February 1884, A/1/10/[291] WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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Edmund was also busy in the late 1870s. In September 1878 Rowland asked him 
to act as his ‘man of business’ for the ironstone as well as the colliery. The workload of 
the West Riding Treasurer’s office had increased considerably and Edmund requested a 
salary increase in 1876, justifying it by the claim that since 1868 receipts in the 
Treasury had risen by 48 per cent and the number of cheques handled by 38 per cent.80 
Edmund’s letters from the late 1870s show that his knowledge of both management and 
mining technicalities had strengthened over the preceding ten years. Despite this, and 
despite his position at the colliery and the high salary attached to it, he did not take 
independent action on major issues and his attitude to the colliery’s affairs was 
noticeably detached. He had no financial interest in it beyond his salary, and was very 
unlikely to inherit the estate because Rowland had five direct male heirs. Edmund was 
content to refer to Rowland the matters that needed resolution and to remind his brother 
about them when, as was often the case, no decision was forthcoming.  
Managerial paralysis resulted. Changes in policy or structure could only take 
place if Rowland was made aware of a problem and was inclined to define a course of 
action. Although regular and detailed accounting information was produced, there were 
no internal triggers to discussion of the colliery’s financial or organisational health, such 
as directors’ meetings, annual reports to justify the organisation’s results, or agitation by 
shareholders concerned for their investment’s health. The colliery was subject to a 
highly personalised form of management. Discussion of its performance was informal 
and took place only with those whose family status qualified them to express an 
opinion, which was effectively only Edmund. This delayed the resolution of major 
issues – particularly related to personnel - as can be seen from the handling of Roseby’s 
eventual dismissal from full-time employment on the estate.81  
Roseby’s input to the colliery in the late 1870s was limited. In 1877 he was 
seriously ill, and when he was able to work the ironstone preoccupied him.82 Roseby 
had reverted to bypassing Edmund and communicating directly with Rowland, and 
while in the late 1860s Rowland had been tolerant of this behaviour, in 1878 he was not. 
Roseby sent a disingenuous reply to Rowland’s rebuke:  
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80 Leeds Mercury, 3 April 1877. His salary was increased to £1,100. 
81 For other personnel problems at the colliery, see pp. 184-185. 
82 Roseby wrote to Rowland in December 1877 that his London doctor ‘was disposed to think it is a 
cancer’. He was later operated on by Sir James Paget, Surgeon Extraordinary to the Queen. Letter, John 
Roseby to Rowland Winn, 3 December 1877, A/1/10[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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I will always be glad to confer with Mr E. J. Winn in all matters and 
have done so latterly as I know your time was much occupied…But I 
am anxious at all times that you should know what is moving.83 
When Edmund was asked to manage the ironstone as well as the colliery, he responded 
bluntly that the price was Roseby’s dismissal: 
I am afraid I can do little good…till the time comes when Roseby can 
be told he must attend to orders or go…If you want me to look after 
things at Frodingham, Roseby will have to go I’m sure, I cannot stand 
been [sic] made such a fool of in the way he has done. When I am there 
he professes to be going to carry out anything I may tell him, and 
nothing is done…he seems to have said what he did merely to mislead 
me, all the time intending to have his own way.84 
Rowland’s did not respond to Edmund’s complaints until May 1879. He was very 
conscious of the debt that the Winn family owed Roseby for the development of the 
ironstone:  
I have not the least doubt I suffer by keeping Roseby…but he has been 
so long there and having been invaluable in the opening out of the place 
[Lincolnshire] that I should not like to turn him off without adequate 
reason…I must tell Roseby that the Colliery is paying nothing and the 
iron greatly reduced because of the times, that you have for several 
years looked after the Colliery when it is now doing nothing and in 
consequence must take the ironstone instead or rather in 
addition…there is not room for both you and him, [and] in consequence 
of the falling off in receipts I must do all that is possible to economise 
expenditure.85 
Roseby was dismissed a full year after this letter. The actual reasons for his 
dismissal were incompetence and indiscipline, but Rowland justified it on the grounds 
of economy and the superior claim to employment enjoyed by Edmund as a family 
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83 Letter, John Roseby to Rowland Winn, 31 January 1878, A/1/10[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
84 Emphases in the original. Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 2 September 1878, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 
372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
85 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 12 May 1879, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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member. Roseby responded with a characteristic combination of passive aggression and 
appeal to Rowland’s loyalty, making clear his disdain for Edmund: 
I can hardly think it is your intention to turn me adrift after over twenty 
years of service [and] the successful development of your estates in 
Lincolnshire…you can scarcely expect me to meet your brother to 
settle so important a matter as the termination of my engagements…I 
must therefore respectfully ask that you will see me and that we may 
settle our business without the interference of Mr Winn or anyone 
else.86 
Although dismissed from full-time employment, Roseby was granted an excellent 
pension and, until his death in early 1882, remained as viewer and registered colliery 
manager at Nostell, an unexpected conclusion to his career given his mutual antipathy 
with Edmund.  It can be explained, however, by the personalised decision-making of the 
owner of a landed estate.  Rowland’s loyalty to an employee who had played a large 
part in the restoration of the family’s financial health – and, therefore, its social position 
- outweighed more workaday considerations.87  
Re-invest or close? 1883-1886 
 
Roseby’s death necessitated the appointments of a registered manager and a viewer at 
the colliery, the roles that he had combined. Rowland promoted William Hay, the 
underground foreman at Nostell, to registered manager despite a lukewarm endorsement 
by Edmund: 
It will be necessary to…let the Government Inspector know who is the 
certificated manager in charge…Hay has a certificate I believe…I don’t 
think [he] always sticks to the truth and I doubt if he is sufficiently 
strict with the men. On the other hand, I believe he is a sober man, 
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86 Letter, John Roseby to Rowland Winn, 2 and 5 June 1880, A/1/10[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
Edmund’s only comment on Roseby’s death was that a replacement registered manager was needed. 
Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 January 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
87 To Edmund’s exasperation, Rowland paid a pension to Roseby’s widow until at least 1887. Letter, 
Edmund to Rowland Winn, 30 December 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
!! 180!
seldom away from the colliery and I don’t think the underground costs 
excessive.88 
Hay was a certificated mine manager under the 1872 Coal Mines Act, and from 1884 a 
member of the Chesterfield and Derbyshire Institute of Engineers.89 When William 
Spencer was appointed as viewer in succession to Roseby, the two leading engineering 
managers at the colliery were fully qualified men. Spencer was a Leicester-based 
mining engineer who, like many viewers, was also an investor in colliery companies.90 
He represented the mainstream of contemporary coal mining expertise, as he had been 
trained in Durham collieries and was a founder member of the North of England 
Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers. His main responsibility on the Winns’ 
estates was the Nostell coal, as by the early 1880s the ironstone required little more than 
oversight of the leases and wayleave agreements.91 His contract required him to visit the 
colliery at least once a month to inspect the underground works.  
 A change in the sales function at Nostell was precipitated by the advancing years 
of Thomas Belton, the last of the joint colliery/estate managers. In spring 1879 the 
Winn brothers discussed contingencies for when Belton ‘broke down’, as Rowland 
charmlessly expressed it.92 Later that year two full-time salesmen were appointed, on 
salary and commission terms.93 As described in Chapter 7, during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century the direct appointment of salesmen by coal companies supplanted in 
some measure the use of agents and factors, and brought the sales process under the 
coalowner’s control.94 Nostell responded promptly to this trend. After Belton’s 
retirement in 1882, sales were professionalised as a distinct function within the colliery 
management structure, entirely separate from estate administration. The personnel 
changes in manager, viewer and salesmen brought Nostell closer to the nineteenth 
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88 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 and 19 January 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
89 Nottinghamshire Guardian, 4 July 1884. This institution later became a part of the Midland Institute of 
Mining Engineers. 
90 Rowland preferred to appoint a viewer from outside the local area who was a qualified mining engineer 
(that is, higher up the professional scale than a certificated manager) to prevent any professional or 
personal jealousy arising between the viewer and the resident manager. Letter, George Winn to William 
Spencer, 19 October 1910, C3/6/4/[1857], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
91 Despite this, most of Spencer’s salary (£160 p.a.) and expenses were paid from Lincolnshire. This was 
probably a hangover from Roseby’s days. William Hay’s starting salary was £200 p.a. (cf Edmund’s 
salary of at least £1,000), increased from £150 on his promotion from under-manager. Letters, Edmund to 
Rowland Winn, 5 February 1883, and 5 February 1884, both A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
92 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 12 May 1879, C3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
93 4/1, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
94 See Chapter 7, pp. 152-153. 
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century norm in terms of the functional division of responsibilities and the 
qualifications of the post-holders. 
In 1881 Edmund initiated some minor cost reductions such as the centralisation 
of bookkeeping in the main Estate office, while pointedly reminding his brother to 
transfer money into the colliery account to make up the £2,000 loss.95 Soon afterwards, 
Edmund began to raise with Rowland the issue of the colliery’s future. In a personally 
managed enterprise, the debate on this important issue was the preserve of the owning 
family, and the final decision was the estate owner’s. Citing the importance of 
maintaining maximum possible production, Edmund argued that the moderate quality 
and limited production potential of the Shafton seam made Nostell uneconomic except 
in times of high prices, and that profitability could be achieved only by increasing the 
family’s investment and the colliery’s impact on the estate:  
Until prices rise very considerably, I do not think it will be possible to 
make it pay anything without a much larger output of coal that would 
mean more men and therefore more houses…If you finally decide to 
give up all idea of the lower beds [being reached], then I think there is 
little use in carrying on the colliery.96  
This suggests that the detached attitude he had taken over the previous few years was 
influenced by the conviction that without a change in strategy, the colliery was a dead 
letter.  
Edmund presented the colliery’s future in the context of the profits accruing to 
the estate, without mention of his own interests. Convinced that profitability could only 
be achieved by investment to increase output, Edmund outlined the three choices that 
faced Rowland – to deepen the colliery’s shafts to the lower coal at his own expense 
and to continue to operate the mine; to lease the lower seams to another party who 
would finance the deepening; or to close the pit. Edmund argued that leasing out the 
deep seams was unattractive because their quality had not been proved, so that lease 
payments and covenants would be heavily discounted against the elevated level of risk 
borne by the entrepreneur. As a result, any terms acceptable to a lessee would be 
unpalatable to Rowland, whether the entrepreneur purchased and deepened the existing 
shafts or made a wholly new sinking: ‘I cannot see why anyone should wish to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 January and 11 February 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
96 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 19 January 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W).  
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undertake the risk and cost of a deep sinking in an untried field, except on [lease] terms 
you would never accept’.97 Rowland, with capital already sunk in the shafts, could 
deepen the workings and improve the surface facilities for a relatively modest 
investment. All being well, this would produce a higher output of good quality coal that 
would secure better returns for the colliery and for the Winns. If Rowland was not 
prepared to increase his investment in the colliery Edmund believed that it should be 
closed: ‘If you make up your mind never to sink deeper or build more houses, I would 
not carry on the present colliery any more’.98 
Edmund’s clear statement of the options and suggestion that a way forward 
should be decided upon before a new viewer was appointed did not hasten Rowland’s 
decision on the future of his property, in the absence of any external trigger to force the 
issue except the extent to which he was prepared to bear the colliery’s losses.99 In 
summer 1883 the subject had still not been properly aired, Rowland writing that ‘the 
question of sinking to the Stanley Main must stand over till I see you, and we can talk it 
over. My own inclination is in favor [sic] of closing the Colliery’.100 However, by 
December 1883 Rowland had decided to deepen the shafts, and sinking to the lower 
seams began in May 1884. This was nearly two and a half years after Edmund had first 
suggested that the colliery was financially untenable in the current market. The 
historical record is weakened by the informal and personal nature of decision-making 
on a landed estate, as there is no evidence for the rationale for Rowland’s change of 
mind. Despite some cautious optimism on Edward’s part about an upturn in the market, 
Rowland was still not entirely convinced of the colliery’s viability and in May 1885 he 
welcomed a possible miners’ strike as it would reduce his losses pending the outcome 
of the deepening:101 
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97 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 February 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). The field 
was ‘untried’ because the seams in Nostell Colliery’s ‘take’ were separated from the wider coalfield by 
faults, preventing any other sinking from having access to them.  
98 Emphasis in the original. Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 February 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
99 ‘You ought to decide this before a mineral viewer [is appointed], it will make so great a difference in 
his engagement’. Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 February 1882, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS 
(W). 
100 Letter, Rowland to Edmund Winn, 24 May 1883, C/3/1/6/[372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). At this point 
Rowland appears to have been set on closure, having written to a colliery agent six months earlier that ‘I 
have no desire now to extend my colliery operations, indeed quite the reverse.’ Letter, Rowland Winn to 
Benjamin Sellars, 16 November 1882, C/3/1/6/[372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
101 ‘I think the Colliery will have done rather better in November and December than it has for a long 
time past – the average selling price is somewhat higher’. Letter, William Spencer to Edmund Winn and 
Edmund to Rowland Winn, 17 and 19 December 1883, both A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
!! 183!
I do not in the least mind [if there is a strike], as the Colliery is paying 
nothing it is no object to me to keep it going and I should close it till we 
have proved the Barnsley bed and then go on or not as that turned 
out.102   
By February 1886 the upcast shaft had been deepened to the lower seams, whose quality 
and thickness was found satisfactory. Small amounts of coal from the new seams began 
to be raised, while the main production continued from the Shafton seam.103 In 
September 1886 work began on the downcast shaft and by early 1888 all shaft 
deepening was finished although the rearrangement and renewal of the surface plant 
continued.  
Managing the redeveloped colliery from 1887 
 
The deepened colliery came into full operation between mid 1888 and the early 
1890s. Annual production was 30,000 tons in 1887, rose to 110,000 two years later, and 
150,000 tons in 1891.104 This quintupling of output materially reduced the average 
working cost and overhead per ton raised, and, in a rising market, from 1889 the 
colliery was profitable.105 















(loss) to the 
Winns 
1886 6/10d 1/11d 5/3!d  (£4,186) (£3,565) 
1887 6/0!d  2/8d 6/7d (£4,065) (£3,495) 
1888 4/9d 1/7d 5/8d (£3,457) (£1,693) 
1889 5/1d 1/2d 6/- £449 £2,928 
1890 5/3d 1/3d 7/6d £2,700 £5,483 
1891 5/10d 1/2!d  7/10d £5,547 £9,174 
1892 5/10!d 1/2d 7/10d £7,788 £11,640 
1893 5/9d 1/2d 7/2d £1,441 £3,865 
Sources: All information from 2/3, 2/4, and 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
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102 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 21 March 1885, C/3/1/6[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
103 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 March 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
104 Mining of the Shafton seam ceased when the deep seams came into production. Colliery Guardian, 28 
December 1894, p. 1161. 
105 Mitchell suggests that by 1890-1891, the average price of Yorkshire coal was at around 175 per cent 
of its 1886 level. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 278. 
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The cost of the redevelopment was around £25,000 and Rowland received a swift return 
on his investment, netting over £20,000 in 1891 and 1892 alone. The colliery employees 
also benefited as between July 1889 and August 1890 they secured pay rises amounting 
to 30 per cent.106 The financial return in 1893 was reduced by a lengthy strike.  
The Winns showed a keen interest in the shaft deepening and the market launch 
of the new types of coal but the daily management of the colliery continued to be 
problematic and policy questions were decided only after much delay. For example, an 
extended correspondence between Rowland, Edmund and William Spencer failed to 
produce a decision on whether to enforce a 10 per cent wage cut on the colliery’s 
employees. Differences of opinion occurred on policy matters, as when Spencer urged 
Rowland to join the coalowners’ association but was rebuffed.107 Practical matters also 
suffered, for example confusion over the date for starting the deepening of the downcast 
shaft, when Edmund wrote to Rowland with some exasperation that ‘possibly 
something may have passed between you and him [Spencer] whilst I was in Scotland 
shooting’.108  
The inadequacy of some aspects of the colliery’s management structure was 
highlighted by the animosity that existed between two senior technical staff, the 
registered manager William Hay and Hewitt the mechanical engineer. Edmund wrote to 
Rowland in June 1886 that: 
 There has been a grand blow up between Hewitt and Hay today, 
Spencer says Hewitt has abused Hay in a most unjustifiable way, before 
the men, that he took an opportunity when there were several men 
collected. Spencer says that things cannot go on as they are…I see 
nothing for it but Hewitt or Hay’s leaving altogether...tell me your 
wishes.109 
Edmund would not dismiss or redeploy one of the pair, presumably because they were 
both senior management figures and Edmund saw this as a decision proper to the owner. 
He repeatedly canvassed Rowland’s instructions, whose responses were as evasive as 
when discussing the colliery’s future in 1882 and 1883. The feud flourished, and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W). 
107 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 11 March, 20 March, and 25 June 1885, and Rowland Winn to 
William Spencer 21 March 1885, A/1/10/[870], A1/10/[291] and C3/1/6/[1876-1889 372], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
108 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 13 July and 1 September 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS 
(W). 
109 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 3 June 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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situation became intolerable when the Yorkshire Mines Inspector, Frank Wardell, was 
angered by Hewitt’s refusal to acknowledge his failure to carry out the statutory daily 
shaft inspection. Writing to Rowland, Edmund patronised Wardell and believed that a 
little noblesse oblige could have resolved the problem, but was aware of Wardell’s 
ability to disrupt the colliery’s operations: 
[Wardell] is not a bad sort of man, but thinks himself of some 
importance...if you had asked him up to luncheon it would have 
covered a multitude of sins…I think it is not the thing to try to oppose a 
Government Inspector or be impertinent…he has plenty of ways in 
which he can make his authority most awkward.110  
Edmund attempted to pass the problem to Spencer: ‘Spencer calls himself 
“consulting engineer”. We consider he has the management of the colliery and if he is 
to do so, I think the only way will be to let him rearrange the staff and appoint the men 
he likes’.111 This approach foundered on the evolving role of the colliery viewer. In the 
first half of the nineteenth century, the viewer was an all-rounder who directed all 
aspects of a relatively small and simple operation during his occasional visits to the 
colliery. Roseby had seen his responsibilities at Nostell in this light, and the Winns 
retained this concept of the viewer’s duties. However, the role had evolved during the 
middle and later years of the nineteenth century. As collieries became larger, more 
capital-intensive and technically complex, on-the-spot management was necessary. 
Furthermore, mining legislation placed the responsibility for safety and technical 
expertise on staff at the colliery itself. Many larger collieries appointed a resident, full-
time general manager in overall charge – in essence, the role that Edmund could have 
played - supported by a colliery manager specifically responsible for technical and 
safety matters. The viewer became a consultant who provided periodic advice on 
engineering and commercial strategy, and took little part in man management.112 
Spencer’s view of his responsibilities aligned with this later model and he avoided 
being drawn into appointing and line-managing Nostell’s employees, which was 
anyway largely precluded by his contractual commitment to spend only a day or two per 
month at Nostell.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 7 February 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). Hewitt 
refused to meet Wardell to discuss the shaft inspections, and Wardell threatened Hewitt with a writ unless 
he did so. 
111 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 2 November 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
112 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, pp. 410-412. 
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Even the workforce contributed to the debate over running the colliery. Rowland 
received a number of anonymous letters complaining about the existing management, 
especially with regard to agreeing a getting price for the new coal. Edmund’s response 
was brisk: ‘I think we need not take much notice of anonymous letters. You may be 
quite sure if any of the men thought they could better themselves by going to another 
colliery they would very soon leave’. He assured Rowland that until the price was fixed, 
‘you are sure to hear the manager, whoever he may be, accused of every crime’.113 A 
managerial vacuum had been created because the Winns failed to recognise that the 
complexity of the redeveloped colliery’s operations required committed management 
effort. The lack of a consistent decision-making managerial presence continued to delay 
strategic outcomes and the resolution of day-to-day problems. 
Edmund suggested to Rowland that the colliery’s management should be 
reformed: ‘I think in general working arrangements at the colliery [require] some 
overhauling and change is wanted, things have got into a slack…I think there ought to 
be one head man on the spot’.114 Neither Rowland nor Edmund wished to fill this role. 
Edmund continued to refer major decisions to Rowland, who was in his mid sixties, had 
retired from full-time involvement in politics after his creation as Lord St Oswald in 
1885, and showed little enthusiasm for taking a managerial lead in his business 
interests. Each brother intervened in the management of the colliery during times of 
change or for specific events but they were not a daily presence.  
Rowland and Edmund’s thoughts turned to a family candidate for the post of 
general manager at the colliery. This was a more complex decision for the Winns than it 
might have been for a middle-class industrialist or merchant. The latter’s focus was on a 
single business without the ramifications of social status, landownership and hereditary 
titles, and they lacked the ‘well-formulated strategy’ of primogeniture and the strict 
settlement to deal with inheritance and succession.115 Rowland had five sons, and 
primogeniture dictated that the eldest would inherit the estates and the peerage, joint 
symbols of the family’s success. The other four sons had the range of career 
opportunities that the Winns’ affluence and status afforded them, in which they would 
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113 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 16 November 1886, A1/10/[291], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
114 Emphasis in original. Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 29 January 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). 
115 Daunton, “Gentlemanly Capitalism’ and British Industry’, p. 146. 
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be supported by a contribution from the family property.116 A newspaper commented 
that the sons’ ‘tastes…incline more to commerce than politics’, so it seemed probable 
that a candidate willing to commit full-time to the colliery could be found.117 
Reluctance to becoming the employee of a sibling might be the main objection to taking 
on the job, an issue of which Edmund had experience and tried to overcome by 
suggesting that the nominee was given a share of the colliery business.118 
Rowland’s fourth son, George, was the preferred candidate. He had an interest in 
and aptitude for engineering and in particular the applications of electricity, which in 
the 1880s was beginning to be used as a power source in mining.119 In summer 1887 he 
oversaw the installation of electric light at Nostell Priory, the power being generated at 
the colliery and brought up to the house by cable. Trade journal reports credited George 
with the design of a number of novel features of the installation.120 Such technical 
expertise in a man of his social background had contemporary precedent, as Charles 
Parsons, a son of the Earl of Rosse, had a few years earlier invented the steam turbine. 
In his critique of Wiener’s thesis of an anti-industrial bias among the landowning class, 
F. M. L. Thompson cites Parsons as an example of aristocratic technocracy. However, 
while Thompson quotes a number of later nineteenth century landowners who were 
happy to invest in industry, and to take an active and informed interest in those 
investments, he does not offer any other examples of technically skilled members of the 
class, a probable indication of their low incidence.121 As a landowning family, the 
Winns were unusual in possessing a member with such expertise.  
In July 1887 Edmund reported George’s willingness to assume the general 
management of the colliery for a trial period. He took over when still only twenty-four, 
and quickly became involved in all aspects of the business. He was willing and 
empowered to make decisions on personnel and technical policy, and was soon !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Edmund also had a son. He managed a cattle-ranching venture in the USA in which Rowland was a 
major investor. He was therefore employed by the family, but not directly by or on the estates. 
117 Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, 21 January 1893; letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 29 January 
1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
118 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 July 1887, C/3/1/9/[287], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
119 Electric lighting began commercial development in the 1880s, and the use of electricity for tramways, 
railways and factories accelerated in the following decade. I. C. R. Byatt, The British Electrical Industry, 
1875-1914: The Economic Returns of a New Technology (Oxford, 1979), pp. 1-2. 
120 The dynamo and cabling for the project were purchased from the Colonial and Imperial Exhibition 
held in South Kensington in 1886, after its closure in November of that year. The lighting at Nostell was 
installed only five years after the first major installation of incandescent lamps in England, at the Law 
Courts in London, at a time when domestic electric light was only available to those who could afford 
their own electricity supply. The Telegraphic Journal and Electrical Review, 27 December 1889, pp. 713-
714; Byatt, The British Electrical Industry, 1875-1914, pp. 15-16. 
121 Thompson, Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, pp. 37-43. 
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occupied in the task of ‘deciding how to divide up Hay’s and Hewitt’s jobs’, a task that 
had been unresolved for the previous two years.122 Another early action was to view 
several types of mechanical coal-cutter in action, in company with Spencer.123 George 
developed a good working relationship with Spencer, and Edmund acted as a mentor 
and sounding board. Edmund was glad to be relieved of the burden, but cannily credited 
the responsibility for the decision to Rowland, remarking to him that ‘I have little doubt 
making Willie [George] manager will prove the best arrangement you could have hit 
upon for the colliery’.124 Table 8.3 provides evidence that Edmund’s view was correct. 
 

















1894 173,581 5/5!d  1/3d 7/4d £5,242 £9,233 
1895 194,500 5/3!d  1/3d 6/3d (£1,364) £3,114 
1896 212,865 5/4!d 1/2!d 5/11d (£4,353) £552 
1897 210,339 5/2!d 1/3d 6/2!d  £215 £5,061 
1898 197,758 5/5d 1/5d 6/4d (£2,894) £1,617 
1899 178,630 6/3d 1/6d 7/2!d  (£1,560) £2,458 
1900 81,386 7/-  1/9d 10/7d £9,159 £10,931 
1901 153,512 7/5d 1/2!d 9/8d £11,024 £14,426 
1902 174,717 7/1!d 10!d 8/4d £3,416 £7,346 
1903 175,417 6/9d  10!d 8/- £2,038 £6,005 
1904 188,811 6/7!d 10!d 7/8d £988 £5,292 
1905 193,766 6/4!d  11d 7/5d £2,022 £6,474 
1906 217,901 6/2d 1/0!d 7/4d £4,584 £9,684 
1907 215,482 6/5!d 1/3!d 8/7d £9,644 £14,686 
1908 199,326 7/1d 1/3d 9/4!d £9,648 £14,299 
1909 189,974 7/1d 1/3d 8/6!d  £4,115 £8,530 
1910 195,086 6/9!d 1/1d 8/4d £6,862 £11,422 
1911 205,698 6/9d 1/0!d 8/7!d  £8,830 £13,965 
1912 184,765 6/9d 1/- 9/11!d  £17,282 £21,624 
1913 195,869 7/8d 1/2!d 10/8!d  £16,186 £20,789 
Average p.a. 186,969    £5,054 £9,362 
Note: Output in 1900 was affected by a strike lasting from 19 April to 1 October.  
Source: All information from 2/4, 2/6, 2/7 and 5/8, WYL523, WYAS (W).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 6 July 1888, A/1/10/[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W). After George 
became general manager, no further problems were reported between Hay and Hewitt.  
123 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 6 July 1888, A/1/10/[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
124 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 8 August 1888, A/1/10/[289], WYL1352,  WYAS (W). 
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Although the high profits of the early 1890s faltered later in the decade as pithead prices 
fell, George Winn’s management of the colliery was successful. Its working costs and 
general overheads maintained levels that enabled the net benefit to the Winns - buoyed 
by the royalties generated by the increase in production - to remain in the black, 
although only barely in 1897 and 1904. Costs were kept under control in the upswings, 
so that the nine years before the First World War were the most successful in the 
colliery’s history to date, during which the net benefit to the Winns averaged £13,500 
p.a. 
‘Electric light is the thing for the colliery’: George Winn and technical 
innovation125 
 
Edmund’s enthusiastic endorsement of the use of electricity in mining was soon realised 
by George Winn. In March 1888 DC-powered lights were installed at the colliery, first 
in the surface yard and later extended to the pit bottom. The event was sufficiently 
novel for a Sheffield newspaper to report in some detail, George Winn receiving the 
credit: 
A dynamo has been introduced at Nostell Colliery to light three large 
arc lamps in the yard, each of three thousand candles’ power. They 
were tried on Friday last for the first time, and with success…the pit 
bottom is to be illumined in the same way. One of Lord St Oswald’s 
sons takes a personal share in this lighting business, being a skilled 
electrician.126 
Improvements in cable technology in the 1880s and 1890s reinforced the advantages of 
electricity as a source of power underground, and particularly for supplying mobile 
machinery. Both its main rivals – compressed air and steam – were expensive and 
cumbersome to deliver below ground. By 1890, electricity was supplied underground at 
Nostell to power haulage and other machinery.127 This early use of electricity placed 
Nostell Colliery in the technical vanguard of the coal industry  - even by 1907, less than 
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125 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 16 October 1887, C3/1/9/[846], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
126 Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, 19 March 1888, p. 5. 
127 The Morning Post, 2 June 1890, included an advertisement for the public flotation for the General 
Electric Power and Traction Co Ltd. The company’s list of its installations included ‘hauling plant at 
Lord St Oswald’s Nostel [sic] Colliery’.  
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5 per cent of the power supplied to British collieries took the form of electricity and 
twenty years earlier, when Nostell’s lights were installed, it was still rarer.128 
 George’s influence also ensured that Nostell was well to the fore in the 
use of mechanical coal-cutters. Machine cutting was intended to reduce labour costs, 
and much of the early experimentation with mechanical cutting took place in thin-seam 
coalfields, including west Yorkshire. The general manager of Pope & Pearson Ltd, 
which owned collieries near Nostell and also was an early user of mechanical cutters, 
remarked that ‘without higher productivity in thin seams we cannot compete with the 
thick seams of south Yorkshire’.129 The redevelopment at Nostell had given the colliery 
a long-term future, if capital and working costs could be controlled. Minimising labour 
numbers would reduce the investment in housing necessary because of the colliery’s 
rural location, and de-skilling would cut running costs. Edmund’s letters to his brother 
made these aspirations clear:  
If…Willie finds the coal cutter will do, you can well afford to dispense 
with some of the men you have and employ a different class…Colliers 
are an awful nuisance. If coal-cutting machines can be made practical 
and a commercial success it will be an immense boon to any colliery 
where the seams are thin.130 
The first electrically powered cutter was developed by officials at the Allerton 
Colliery near Leeds, owned by the Bower family, which George and Spencer visited in 
early 1888 as part of their survey of mechanical cutters.131 George arranged to borrow a 
machine for trial.132 The Bower machine proved unreliable, although it is unclear if this 
was the fault of the machine, its handling or the environment in which it was used. 
Edmund was confident of eventual success: ‘Willie tells me they broke the cutter after 
they had bored only a few yards. There are sure to be these mishaps before the thing is 
got into proper working order’.133 At the end of trials lasting two years, William 
Spencer was forced to echo Edmund’s blend of short-term disappointment but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 Byatt, The British Electrical Industry, 1875-1914, p. 74.  
129 Church, History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 3, p. 354. 
130 Letters, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 10 October 1888 and 25 March 1891, both A/1/10/[289], 
WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
131 ‘It is two years since myself and young Mr. Winn (son of Lord St Oswald) went over to see these 
machines at Allerton’ (comment made by William Spencer at a meeting of the Midland Institute of 
Mining, Civil and Mechanical Engineers, 22 January 1890). Transactions of the Institute of Mining 
Engineers vol. 1 (1890), p. 139; Buxton, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 111. 
132 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 6 July 1888, A/1/10/[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
133 Letter, Edmund to Rowland Winn, 9 November 1888, A/1/10/[289], WYL1352, WYAS (W). 
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confidence in eventual success: ‘I cannot say that so far we have done much, but we 
believe we are on the way to success. I mention this to show the great difficulties in the 
way’.134  
Despite this setback, mechanisation remained central to the Winns’ plans for the 
colliery. They resumed their involvement with coal-cutters in 1892, as investors as well 
as users. The development of the Bower cutter passed to a London-based group of 
entrepreneurial engineers, who in June 1892 founded the Electrical Coal-cutting 
Contract Corporation (ECCC), of which George Winn was a founding shareholder.135 
The company manufactured and rented out cutters, each hire including a supervisor to 
oversee the cutting operation and maintain the equipment, an early exercise in out-
sourcing. The coalowner supplied the labour and haulage that, directed by the ECCC 
supervisor, brought the coal down and took it out of the pit. The hirer could therefore 
obtain the full benefit from mechanical cutting without spending time to develop 
internal expertise, as the ECCC supervisor was responsible for ensuring that the work 
was properly planned and there were the minimum of interruptions to production. The 
service was considered too expensive by many coalowners, who, having experienced its 
benefits, bought and operated their own machines. Without proper supervision, they 
often could not replicate the results achieved under the ECCC hire.136 The ECCC 
quickly failed and was liquidated in 1898.  
Nostell was one of ECCC’s earliest customers, with a contract running from 
1892 to 1896.137 After the ECCC contract terminated, the Winns bought four machines 
and continued to use them on a regular basis.138 Greasley suggested that ‘the key 
elements in the process of technical change’ for mechanical cutters were ‘pervasive 
modification to innovations during diffusion, arising from local and collective 
experience’. George Winn contributed to the grass roots nature of the development of 
coal-cutting technology both financially in his backing of the ECCC and at the practical 
level with a cutting head that he patented in 1902.139 Nostell’s experience with 
mechanical cutters was typical of many collieries, in that a long period was spent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Transactions of the Institute of Mining Engineers vol. 1 (1890), p. 139 
135 Memorandum and Articles of Association, Electrical Coal-cutting Contract Corporation Ltd., National 
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understanding the best means of applying the new technology. Mechanical coal-cutters 
were eventually used at Nostell with success, but not all George’s technical experiments 
turned out well – in 1907 to 1909 he made a lengthy and ultimately failed attempt to 
generate electricity economically by use of an engine driven by producer gas, and he 
also collaborated with a local inventor on an improved form of household battery.140 It 
is worth noting that the Winns’ enthusiasm for mechanisation was not restricted to the 
colliery – in 1885 they introduced the first grab cranes in the Lincolnshire iron field, to 
remove the overburden before extraction of the ore.141 
The evolution of management at Nostell Colliery 
 
Church defined the typical management structure of medium to large collieries in the 
later nineteenth century as consisting of the owner or his direct representative, a 
consultant viewer and a salaried resident colliery manager.  Beneath this tripartite top 
layer, functionally-divided technical departments reported to the certificated manager, 
while the commercial/sales function often reported direct to the owner or his 
representative.142 The viewer and the owner’s representative formulated the colliery’s 
strategy, particularly on production but also labour relations and marketing, while the 
viewer guided the colliery manager on technical matters. Boyns and Wale modified 
Church’s tripartite concept for collieries owned by limited companies by substituting 
the company board for the owner’s representative and the organisation’s managing 
director for the viewer, examples of which were Barber, Walker & Co. under Robert 
Harrison and the Staveley Coal & Iron Co. Ltd under Charles Markham.143 After the 
appointments of Hay, Spencer and George Winn, Nostell Colliery conformed to the 
pattern described by Church. Hay and Spencer were qualified for their roles through 
apprenticeship and examination. William Hay carried out Spencer’s instructions 
underground, and issues such as the preferred type of coal-cutter and the timing of price 
and wage changes were worked out between Spencer and George Winn. The technical 
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production function was separate from the commercial/sales department, which reported 
to George as general manager.  
From the outset, George Winn brought together the roles of manager and 
strategic decision–maker. He dominated the daily operation of the colliery, 
corresponding directly with customers, suppliers and government authorities. He rarely 
referred decisions to his father or, after Rowland’s death in 1893, to the second Lord St 
Oswald, who showed limited interest in the colliery. George’s correspondence makes 
clear that policy decisions in all spheres of operation were his responsibility, informed 
by discussions with Spencer or the relevant manager. He was willing to overturn 
longstanding policies, as in 1890 when he decided to join the West Yorkshire 
Coalowners’ Association despite Rowland’s initial rejection of their invitation.  
In 1910, when a new viewer was appointed following William Spencer’s 
retirement, Spencer’s son wrote to the appointee to describe the Winns’ concept of the 
viewer’s duties: 
…visiting the colliery one day each month, making an inspection of a 
portion of the underground workings, advising the Manager generally 
on the working of the mine, seeing the plans, and making suggestions, 
if of sufficient importance, to Mr Winn as General Manager…My 
father and I always finish our letters with ‘Yours obediently’, Mr Winn 
being the son of a noble lord and brother of the present one; it may 
seem rather old fashioned…Your business relations will be entirely 
with Mr Winn, Lord St Oswald only coming to the colliery for a few 
minutes very occasionally, just to show us that he is alive.144 
These social niceties recognised that the colliery was the estate owner’s personal 
property and Spencer accurately characterised the ownership arrangement as old-
fashioned. However, between 1866 and the late 1880s the colliery’s management had 
radically changed. At its opening, it was largely run by part-time managers whose main 
qualification for their positions was that they were known quantities to the estate owner 
and, with qualifications so far as Roseby was concerned, trusted by him. There was no 
clear separation between the management of the colliery and that of the estate on which 
it was located. Individual responsibilities were ill defined and sometimes contradictory. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Letters, Edward Spencer to G. H. Ashwin, 29 October and 1 November 1910, C/3/3/3/10, WYL1352, 
WYAS (W). Ashwin was appointed on William Spencer’s recommendation.  
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The colliery’s prime raison d’être of providing Edmund with an income was bound up 
with the ethos of a landed property. Rowland’s attitude in the first twenty years of the 
colliery’s existence was that of a traditional landowner and he retained the right to make 
managerial decisions related to any aspect of his property. Edmund’s role as general 
manager was shared with other responsibilities both within and outside the Winn 
property. He was not fully occupied by the colliery, and he saw his role as being the 
estate owner’s representative, bringing major issues to Rowland’s attention for a 
decision.  
By the late 1880s the colliery was still run by a family member, but he was 
committed full-time and had executive capability. His influence extended throughout 
the organisation, and his knowledge and personal characteristics shaped its 
development. Operational decisions were taken within the colliery organisation and its 
management was wholly separate from that of the estate. The experience and 
qualifications of the professional managers at the colliery reflected those of the coal 
industry as a whole. The organisational structure that of a typical personally owned and 
managed family business, and consisted of a shallow managerial layer, split 
functionally, with all major decisions reserved to the family member at its head. There 
was no board of directors or other designated governing body. Some elements typical of 
the landed estate remained. Rowland had begun to take a less prominent role in 
decision-making and the 2nd Lord St Oswald was still more remote, but Nostell Colliery 
remained their personal property. It was run by a younger son, and the profits accrued 
directly to the estate owner. The Winns had successfully grafted a modern and 









‘A remarkable talent for survival’ 
 
Writing on the social history of Britain between 1860 and 1914, Thane remarks that, 
despite the high level of industrialisation, the landed interest ‘showed a remarkable 
talent for survival’ and that although industrialisation and agricultural decline were in 
some respects a threat, they ‘also offered the shrewder [landowner] new opportunities 
for making money and wielding influence’. In taking these opportunities, the 
landowners’ efforts did not accrue purely to their own interest, as they often made 
substantial contributions to the infrastructure of nineteenth century Britain. Thane offers 
the example of the Marquess of Bute’s financing of Cardiff docks, a venture barely 
profitable to its owner but which opened up the South Wales coalfield.1 By both these 
criteria, Rowland Winn was a shrewd operator. His entrepreneurialism enriched his 
family so that in barely twenty-five years from 1860, the Winns rose from debt-ridden 
gentry to secure affluence. Rowland became an established industrialist and successful 
politician, with a seat in the House of Lords. His efforts also benefited the regional 
economies of the West Riding and Lincolnshire by building railways, helping to open 
up a new coalfield, and founding the Scunthorpe iron industry.  
Rowland’s success was built on his willingness to put existing resources to new 
use, by exercising his entrepreneurial talents in a landowning context. Chapter 2 
illustrates that many of his actions and attitudes conformed to the traditional 
preoccupations of the landowning class. The potential loss of the family property was 
the initial spur to exploitation of its iron and coal assets. His industrial ventures were 
based on mineral resources, and were confined to the physical extent of the Winn 
estates. The source of the Winns’ wealth became predominantly industrial rather than 
agricultural, but the estates and their industry remained personally owned and passed 
between generations through strict settlement and primogeniture. Support for a younger 
son in finding a career was a major objective for the family, and capital was raised 
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through the channels conventionally used by landowners. From this perspective, the 
Winns’ activities were typical of the landowning class.  
 From another viewpoint, the Winns’ behaviour with regard to the industrial 
development of their estates was characteristic of a middle-class entrepreneur running a 
family-owned business. As shown in Chapter 2, the Carlton episode provided a solid 
grounding in business practice. Once Rowland took up the challenge of restoring the 
family’s fortunes in the late 1850s, his approach was that of close personal involvement, 
attention to practicalities, and persistence.  Rowland applied to his coal and ironstone 
the detailed, cost-driven approach used by the consultant engineer John Walker in his 
report on Carlton, and he retained a strong grasp on the importance of infrastructure, 
particularly transport. There was nothing detached or dilettante about his analytic 
approach to developing the ironstone, or about the brothers’ relentless travel in pursuit 
of railway bills, iron lessees and coal sales. Learning from Edmund’s experience when 
seeking partners for Carlton, Rowland was willing to engage with middle-class 
businessmen and to establish commercial partnerships with them. The care with which 
he confirmed the viability of the minerals and ensured that transport to market was 
provided in a timely manner are shown in Chapters 2 and 3, while Chapter 5 
investigates Rowland’s careful manoeuvrings to establish the ironstone quarries and 
colliery without incurring a substantial increase in estate debt - a financial strategy that 
reflected the preferences of the typical middle-class personal capitalist. Chapters 3 and 6 
demonstrate that Rowland was not simply a passive investor but was active in 
operational and commercial matters for the railway companies in which he was 
involved. The Lincolnshire ironstone was leased for financial reasons, not from a desire 
to be distanced from industry, and the Winns’ involvement with the nitty-gritty of 
industrial life continued after the enterprises were established. Chapter 8 shows that 
members of the Winn family were key protagonists in founding the ironstone and coal 
businesses, were closely involved in managing them, and remained so into the 
following generation.  
The Winn brothers’ activities in the 1860s and 1870s are hard to reconcile with 
Wiener’s thesis of landowning disdain for industry, or even with Thompson’s 
suggestion of a lordly, arms-length attitude by landowners to industry on their property. 
The Winns’ high level of involvement in their iron and coal ventures represented 
personal industrial capitalism with a landowning flavour. Daunton summarised 
gentlemanly capitalism as ‘a way of getting rich and being a gentleman’, combining a 
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lucrative financial activity with actual or aspiring landowning status.2 The Winns 
arguably embodied an equivalent category of gentlemanly industrialist, landowners who 
used industry to achieve their class’s socio-economic objectives. Daunton does not 
discount the possibility that such a category existed, concluding that landowners 
‘differ[ed] in their ability to benefit from urban and industrial growth’ and that the 
nature of aristocratic landowners’ involvement in industry needs ‘more detailed 
investigation’.3 Thompson supports the concept of the gentlemanly industrialist more 
positively, acknowledging that it is ‘extremely hard’ to conclude that those nineteenth 
century landowners well endowed with industrial opportunities were ‘hostile to 
industry, indifferent to its problems or ignorant of its nature’.4 Under the initial spur of 
their debts and cash-flow problems, Rowland and Edmund Winn certainly were not. 
Even when Rowland had a demanding political career, he retained his involvement in 
industry. 
 Habbakuk remarked that English landowners ‘did not acquire their land in order 
to develop it, but to enjoy it’.5 In the late 1850s the Winns resolved to develop their 
estates in order to continue enjoying them. Rowland and Edmund combined industrial 
activities with more typical landowner pursuits, and at different times one or the other 
activity would predominate. Rowland worked energetically to increase estate income, 
but once financial stability had been restored, he became involved in the traditional 
landowner sphere of national politics. As we see in Chapter 8, this distracted him from 
the industrial enterprises that had made a political career possible. Although Edmund 
expressed a preference for commercial employment, in order to achieve an income 
equivalent to his social status he supplemented his colliery income with a sinecure in 
the Quarter Sessions. Conversely, it is worth recalling that the Winns started their 
industrial ventures in order to improve their financial position and thereby retain their 
elite status. Despite the initial incentive being economic, Rowland and Edmund showed 
signs of the motivation ascribed to middle-class industrialists, that their ‘interest and 
satisfaction in…business’ was based on ‘success in well-contrived and well-conducted 
action’, as much as the pursuit of profit.6 This attitude can be detected when Rowland 
noted the speed with which the iron had been brought to market and described the 
manoeuvrings for the take-over of the West Riding and Grimsby Railway, and in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Daunton, “Gentlemanly Capitalism’ and British Industry’, p. 125. 
3 ibid , pp. 141-142. 
4 Thompson, Gentrification and the Rise of the Enterprise Culture, p. 43. 
5 Quoted in Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, p. 13. 
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Chapter 6 when Edmund ruminated on the most efficient use of the colliery’s wagons. 
They did not merely tolerate industry for its financial rewards but enjoyed the prestige 
and self-fulfilment brought by business success. 
Rowland, Edmund and George Winn divided their time between social worlds. 
They were landowners, Justices of the Peace, officers of the Quarter Sessions, 
Conservative MPs, holders of advowsons and conscientious supporters of organisations 
local to their property. At the same time they managed a colliery and its labour force, 
argued with recalcitrant lessees and coal merchants, negotiated commercial agreements 
and worried about the state of the iron and coal trades. As noted in Chapter 4, they were 
also investors. The family therefore had a presence in land, industry and finance. The 
Winns gave no indication of seeing any contradiction between these sets of activities, 
and they moved between the different worlds with ease.   
Management at Nostell Colliery 
 
In a case study of a medium-sized colliery in the west Yorkshire coalfield, Dintenfass 
argues that management is a crucial factor in defining the success of an enterprise. He 
concludes that the ability to link marketing objectives to technical and commercial 
processes had enabled an enterprise with unexceptional natural resources to outstrip 
better-endowed rivals:  
The unique suitability of the coals for domestic purposes had to be 
recognized; production had to be oriented to the nuances of the 
household-coal market; and the appropriate commercial outlets for the 
coal had to be developed.7 
The skill lay in matching resources to profitable commercial outcomes. A key element 
in the turn-round of the Winns’ financial health was an improvement in the quality and 
technical skill of the management employed on the property, both the estate and the new 
colliery. In Chapter 2 and 3 we saw that Charles Winn had a loose grasp on the estates’ 
affairs, and had run heavily into debt. When Rowland assumed the leadership of the 
estates in the late 1850s, he actively managed the property to a defined purpose and did 
not simply allow it to run in the manner that it always had. The Yorkshire and 
Lincolnshire estates were united for budgetary purposes, no further borrowing was 
permitted and capital was conserved in the interest of generating income. These !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Dintenfass, Managing Industrial Decline, p. 28. Waterloo Colliery, Temple Newsam. 
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strategies came together in the decision to exploit the ironstone first, and to lease it so 
that a reliable and rising income could be generated at minimum risk. Agents and 
professional managers were subject to more direct and critical oversight than Charles 
Winn had exercised. For example, Rowland’s concerns about the conflict of interest 
inherent in John Marsden’s position as land steward, legal advisor and loan broker to 
the estate – but also its competitor in the coal trade – led to his replacement. Alternative 
arrangements were made that avoided the inefficiencies generated by moral hazard. 
Throughout this process, Rowland applied to a landed estate the managerial approach of 
the personal capitalist: closely involved, and distrustful of professional agents and of 
outside influence on his property. 
The management of Nostell Colliery took time to evolve. In its first years, the 
colliery was run largely as an adjunct of the agrarian estate. Over the following twenty 
years its management became more specialised, not only in technical mining skills, but 
also in managing transport, marketing, sales and finance, issues that are discussed in 
detail in Chapters 5-8. Management became organised by function and worked within a 
framework of statutory requirements and professional guidelines. The colliery also 
became established as an entity distinct from the estate, with its own corpus of 
management. However, the Winns displayed more uncertainty in management than they 
did in entrepreneurial matters. Edmund had to serve a lengthy apprenticeship in colliery 
management, and, particularly after he assumed oversight of the ironstone in 1878, was 
distracted by other responsibilities. Roseby was retained too long. The Winns 
eventually recognised the need for increased professionalisation of management and 
adjusted to the changes it required. Rowland’s entrepreneurial ability returned to the 
fore in deciding to invest in deepening the colliery. Finally, by recognising George 
Winn’s managerial and technical abilities, a successful team was placed in charge of the 
colliery.  
From the late 1880s Nostell Colliery represented the apogee of personal 
capitalism: ‘Personal ownership and a style of management governed by a small, but 
clearly defined, governance structure’.8 It was heavily reliant on the competence of the 
family members involved. George Winn had the authority to run the colliery without 
constant reference to the estate owner, which represented the final break with the 
managerial habits of the landed estate and eliminated the indecision of the early 1880s. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Management became a strength of the organisation. George’s full-time involvement, 
independence of action and interest in engineering were an excellent foil for William 
Spencer, who brought in a broad knowledge of the coal industry and strong technical 
and commercial competence. The statutory registered manager was professionally 
qualified and resident at the colliery, whereas up to 1882 Roseby had held the position 
largely through Rowland’s loyalty and in absentia. The desire and expertise were in 
place to introduce modern sources of power and methods of working. The management 
had sufficient understanding of the nature of the coal from the deeper seams, and of the 
requirements of the market, to enable a substantial proportion of sales to be made in the 
high-priced domestic market. Nostell had achieved the synthesis that Dintenfass 
identifies, of good management securing the close alignment of production and 
marketing. This sophisticated grasp on the priorities of the coal trade represented a 
considerable advance from 1868, an improvement that owed much to the Winn family’s 
willingness to adjust to the demands of a dynamic market environment.  
The Winns in the regional economy 
 
The Winns’ contribution to the regional economies of Yorkshire and 
Lincolnshire was extensive. Chapter 2 notes that they supported local organisations in 
the manner typical of most landowners: patronising local shopkeepers and tradesmen, 
and subscribing to multifarious sports clubs, musical groups, charities and similar 
bodies. The Winns invested – unsuccessfully - in the agricultural economy when they 
bought additional land in Lincolnshire and spent £40,000 in trying to improve its 
output. They were also prominent in civil administration. Rowland’s service as MP to 
North Lincolnshire from 1868 was the springboard to Conservative Party prominence at 
the national level as Chief Whip. The Winns’ financial arrangements were mainly local. 
The estates and the colliery and ironstone businesses all banked in nearby towns, and 
initially capital at Nostell was obtained from Yorkshire sources via John Marsden. Later 
they also had a hand in stimulating inter-regional capital flows. The appointment of a 
Preston-based loan broker initiated a transfer of capital into Yorkshire from Lancashire, 
and while the first ironmasters to be established on the Appleby estate were all based in 
Yorkshire, they were followed in the mid-1860s by a Manchester company and in the 
1870s by a Scottish firm.9  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The largest contribution made by the Winns to the economies of the West 
Riding and Lincolnshire was in their industrial activities and support of new 
infrastructure, a theme running throughout the Winns’ story. They were longstanding 
investors in transport projects, from turnpikes and canals to the South Yorkshire 
Railway. Rowland understood the importance of railways and backed well thought-out 
schemes that were eventually approved and constructed. The two companies of which 
he was a director built lines that were – and remain – important links in the railway 
network, and stimulated development in the West Riding coalfield and iron industry, the 
Scunthorpe iron field, and the ports of Grimsby and Immingham. After deepening, 
Nostell Colliery employed over one thousand men in a predominantly agricultural area. 
An undeveloped heathland in Lincolnshire was transformed into an industrial centre. 
Urban development followed both the coal and iron. The Winns built housing at 
Wragby and Crofton in Yorkshire, and at Scunthorpe and Frodingham in Lincolnshire.10 
They paid the stipend of the clergyman and funded the restoration of Wragby church, 
and contributed largely to the cost of two churches, a town hall, and church institute in 
Lincolnshire.11 They were key players in the economies of the eastern portion of the 
West Riding and northern Lincolnshire during the sixty years preceding the First World 
War, and also contributed extensively to aspects of the social, cultural and religious life 
of the regions.  
In the course of enriching themselves, the Winn family left a mark in their home 
counties that in various forms survives to the present day. They displayed a high degree 
of flexibility and willingness to adjust to the realities of a competitive industrial 
environment. At the same time they retained key tenets of the landowner’s cultural 
norms, particularly in relation to the ownership and succession of their property. The 
later Victorian landowning class’s ‘talent for survival’ has rarely been better 
demonstrated than by the Winns’ enthusiastic and successful seizure of the 
opportunities arising from possession of the land. 
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Appendix 1: short biographies and Winn family tree 
 
Belton, Thomas (1806-1886): longstanding estate employee at Nostell. By 1833 was 
employed as a gardener, and from 1850s to 1880s was house steward at Nostell Priory. 
Also sales/commercial manager for Nostell Colliery until early 1880s.  
Dickson, J. B. (d. 1889): Preston, Lancs, lawyer who acted as loan agent for Rowland 
Winn from c1860 until his death. 
Hay, William (d. 1896): Underground manager at Nostell Colliery in the 1870s, 
appointed colliery manager in February 1882. His son William became director and 
general manager of Newton, Chambers Ltd, and his grandson Sir Douglas Hay was the 
first Chief Mining Engineer for the National Coal Board. 
Hewitt, ?: engineer for Nostell Colliery in the 1880s.  
Holt, Henry: mineral agent for Nostell estate c1830-1850s. Also mineral agent for Lord 
Wharncliffe in the mid-1850s. 
Marsden, John (1807-1886): Wakefield solicitor. Estate and loan agent at Nostell from 
c1845 to 1861. Part-owner and managing partner of Woolley Colliery; also Solicitor for 
the West Riding. 
Roseby, John (d. 1882): Geologist and mining engineer trained in the Cleveland iron 
field. Appointed mineral agent to the Appleby estate in January 1860, and had advised 
Rowland Winn on the ironstone for at least the previous six months. Advised on the 
sinking of Nostell Colliery, and appointed colliery viewer in June 1868. Remained in 
these posts until dismissed in 1880, but continued to be the registered colliery manager 
at Nostell until his death. 
Shaw, Johnson: appointed salesman at Nostell Colliery in 1879. Like Belton, Shaw 
was a very longstanding employee of the Winns. He became colliery agent at Nostell 
and was still working in this capacity in 1927.  
Spencer, William (1831-1911): Leicester-based mining engineer who was appointed 
viewer at Nostell Colliery c1882-1883. Continued in this capacity until 1910, the work 
latterly being undertaken by his son. Founder member of the North of England 
Institution of Mining and Mechanical Engineers in the early 1850s, and president of the 
Chesterfield & Midland Counties Institution of Mining Engineers, 1894-95. 
Winn (ex-Williamson), Charles (1795-1874): Younger brother of John Winn and 
owner of Nostell and Appleby estates from 1817. Father of Rowland (I) and Edmund.  
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Winn, Edmund (1830-c1908): Younger son of Charles Winn. General manager of 
Nostell Colliery 1866-1888. Assisted in running the Lincolnshire iron stone business 
from 1878. Treasurer of the West Riding Quarter Sessions, 1868-1889.  
Winn, George (‘Willie’) (1863-1952): Fourth son of Rowland (I). General 
manager/director of Nostell Colliery 1888-1947.  
Winn (ex-Williamson), John (d. 1817): Elder brother of Charles. Inherited the estates 
at Nostell and Appleby on the childless death of Sir Rowland Winn, Bart., in 1805. 
Winn, Rowland (I) (1820-1893): Elder son of Charles Winn and inherited Nostell and 
Appleby estates on his death. Discovered Appleby ironstone 1858-1859. Conservative 
MP for North Lincolnshire 1868-1885. Government whip 1874-1880, and chief whip 
1880-1885. Ennobled as Lord St Oswald 1885.  
Winn, Rowland (II) (1857-1919): Eldest son of Rowland (I). Succeeded in 1893 as 
second Lord St Oswald and owner of the two estates.  
 
Winn family tree 
 
Sir Rowland Winn, 5th Baronet (d. 1785) = Sabine d’Hervart 
 
 
One son (Rowland ); one daughter (Esther) 
 
 




  Two sons (John, Charles); one daughter; adopted by 6th Bart. 
 
 
John (d. 1817) inherited the estates from 6th Bart. 
 
 
Charles (d. 1874) inherited the estates from John. Charles = Priscilla Strickland 
 
 
Two sons (Rowland I, Edmund); four daughters 
 
 
Rowland I (1st Lord St Oswald) = Harriet Demaresque     Edmund = Frances St George 
 
 
Five sons (Rowland II, George + three); three daughters One son; one daughter
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Appendix 2: Glossary of estates and collieries 
 
Appleby estate: The Winns’ Lincolnshire estate on which Rowland I lived before 
inheriting the entire Winn property from Charles. Ironstone was found on this estate in 
1858 and it became the focal point of the North Lincolnshire iron and steel industry. 
c5,500 acres. 
Carlton: Lord Wharncliffe’s property near Barnsley. Edmund Winn put in a bid for the 
coal lease of Carlton estate in 1854-1856. 
Nostell Colliery: The new colliery on the Nostell estate and the focus of this thesis, 
sunk 1864-1866. It opened in 1866 and its shafts initially reached the shallow Shafton 
coal. The colliery was deepened to the Beamshaw (aka Priory or Stanley Main) and 
Winter seams in 1884-1888. Closed in 1987.  
Nostell estate: The Winns’ Yorkshire estate, on which Nostell Priory was located, the 
family’s main home. c2,500 acres. 
Thornton estate: An estate in Lincolnshire estate that the Winns sold in 1847. 
Trent, Ancholme and Grimsby Railway (TA&GR): Railway promoted by Rowland 
Winn to connect the South Yorkshire Railway at Trent to the Manchester, Sheffield and 
Lincoln Railway at Barnetby. It crossed the Appleby estate and iron field, giving access 
for the ironstone to Grimsby and Immingham to the east, and the industrial Midlands 
and north to the west. Opened in 1866. 
West Riding and Grimsby Joint Railway (WR&GJR): Railway promoted by a 
company chaired by Rowland Winn that connected Barnby, on the South Yorkshire 
Railway Doncaster to Goole line, to the existing Great Northern Railway main line at 
Wakefield. It included a south-facing connection to the GNR’s east coast main line at 
Doncaster and a spur to the colliery at Nostell. It gave access from Nostell Colliery to 
the east coast, the Yorkshire/Lancashire industrial region, and eastern and south-eastern 
England. Opened in 1866. 
Wragby Colliery: The successor to other small mines on the Yorkshire estate and 
immediate predecessor to Nostell Colliery. Sunk in the early 1830s to the Nostell seam, 
and closed in 1869. 
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